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I.

THE MYSTICAL AND THE ETHICAL.

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It is one of the commonplaces that Christianity is an ethical religion. Compared with other religions of the highest type it is characterized by its superlatively ethical conception of God. The supreme divine attribute is love. God is Spirit, Personality, Character. It is only when this conception prevails that the Incarnation is at all thinkable. The complementary truth is that of the dignity of man. The one thing in all the universe that has value in the sight of God is character. To make this possible the Creator endowed man with freedom, a truly godlike, creative power. It is because man has this power of initiative and is not in all things blindly and unresistingly impelled by God's will that he can be the object of God's love and can reflect that love in his own nature. Christlike character is the end and aim of all existence, and in its attainment will be found the complete solution of all problems.

Vigorous ethical life is accordingly the bearer of true religion. But religion is more than morals. There is something in Christian experience that is not reducible to ethical

terms. When the specifically religious element is suppressed there ensues a degeneration to rationalism and, finally, materialism; for the spirit that asserts the absolute sufficiency of the will is akin to the spirit that enthrones the reason, and in the end both are overcome by the flesh.

If St. Paul were to preach on Beacon Hill in Boston as he preached at Athens he would perhaps say: "In all things I perceive that ye are very practical." In America the hero is not the philosopher or the poet but "the man that does things." In the religious life too intense practical activity has taken the place occupied by contemplation and prayer in former ages. The *Andachtsbücher* of our great-grandfathers are becoming not only in language but also in sentiment as strange and unfamiliar as the hymns and homilies of Ephraem Syrus. Our Japanese brethren shudder at our cool, calculating conferences on the best methods of doing Christian work and some of them declare that American ministers of the Gospel are neglecting their proper spiritual functions and attending instead to the administration of multitudinous societies and the building of big churches. What we need is not less practicality but more spirituality. It is time for us to learn that to be exclusively and excessively practical is to be profoundly impractical.

The same tendency is revolutionizing dogmatics. The business of the dogmatician is to define a preachable theology, and the times demand practical preaching. So the ethicization of the dogma is the order of the day. The doctrine of the two natures in Christ is being superseded by a theory that reduces the unity and harmony of God and man in his person to terms of moral perfection. The atonement is set forth as a moral process. The doctrines of original sin, justification by faith and the like are dismissed with the summary verdict: "Unethical." The theological world can never again be what it was before this revolution began any more than Europe could restore pre-Napoleonic conditions in the political sphere. In the painful process of house-cleaning through

which we have passed quantities of battered furniture and useless heirlooms,—obsolete metaphysics and scholastic speculations,—have been removed never to be restored.

This demand for the ethicization of the dogma has a certain justification. Every doctrine must be understood and interpreted in its ethical bearings. We have to eliminate as extraneous and nonessential not only those elements in doctrine that are really unethical but also those that have nothing to do with ethical interests, that is, do not vitally affect the development of Christian character. This, however, does not mean that we are to resolve piety into morals. Religion must be thoroughly ethical; but religion is not ethics.

In the usual division of systematic theology (apologetics, dogmatics, ethics) dogmatics will always remain the dominant discipline; for it determines the character of the other two. Dogmatics analyzes and clarifies the essential contents of Christian faith; it sets forth specifically Christian principles. Apologetics deals with the relations of the Christian life to secular thought; ethics with the relations of the Christian life to conduct in the world. It has been customary to give apologetics the first place and ethics the last. There is more reason for arranging the three disciplines in the reverse order,—ethics, dogmatics, apologetics. The practical defense of the faith against its philosophic and scientific foes must wait until one is quite in the clear as to the contents of the faith; and principal apologetics, or the determination of the theory of knowledge and the relation of dogmatics to other sciences, ought to be reduced to the simplest possible terms, for the reason that all introductions should be brief and not delay more than is necessary the progress of the student in *medias res*. So too practical ethics properly follows dogmatics; but principal ethics has a better right to the first place than principal apologetics. Schleiermacher, beginning his dogmatics with "postulates from ethics," indicates the right order of thought. As Christianity is much more an experience than a theory, it is but reasonable that systematic theology should

begin and end in ethics. Such is the plan of the Epistle to the Romans. But the central message of that incomparable document is a dogma, not a canon. The vital theme is what God does for us, not what we ought to do for God.

The so-called "new theology" has allowed the ethicizing tendency to run to extremes. It is hyper-ethical. It relegates to the limbo of "superstitions" such ideas as those of the power of sin in the subconscious reaches of the soul, the absolutely superhuman element in the person of Christ, the reality of the atonement as effecting a change in the relation of God to man, the objective efficacy of the sacraments, and everything that is not reducible to terms of human will and consciousness. Every attempt of the orthodox theologian to maintain the thesis that "the Christian life is something broader and deeper than its manifestations in conscious experience" is met with charges of imparting into dogmatics Greek metaphysics, medieval realism, a dualistic view of the world or a conception of the grace of God as a magical force.

The classical exponent of this type of thought in the modern world is Unitarianism. The name ought rather to be Humanitarianism. For the unity of God is really not the point at issue. That is, in itself, an utterly barren abstraction. Rev. Dr. Edward Everett Hale's recent utterance no doubt expresses the real animus of so-called Unitarianism. "We affirm that the doing of the will of the Master is the vital thing, and that beliefs about the nature of Christ are unimportant in comparison with practical obedience to his precepts." If this is the platform of the Unitarian churches they are, properly speaking, ethical societies and hardly have any right to complain when religious bodies show indisposition to admit them to their conferences. In saying this we are not unmindful of the fact that the Unitarians have been and are still in the van of moral progress and social reform. A tree attacked by a fatal disease does not immediately cease to bear fruit; often it exhausts its last energies in producing an extraordinary yield before it dies.

Dr. Samuel Atkins Eliot declares: "Unitarians find an adequate basis for religious organization in a common purpose to do good and to be good." To see how this principle works out one has but to observe the effect of the missionary effort of the denomination. In Japan the process of degeneration into sheer humanitarianism and intellectualism has been very rapid. The Unitarian movement in that land no longer stands for anything distinctively Christian or even for anything distinctively religious.

One is not even permitted to regard ethical agitation as an unmixed blessing. It may be a concomitant of the decay of concrete morals. Plato (*Republic*, 538) feared the effect of dialectic on immature minds. In his ideal state he would not suffer ordinary men to be exposed to its influence. The "principles of righteousness and beauty" (*δόγματα περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν*) cannot safely be subjected to the indignities of debate, especially in the case of young men. A German writer (Stange, *Die Christliche Ethik*) says: "An age whose attention is devoted mainly to ethical problems is an age of dissolution and decay. The vigorous discussion of ethical questions shows that the foundations of spiritual life have been shaken and this disintegration has involved in uncertainty the basis of concrete morals."

The scope of ethics is limited to what men can do. Religious faith contemplates all that God has done, is doing and will do for men and for their salvation. We have here two mutually interpenetrating factors, each involving the other. But the two are not identical and must be kept distinct in thought.

The specifically religious element in the Christian life is indicated by the term "mystical." Etymologically this word is connected with the Greek "mysteries" and with our word "mute" and suggests that which is secret, inexplicable. The dictionary thus defines "mystical": "remote from or beyond human comprehension; baffling human understanding; unknowable; obscure." In theological usage the term has two

senses. One, the subjective, has reference to the ineffable, incommunicable, quality of religious experience, which may be felt but cannot be clearly understood and described. An exaggerated mysticism is individualistic, unsocial, irrational, unethical.

The little book called *Die Deutsche Theologie*, so much admired by Luther, instructs us that the Adam in us must die that the Christ in us may be quickened. The sin of all sins is the assertion of the creature self, expressed in the words *Ich, Mein, Mir, Mich*. The self must be unselfed that it may be filled with the presence of God. Beautiful as is the spirit of the little book, its fundamental principle is after all a sublimated selfishness. It is not by retiring to the inner recesses of one's own being that the self is unselfed. God is to be found rather in His kingdom, in the service of the cause of righteousness among men. Moreover, God does not desire the extinction of the self with all its desire, ambition and energy. He delights in personal force. As a pilot cannot steer a motionless ship, so the Spirit of God cannot be expected to possess the kind of personality that is the ideal of the Quietists. It is true that the old self must be nailed to the cross; but its death is in order that it may rise with Christ to newness of life. The tendency to antinomianism and immorality that has accompanied the history of mysticism is not a case of accidental coincidence. Ritschl was governed by a sound instinct in his attitude toward this type of Christianity.

It is rather in the objective sense that we would use the term "mystical," as denoting the divine factor in the process of redemption. Dr. Nevin (*The Mystical Presence*, p. 45) says: "We must distinguish carefully between two tendencies; the properly pantheistic mysticism, whose chief representative is Master Eckart, so highly lauded by the modern speculation, and the prevailing theistic. In the view of the first, union with the divine nature is taken to be the product of thought, a point in the development of consciousness; Christ in the end is but the type of humanity, and his history only figure and

allegory; he was the first who came to the sense of his sonship in the relation to God; by him we learn that we also partake of the same nature, and are in like manner sons of God. In the other case the unity of Christ with God is regarded as the result of a free act of self-communication on the part of God, conditioned by the moral character of Christ, who accordingly carries with him more weight as a historical prototype; and so also the union with God which is effected for men through Christ is of a far more decidedly moral nature. The first view resolves it mainly into the exercise of thinking; here it is reached by an essentially ethical or even ascetic process."

The history of Christian theology is in the main a record of one long conflict between the champions of the mystical and the champions of the ethical. Following Kaftan (*Dogmatik*, § 7) we may distinguish the following types:

1. The ancient Church was not deeply interested in the problems of the present life. The advent of the Lord was momentarily expected. The piety of the times was prevalently "otherworldly." Salvation was regarded as the gift of a supernatural life by virtue of which men are to be released from the painful limitations of the phenomenal world. There was no adequate recognition of the slavery of the human will under sin, no proper appreciation of the sacrifice of Christ. It was not the work of Christ so much as His person, not the Atonement so much as the Incarnation that interested the Greek Christians.

The Greek Church of the present day is heir to this conception of the Christian life, which is profoundly unethical. In not a few respects the morality of the people under its influence is not so far advanced as that of the best of the heathen. The ethical is sacrificed to the mystical. No other Christian body could have produced the Hesychasts. Such Christians are exceedingly religious. They make long pilgrimages to the shrines of Jerusalem and struggle for a bit of light from the Holy Sepulcher at the dawn of Easter Day. If their moral

culture corresponded to their religious zeal how different would be the state of the eastern nations of Europe!

2. When Augustine developed his mystical theology he was met by a powerful reaction headed by Pelagius. The protests of the latter made such an impression that the Western or Roman Church has since been "Semi-Pelagian." Rome added the ethical to the mystical in an external artificial way. Roman piety has two foci, the mass and the confessional. Salvation is to be obtained mainly through magical, sacramental transactions, but must also be partly achieved through the exercises of the penitential discipline.

The dualistic character of this form of Christianity appears in Anselm's doctrine of the atonement. His argument turns mainly on the infinite value of the life of our Lord, but stress is also laid on His perfect innocence plus His passive obedience in submitting to an unmerited fate.

The balancing of the two elements, the mystical and the ethical, makes possible the extreme perversion of both. On the one hand we find the theory of *opus operatum* and pitiful superstition in regard to holy things; on the other we see the degeneration of morals to asceticism and casuistry. The original universality of the Christian ideal breaks down and the Church is divided into first-class Christians and those of a lower grade, or priesthood and laity, those who keep the counsels of perfection and those who live the vulgar life.

3. The Reformation abolished these mistaken ideals. The cardinal ethical doctrine of Protestantism is that salvation consists not in escape from the limitations of the everyday world about us, but rather in the spiritualization of the common life of men. The way to love God is not primarily to find a holy place and a sacred hour when you may be for a while exalted above the ordinary level of life; but "whether ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." In a word, holiness is to be realized, not by fleeing from the world, but by overcoming the world.

The characteristics of the three types may be summarized

thus: The Eastern Church's conception of salvation is mystical. The principle of the Western Church is partly mystical and partly ethical. That of Protestantism is the mystical in, with and under the ethical.

The "new theology" is often unjust to the mystical view of the Christian life in assuming that it is necessarily incompatible with the ethical. Professor William Adams Brown (*Christian Theology in Outline*, p. 368) says: "There are only two possibilities, either that of an impartation of new life through subconscious and non-moral means, as in the mystic idea of baptismal regeneration, or of a personal appropriation through repentance and faith, of the moral impulse received through contact with Jesus Christ." Is such a disjunction inevitable? Granted that we must distinguish the subconscious and the moral spheres of our life, is it reasonable to assume that the Author of both cannot touch both concurrently?

All vigorous and persistent types of Christianity are characterized by regard for both of these elements and constant reference to them in the preaching of the Gospel. The measure of perfection is the degree to which the mystical, divine element is embodied in that which is human and ethical. Normally the presence and power of God in the Church is conditioned by its ethical state. The saving grace of Christ has access in fullest measure to the hearts of those who are like Him and with Him agonize for the salvation of the world. It is our part to supply the conditions for the manifestation of the energy of the Spirit of Christ. These conditions are ethical, rational, within our reach. It is indeed the privilege of the Spirit, who works when and where and how He will, to condescend to human weakness. Man's extremity is often God's opportunity. But ordinarily it is required that the conditions be met; and the more mature Christians become the less will they desire that the conditions be disregarded.

The relation between the two elements may be inadequately illustrated by the behavior of electricity. The only thing that

can take power from a live wire is a machine made like the dynamo that produced it, a machine that is itself a small dynamo. In wireless telegraphy messages can be received only by wires that are attuned to those of the sending station. So the recipients of the grace of Christ must be, in a measure at least, ethically attuned to His character of love. The illustrations are inadequate because it is the Spirit Himself that attunes the hearts of believers. Yet it is in our power by developing character and intelligence to reduce the resistance in the medium that conveys to us the currents of the power of God.

In the physical sphere electricity is the greatest of mysteries. What it is no one really knows. But we do know most accurately the conditions under which its power may be utilized. In like manner the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth. This power of God is not to be resolved into ethical processes or any constituent elements that may be rationally apprehended. It is a simple, irreducible fact. It is attested by the best of witnesses in all ages. Never was it more amply attested than it is now on the missionary field.

The conviction that the human factor in the work of the Church is subordinate and relatively insignificant does not excuse the lethargy that now characterizes the attitude of the Church toward the fearful ethical problem of modern civilization. While Christendom in the providence of God is now spreading roots and branches over the whole world the increased resources of this expanding life will all be required to cure the social evil that threatens the heart of the Church. We may even dare to say that in the present period of economic change it becomes theologians to devote their energies mainly to the task for which the temper of the age best fits them,—the study of the application of Christian truth to the new practical social questions that confront us. We should love not dogmatics less but ethics more.

The Epistle of John, which we may well regard as the last

word of the New Testament, is a perfect model of the union of the two elements. "He that keepeth His commandments dwelleth in Him and He in him. And hereby we know that He abideth in us by the Spirit which He hath given us." "Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God." "Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith."

LANCASTER, PA.

II.

POETIC POINTS OF VIEW.

BY THE REV. EDWARD S. BROMER, D.D.

The modern spirit is at last entering upon its creative period. A new sense of possession always brings with it a new consciousness of spontaneity. The search-instinct has by its very nature in it the creative and constructive faculty. Homeric insight and Baconian experiment cannot be far separated. The hypothesis of the imagination and the scalpel of investigation are twin-tools, never ends in themselves but tools for building. The very wealth of experiments and facts in modern science and of experiences and deeds in modern social and religious life, challenge the creative and constructive instinct of the prophet to proclaim the new ideals and of the poet to sing new songs.

The prophet and the poet are now sympathetic friends; though in times past they looked askance at each other. Both are feeling the force of Mr. Stedman's statement in his *Victorian Poets*: "In fact, the new light of truth is no more at war with religious aspiration than with poetic feeling, but in either case with the ancient fables and follies of expression which these sentiments respectively have cherished." Both have been and are being subjected to the tests of universal truth. Are they found wanting? "A spark still disturbs our clod" and the prophet and poet are coming to their own. The message of the new age is positive, constructive and real-idealistic.

The pathway of theology, beginning with the seventeenth century forms and systems, through eighteenth century Deism, Rationalism and political and social revolution, passing into the temporary absorption of nineteenth century reaction, scien-

tific research and skepticism, and out again into the light of a new idealism, so ethical and democratic in its emphasis, is familiar to many of its students who persisted in its course and are rejoicing in a new and enthusiastic faith and hope both for the individual and society. In philosophy, social and political science, art, and in religion the star of idealism again ascends. Aristotle's head, even though his feet are still standing fast on the earth, is crowned with Plato's glory. In the new age realism and idealism are inseparable. At length the logic of evolutionary thought must confess that it begins and ends only in the Absolute which for Herbert Spencer is "unknown," for Matthew Arnold "makes for righteousness," and for Robert Browning is both "The All-powerful and The All-loving too."

There is a vital parallel in the history of theology, political and social science, literature and art. Various gifts but of the same *Zeit-Geist*. Democracy and science are the master ideas of the nineteenth century. At first they seemed iconoclastic in spirit and method but a reactionary period in both Church and State could not dim the vision of the faith that believed in a higher individual and a truer social democracy. The parallel between the Prophet's and Poet's way is closer than any other. Goethe's faith impelled both of them: "Die Geister Welt is nicht verschlossen." However low their murmur in the "dreadful night," it told the truth of life beginning and ending in God; and now with the breaking of a new day it is no longer "an infant crying in the night and with no language but a cry" but the clear message of faith, "God's in his Heavens; All's right with the world." Nor is their message unheard. Dr. Cuthbert Hall in that remarkable article in a recent issue of the *Atlantic Monthly* on "The Ideal Minister," truly says, "Ministers like poets are born not made. They arise, as parts of the essential structure, as modes of the progressive action of human society; and however many there be of spurious and perverted occupants of the profession unblessed of God and rejected of men—where

one arises having the true vocation, the hearts of men answer to his influence, as the viol to the bow."

The purpose of this paper is to study several of the English poets of the nineteenth century, in order to get a glimpse of their struggle toward a sense of reality and a mission in this great century of new light, upheaval, transition, and convictions. The preacher may well turn to the poet as a companion spirit; for our age has taken from him the pulpit tone, the ecclesiastic garb, the refuge of fixed dogmatic statement, even the reverence for tradition and antiquity, and makes him stand face to face with his fellowman to tell the truth of the image of God in his own soul and the race as he knows it as a reality. Never was preacher put to severer test of message and of mission in Jesus Christ. This first-hand method and spirit have ever been the true poet's. His mission and the prophet's are, as Emerson says, "to teach men to live at first-hand with God."

Now just a word about "points of view" as used in the title of this paper. We have in theology these days heard much about the theory of knowledge and its importance to the science. Taking the three ultimates of thought: Subject, object, and the source of each—the soul, the world and God—as centers we get the six following possible points of view of reality. To aid clearness of conception make the subject and the object the foci of an ellipse and regard the whole of the ellipse, the Absolute. Two of the points of view center around the focus, object—the real-sensationalism of Locke and the ideal-sensationalism of Hume. Two others center about the focus, subject—the real-rationalism of Plato and the ideal-rationalism of Kant. Assuming both foci, subject and object, we have in "judgments of value" or heart-judgments, the neo-Kantianism of Ritschl. Going still further, involving feeling, intellect and will, we have the immediate perception theory of Lotze, Greene, Caird, James, Royce, etc. These terms are inadequate, to be sure, but they indicate the paths which the human mind has found to what it calls knowledge

of reality. The third, fifth and sixth yield for believers a knowledge of God.

In poetry it is not difficult to select men who are types of these points of view. For our purpose, however, we shall confine ourselves to four of the English poets of the nineteenth century. The first one lost himself in the object; the second saw reality through the subject; the third, acknowledging both subject and object, could find no resting place between them; the fourth embraced both and found himself and God: Arthur Hugh Clough, John Keats, Matthew Arnold and Robert Browning. Around Keats revolve Rossetti, Hunt and Landor; Clough and Matthew Arnold are kindred with Carlyle, though the prose-prophet had the deeper and more constructive vision; with Browning come Byron, Shelly, Wordsworth and Tennyson.*

Arthur Hugh Clough (1819-1861) had a keen sense of "the object." His whole life, so full of sorrow and disappointment, reflects the ebb-tide of the French Revolution. The hopes of man lifted so high were dashed the harder for their very height to the ground. Beside this the scientific invasion of accepted dogmas both in science and faith had fully begun. Men ceased to look up; their faces were fixed upon the earth. The passion for reality was hot in the human breast. The Baconian spirit and method held men to fact and experiment. Clough drank deeply of this spirit, despite his early training under the elder Arnold at Rugby. In *Dipsychus*, he says,

"But play no tricks upon thy soul, O man;
Let fact be fact, and life the thing it can."

Life, as it is, was his creed. To see things as they are and to keep the subject, soul, within the fact of the object, body, seemed to be his aim; in his own words, to keep—

"The living central inmost I
Within the scales of exterior me."

* The scope of this paper does not permit the detailed treatment given each of these poets. Four papers are condensed into two, with a view of being suggestive rather than exhaustive.

The coward flees from facts as they are. Sorrow, disillusionment, difficulties, disappointments—all must be faced for what they really are.

"Better a crust of bread, than a mountain of paper confections,
Better a daisy in earth, than a dahlia cut and gathered,
Better a cowslip with root, than a prize carnation without it."

In such a mood, the sense of vision almost passed away. An agnosticism, open and ready to believe, it is true, when the sign should be given, possessed him. Alas, to him the sign was never given. His poem "There is no God" was written in this period. In another he laments,

"Ah, hold! the heart is prone to fall away,
Her high and cherished vision to forget;
And if thou takest, how wilt thou repay
So vast, so dread a debt?"

A consciousness of God seemed out of the question.

"It seems His newer will
We should not think at all of Him, but turn,
And of the world that he has given us, make
What best we may."

A most conclusive passage is that one in *Amours de Voyage*, showing the loss of himself in the objective world.

"What with trusting myself, and seeking support from within me,
Almost I could believe I had gained a religious assurance,
Formed in my own poor soul a great moral basis to rest on.
Ah, but indeed I see, I feel it factitious entirely;
I refuse, reject, and put it entirely from me;
I will look straight out, see things, not try to evade them;
Fact shall be fact for me, and Truth the Truth as ever,
Flexible, changeable, vague, and multiform, and doubtful.—
Off, and depart to the void, thou subtle, fanatical tempter."

What makes the tragedy of his life and poetry is the realization that however necessary it is to hold fast to fact, the soul is not satisfied. In a letter on "The Development of English Literature from Chaucer to Wordsworth," he writes these strong, courageous but sad words: "This austere love

of truth; this righteous abhorrence of illusion; this rigorous, uncompromising rejection of the vague, the untestified, and merely probable; this stern conscientious determination without paltering and prevarication to admit, *if* things are bad, that they are so; this resolute upright purpose, as of some transcendental man of business, to go thoroughly into the accounts of the world, and make out once for all how they stand: such a spirit as this, I may say, claim more than ever our attention—claims our reverence.

"We must not lose it—we must hold fast by it, precious to us as Shakespeare's intellectual or Milton's moral sublimities; while our eyes look up with them, our feet must stay themselves firmly here. Such, I believe, is the strong feeling of the English nation; the spirit of Newton and of Locke possesses us at least in as full a measure as that of any of their predecessors." He at another place confesses the necessity of "the impalpable air, the subtle atmosphere of religious emotion" for the health of the soul, but he himself has no vision, no message, he dies broken in nerve and heart. Wordsworth truly characterizes such a spirit and Clough actually applied his words to himself, as one "having the blank misgivings of a creature moving about in worlds not realized." How pathetic are his poems, "Easter Day," "To the Unknown God" and "Consider it Again!" In *Dipsychus*, it is said,

"Yes, it is beautiful ever, let foolish men rail at it never.
Yes, it is beautiful truly, my brothers, I grant it you duly.
Wise are ye others that choose it, and happy ye all that can use it.
Life it is beautiful wholly, and could we eliminate only
This interfering, enslaving, o'ermastering demon of craving,
This wicked tempter inside us to ruin still eager to guide us,
Life were beautiful, action a possible pure satisfaction."

He received a part of his early education under Arnold of Rugby whose deep moral, introspective method had a great effect on him but failed to hold him in his maturer years. He could not join the reactionist of the Oxford movement

under Newman; nor could he follow the liberalism of the "new enlightenment and reason." The one meant for him stagnation and dishonesty; the other, mystic vagueness and self-deception. The suggestions of Shelly, Keats, Wordsworth, etc., may be, indeed, of "the inborn sense, the vision and the faculty divine" but what if they are

" . . . in reason's grave precision,
Nothing more, nothing less,
Than a peculiar conformation,
Constitution, and condition
Of the brain and of the belly?
Is it true, ye gods who cheat us?
And that's the way ye treat us?

Oh say it, all who think it,
Look straight, and never blink it!
If it is so, let it be so,
And we will all agree so;
But the plot has countepplot,
It may be, and yet be not."

To students of theology his *Epi-Strauss-ium* has a grim humor in it, realizing the loss of faith but nevertheless seeming to rejoice in a compensating sincerity and truthfulness.

This leads to one of the dominating elements of his skepticism,—his heroic truthfulness, moral purity. There was nothing sickly nor sentimental about him. He was as one who having done all, stood—stood feeling the darkness, longing for the light but not yet able to see the breaking of the day. But he stood, he worked and kept on working in the night. He had something of the spirit of Carlyle who said: "There is no doubt resolved except in action." In his *Prose Remains* we find this passage: "All things become clear to me by work more than by anything else." On account of his religious scruples he resigned both his tutorship and fellowship at Oxford and courageously took issue with the hard practical world. For this heavy task he was physically but poorly fitted. He suffered hardship and disappointment. He finally died a paralytic at forty-two years of age. His

gospel of work is a theme that Matthew Arnold and Carlyle worked out in greater clearness and definiteness. It was along this line that his best thought so far as it is constructive at all goes. *Qui Laborat, Orat* is the poem that clearly expresses his creed.

"O only source of all our light and life,
Whom as our truth, our strength, we see and feel,
But whom the hours of mortal, moral strife
Alone aright reveal."

Toil, drudgery even, is praised as a way of life. Indeed, it is glimpse of the way through which the Rev. F. W. Robertson later fought. "He that willeth to do his will shall know of the doctrine."

His various moods of heroic skepticism are clearly reflected in the following poems: *Dipschus*, *Amours de Voyage*, *Cold Comfort*, *Πάντα πέι· οὐδὲν μένει*, *Easter Day I. and II.*, *The Bothie of Tober-na-vuolich*, *Two Moods*, *Perche Pensa? Pesandos' invecchia*, *All is Well*, "With Whom there is no Variableness nor Shadow of Turning," *Life is a Struggle*, *Say not the Struggle Nought Availeth*, etc.

For our purpose it would be interesting to analyse these in detail but enough has been said to see how deeply rooted his life was in this world of objective experience. He could sympathize with the negative side of Kant, could easily understand Hume and Locke but could not rest comfortably in any one of them. The value of his point of view lies in the fact that he kept his face turned toward the eastern hills, whence, if the dawn could ever come, it must arise.

"It fortifies my soul to know
That though I perish, Truth is so:
That, howso'er I stray or range,
Whate'er I do, Thou dost not change.
I steadier step when I recall
That if I slip, Thou dost not fall."

He clearly heard the note of realism in his age but he had not, it seems, even surmised the theory of development which

already had found expression in Goethe and others. His cry was much like the Psalmist's, "I had fainted unless I had seen the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living." He bravely worked on till death took him. Of him C. E. Norton says, "The memory of Clough remains. . . . It is that of one of the highest and purest of souls. Sensitive, simple, tender, manly, his figure stands as one of the ideal figures of the past, the image of the true poet, the true friend, the true man."

John Keats (1795-1821) is the very opposite of Hugh Clough. It is a temptation to enter into the pathetic story of his short life of five-and-twenty years but it is a temptation to be overcome in the immediate interests of this paper. His point of view is what we want. It must have been full of suggestion; for it is said he exercised a fecundating influence on Hood, Tennyson, Rosetti, Matthew Arnold, our own Lanier and Lowell. His early death put a halo of glory about him which has made many sympathize with him and spare him in criticism but even this halo would not account for the fact that he is a general favorite among those who delight in poetry.

The list of his poems is not very long. He gave enough to the world, however, to give him a name among the great ones in English literature. One of his critics, and the one most astute and artistic in his judgment, has said: "In one of the two great modes by which poetry interprets, in the faculty of naturalistic interpretation, in what we call natural magic, he ranks with Shakespeare." *Sleep and Poetry*, *Endymion*, *Hyperion*, *Lamia*, *Isabelle* and *The Eve of St. Agnes* are the longer of his poems, varying much in merit, but revealing his characteristics clearly. In his odes and sonnets he is often at his best, however, and readers of poetry will always read *Ode to a Nightingale*, *Ode on a Grecian Urn* and *To Autumn* as among the finest odes in the language.

If Clough saw life through the "object," Keats saw it through the "subject," using the somewhat technical terms

given above in speaking of points of view. The former stood barefooted and hungry in the storm and stress of his period; the latter lived and wrote as though they were not. The former personified the second part, the latter the first part, of Goethe's saying—"Ein Talent bildet sich in der Stille, ein Charakter im Strom der Welt."

Keats represents the extreme of the reaction against the mechanical spirit of the eighteenth century. His aloofness from his times is the dominant characteristic of his spirit and method of work. He was a romanticist of the romanticists. Neither Wordsworth nor Coleridge, Byron nor even Shelley could so live outside of the stress of their day as did Keats. His short life covers the rise and fall of the French Revolution. The star of hope that rose so suddenly and gloriously sank as quickly into an awful sea of blood. Instead of liberty, equality and fraternity there rose the august directorate of the First Consul only to be followed by the restoration of the Monarchy. The English poets, Southey, Coleridge and even Wordsworth soon retracted their early praise and were carried backward on the reactionary tide. Shelley refused to recant and continued to sing the hope of a triumphant democracy; Byron, wayward and rebellious, carried "the pageant of his bleeding heart through Europe," but was nevertheless a poet of humanity; Keats held fast his vision of Beauty as Truth and both as Joy. This he did as one apart from his day. Quoting from one of his letters, in which he praised the objectivity of Shakespeare's work, we get something of the view that impelled him. "*Negative capability*, I mean, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason." In other words, he believed in the maintenance of his independence; his intuitive sense of beauty and of truth, which no upheaval of human life, however disastrous, dare vitiate; he would under all odds keep unfurled above the stress of storm and din of battle

"Love's standard on the battlements of song."

His choice of material and themes is part and parcel of this aloofness of the times. He turned to the Classic period, when "poesy was easy" because the imagination had freedom. By temperament he was one with the pagan spirit. Of the Hebrew sense of righteousness he had little; of the Hellenic warmth of life, sense of beauty and of joy he had much. His was preëminently an æsthetic and artistic nature, little troubled with life's high ethical hopes and ideals. His Platonism is manifest on every page. Beauty is truth and both are joy. This they are and always are, archetypal, eternal.

This accounts for the lack of the ethical in all his work. For him the poet was not a teacher nor a prophet nor a philosopher. How contrary to the modern spirit all this is! Shelley, Wordsworth, Tennyson and Browning, above all things, would make poetry the high message of the soul, impelling to the best in life.

Nature, too, appealed to him in the same manner. He infused into her none of the ethical and spiritual strivings of the human spirit. Her mirror was to be looked into for what she really was in all the objectivity of her beauty and strength. No reasoned philosophy about her source of ways ever troubled him. To see things as they are was his passion, but his seeing eye and keen imagination pierced beyond the symbol to the beauty of the symbol and beheld it as truth.

How strange and contradictory it all seems that a poet whose strength lies in his intuitive insight and comprehension should be so objective in his treatment in spirit, material and method. In one of his letters, from which we quoted above, writing about Shakespeare's *negative capability*, he adds: "This pursued through volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, that with a great poet the sense of beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration." This is the real cue to his point of view.

Before this cue is taken and analyzed, note what some of the leading critics have to say.

"Since Spenser, Keats is the most poetical of poets, because

his thought was poetry—because he saw with the imagination; and what he saw flashed into images, figures, metaphors—the fresh and glowing speech of poetry.”—Hamilton Wright Mabie.

“The truth is that ‘the yearning passion for the beautiful,’ which was with Keats, as he himself says, the master-passion—is not a passion of the sensuous or sentimental man, is not a passion of the sensuous or sentimental poet. It is an intellectual and spiritual passion. . . . For to see things in their beauty is to see things in their truth and Keats knew it.”—Matthew Arnold.

“His one recognized road to reality was the primrose path of the imagination.”—Wm. Henry Hudson.

“Beauty with him—as with the Greeks above all the world—is the first word and the last of Art; the one quality without which it is not. In this respect, again, Keats is a true son of Hellas.”—Francis T. Palgrave.

Several of his own statements lead us straight to our conclusion. The one quoted above he strongly reinforces in another place. “If I should die I have left no immortal work behind me—nothing to make my friends proud of my memory; but I have *loved the principle of beauty in all things*, and if I had had time I would have made myself remembered.” In writing to a friend, complaining somewhat of the harsh criticism that Endymion received at its first appearance, he says: “When I wrote it was a regular stepping stone of the imagination toward the truth. What the imagination seizes as beauty must be truth, whether it existed beforehand or not. The imagination may be compared to Adam’s dream, he awoke and found it true.” He never wrote except he was possessed with a vision of the beautiful. The pressure from within drove him to expression. “Nature herself appears to speak for him: the words come by inner law; they do not as such, strike one either as prose or as poetry: they seem as if they could not have been otherwise.” Corroborating this statement of Palgrave, Keats himself tells of the sense of spontaneity

which he felt in writing *Endymion* with all its faults. "I have written independently without judgment. I may write independently and with judgment hereafter. The Genius of Poetry must work out its own salvation in a man. It cannot be matured by law and precept but by sensation and watchfulness in itself. . . . If poetry comes not naturally as the leaves of the tree, it had better not come at all."

Considering the objectivity of his treatment we should expect but little in his poems illustrating his point of view. It is even so. Enough, however, and amply enough, is found to show the purpose of this paper clearly.

Concerning his estimate of the imagination we get an intimation in *Sleep and Poetry*, in which he laments,

" . . . Is there so small a range
In the present strength of manhood, that the high
Imagination cannot freely fly
As she was wont of old?"

It is the freedom of the classic days for which he longs, when

" Easy was the task:
A thousand handicraftsmen wore the mask
Of poesy."

An ardent hope fills his breast that the imagination soon again may be free, breaking the hard fetters of the age.

" All hail delightful hopes!
As she was wont, th' imagination
Into most lovely labyrinths will be gone,
And they shall be accounted poet kings
Who simply tell the most heart-easing things.
O may these joys be ripe before I die."

Cold logic, scientific analysis, philosophic wanderings, are fatal both to poetry and peace.

" Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven:
We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an angel's wings,
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine—

Unweave a rainbow, as it erewhile made
The tender person'd Lamia melt into a shade."

Mere utilitarian aims and ends rob everything of beauty.

"O sweet Fancy! Let her loose;
Everything is spoiled by use."

"The principle of beauty in all things" is his self-avowed passion. We can easily see how he failed to reach the fulness of vision in the fact of the avoidance of the ethical note in life. Rare, indeed, are the places in the entire range of his works when he touches upon the austere in nature or the moral in life and when he does he recalls himself with rebukes in most characteristic fashion.

"'T was a quiet eve,
The rocks were silent, the wide sea did weave
An untumultuous fringe of silver foam
Along the flat brown sand; I was at home
And should have been most happy;—*but I saw*
Too far into the sea, where every maw
The greater or the less feeds ever more.—
But I saw too distinct into the core
Of an eternal fierce destruction,
And so from happiness I was far gone.
Still am I sick of it, and tho' to-day
I've gathered young spring leaves and flowers gay
Of periwinkle and wild strawberry,
Still do I that most fierce destruction see,—
The shark at savage prey—the hawk at pounce—
The gentle robin like a pard or ounce,
Ravening a worm."—

It lasts but a moment. His soul recoils upon itself in strong revulsion.

"Away ye horrid moods!
Moods of one's mind. Ye know I hate them well."

In Sleep and Poetry he in a similar way but not as clearly expresses himself. After characterizing the hard spirit of the age he continues,

"How much toil!
How many days! What desperate turmoil!
Ere I could have explored its wilderness.

Ah, what a task! upon my bended knees,
I could unsay those—no, impossible!
Impossible.

For sweet relief I'll dwell
On humbler thoughts, and let this strange assay
Begun in gentleness die so away."

His "horrid moods" are those characterized by some of the typical expressions of the period, such as, "introspective analysis," "the disease of thought," "inquisitorial metaphysics," "riddle of life," "the *maladie du siecle*." His artistic sense avoided these with a sort of nausea but he in so doing also avoided the real problem of the soul which they reflected. Who knows but that had Keats lived fifty years instead of twenty-five his songs would have had their minor keys. His Platonic vision of beauty would not only have proclaimed the truth but also its righteousness and goodness. Alongside of his characteristic expression, "The principle of beauty in all things," we feel the necessity of placing that of F. W. Robertson who struggled through the same gloom, namely, "The soul of goodness in things evil." The reactionist poets to his mind were sick with the *maladie du siecle*,

"forgetting the great end
Of poesy, that it should be a friend
To soothe the cares and lift the thoughts of man,"
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and

"Simply tell the most heart-easing things."

On this ground many of the liberal writers roundly abused Keats as being sentimental and lacking in real virility. His avoidance of the ethical must be studied, however, from another standpoint.

His was not a sickly sentimentality. Now and then we catch the note of pagan melancholy but this too has its root in his point of view. The principle of beauty is vital in life and in its relation to truth, but it is not all. The melancholy is that of the classical period at its best in the sense of

"Beauty that must die;
And Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips
Bidding adieu."

Would that he had lived longer to cure his melancholia. His Platonic vision would have been completed; for he truly was on the way of most rapid development. Let us follow him as far as he went and then complete his vision in the larger light of Emerson.

The archetypal idea of beauty was for him the great reality. "What the imagination seizes as beauty must be truth," he said in a letter; in the Ode on a Grecian Urn he says it in poetic form.

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know."

Not only is beauty truth but also joy.

"A thing of beauty is a joy forever."

Beauty, truth, joy—surely these lead to the heart of things; but he was wrong in saying, "that is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know." Keats himself was not fully satisfied. His pagan melancholy, even as in the Greek classic period the same sadness crowned philosophy, at times filled him to overflowing. Beauty alone in mortal life must of necessity be evanescent. It is associated too much with form. As truth it reaches deeper into life. As joy it reaches the mountain heights. But how much more is wanting to the earnest soul! With the true and the beautiful must be the right and the good. Emerson in his remarkable address to the senior class of the Cambridge Divinity School closes with the following full-orbed vision: "I look for the new Teacher that shall follow so far these shining laws that he shall see them come full circle; shall see their rounding complete grace; shall see the world to be the mirror of the soul; shall see the identity of the law of gravitation with purity of heart; and shall show that the Ought, that Duty, is one thing with Science, with Beauty, and with Joy." Browning, coming by another path, reached the same crowning view:

"There where law, life, joy, impulse are one thing."

And was it not Milton who believed in that higher life,

"Where love is an unerring light
And joy its own security."

John Keats, though his allotted days were so few, lived long enough to start the springs of poetry anew in spontaneity and new vision. He emphasized the necessity of the "seeing eye," the contribution of the "subject" to the sense of reality of knowledge. Hugh Clough held fast with all the purity of his moral life to the necessity of the "object," i. e., that all knowledge is rooted in perception. To-day we feel both the strength and weakness of both these poets, the extremes of realism and idealism. As poets their value for the student of theology lies in the fact that the point of view of neither was satisfactory, even to themselves. Life is from below upward, but more from above down, using a simple phraseology. Raphael, in his painting, *The School of Athens*, makes Plato stand with raised hand, the index finger pointing to the sky, and uplifted face all radiant with a light from above. Aristotle looks down upon the earth, holding in his hand a copy of his *Ethics* and *Politics*. They both live to-day. Professor Ladd, in his *Introduction to Philosophy*, says: "The tendency of modern thought toward a form of speculative thinking that (if the compound may be pardoned) a 'real-idealism' or an 'ideal-realism,' is unmistakable." How well Goethe has given us a sense of the same movement in the verse,

"Seek within yourself,
And you will find everything;
And rejoice that, without, there
Lies a nature that says, Yea and Amen,
To all you have discovered in yourself."

Toward this goal our nineteenth century poets worked as truly as did the philosophers and theologians. Matthew Arnold, the subject of our next study, marks the transition; Robert Browning the full entrance into this new-world glory.

GREENSBURG, PA.

III.

ERNST HAECKEL AND FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.

FIRST PART.

BY PROF. R. C. SCHIEDT, PH.D.

An odd combination of names, of tendencies, of systems of thought—and yet only apparently so. For they both have a common aim; they both earnestly desire to improve humanity, to fill the heart of man with finer and nobler ideals than either the Christian church or Christian philosophy have ever dreamt of. Haeckel, the preëminent scientist, and Nietzsche, the brilliant literary artist and metaphysician, belong to that galaxy of great minds who have given the second half of the past century a characteristic impress and who demand a hearing at the forum of a magazine which claims to interpret the thought of the age. Haeckel, a Brandenburgian from Potsdam, born in the middle of the fourth decade of the nineteenth century is the very embodiment of the precise, matter-of-fact Prussian spirit which so rapidly became the dominant force of central Europe; Nietzsche, a Thuringian from Naumburg, born ten years later is also Prussian in his ultimate standards of judgment, but his poetic trend for form and expression betrays the romantic flavor of his native heath. The former, a physician by choice, became the most lucid and withal the most radical exponent of Darwinian evolution, occupying at the early age of twenty-eight the professorship of zoology at the university of Jena; the latter, a student of classic philology in the university of Leipzig, was called to the chair of his chosen science at the University of Basel at the age of twenty-four without ever having passed an examination, an unparalleled acknowledgment of his genius.

Both men came from a long line of intellectual aristocracy. Both sought for their specific sciences philosophical values, the one was led from his scientific exposition of the unity of nature to his doctrine of Monism, the other from his studies of Socratic limitations to the doctrine of the Super-man. Both are fine types of irreproachable character, of purity of mind and heart, and have therefore a large host of disciples who reasoning from their character to their doctrines accept their judgment as ultimate truth. It is largely on this account that it behooves us to test their reasoning. Haeckel's chief writings which concern us here particularly are "*Der Monismus als Band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft. Glaubensbekenntniss eines Naturforschers, vorgetragen am 9. Oktober, 1892, in Altenburg beim 75 jährigen Jubiläum der Naturforschenden Gesellschaft des Osterlandes,*" and "*Die Welträthsel,*"* published in 1899, largely a reiteration and continuation of the former and based upon his previous scientific writings.

I.

Professor Haeckel claims at the outset, that "by reason only can we attain to a correct knowledge of the world and a solution of its great problems." Emotion and revelation have nothing whatever to do with the attainment of truth, experience and thought or speculation are the only two paths which lead to this goal. Neither pure speculation, as employed by Plato and Hegel, nor mere experience, such as Bacon and Mill, for example, made the basis for their realist systems, will suffice for the attainment of true knowledge, only by combining the activity of the two, the one elaborated by the sense organs and the inner sense centers, the other by the thought centers, the great center of association in the cortex

* "Confession of Faith of a Man of Science: Monism as a Connecting Link between Religion and Science," 1892, 8th edition, 1899. "The Riddle of the Universe at the Close of the Nineteenth Century," Harper Brothers, Publishers, 1901.

of the brain will we learn to comprehend the real world. "Both channels of knowledge are mutually indispensable" and have entered in monism into mutual covenant. While dualism separates the world into the material world and an immaterial God, its creator, sustainer and ruler, monism recognizes one sole substance in the universe which is at once "God and nature," not in the sense, however, of materialism which denies the existence of spirit nor in the sense of spiritualism which rejects the notion of matter, but in the sense in which, according to Haeckel, Spinoza defines it: "Matter, or infinitely extended substance, and spirit (or energy), or sensitive and thinking substance, are the two fundamental attributes or principal properties of the all-embracing divine essence of the world, the universal substance." His monistic philosophy consequently recognizes only one simple and comprehensive enigma (or riddle)—the "problem of substance." He contends that the seven world enigmas, recognized and discussed by Professor Emil du Bois-Raymond in his famous oration before the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 1880 and accepted by thinkers generally, are no longer enigmas, viz., (1) the nature of matter and force, (2) the origin of motion, (3) the origin of life, (4) the (apparently preordained) orderly arrangement of nature, (5) the origin of simple sensation, (6) rational thought and the origin of the cognate faculty of speech, (7) the question of the freedom of the will. The first, second and fifth which the Berlin professor considered entirely transcendental and insoluble Haeckel claims to have settled by his conception of substance; the third, fourth and sixth, considered by du Bois-Raymond capable of solution but extremely difficult, Haeckel thinks decisively answered by the modern theory of evolution, while he considers the seventh, the freedom of the will not an object for critical inquiry at all, but "a pure dogma based on an illusion and without real existence." In the light of this brilliant array of dictatorial statements, which have all the flavor of dogmatic infallibility, we modestly ask: Has Haeckel's mon-

ism really solved this problem of substance, do we now actually know the nature of matter and force, the origin of motion and of simple sensation? With him it presents all the issues of life and death, of character and attainment; it is the great balm which brings consolation to the sorrowful and condemnation to iniquity. Does he convince us? In the "Conclusion" to his last work he makes this concession: "We grant at once that the innermost character of nature is just as little understood by us as it was by Anaximander and Empedocles twenty-four hundred years ago, by Spinoza and Newton two hundred years ago, and by Kant and Goethe one hundred years ago. We must even grant, that this essence of substance becomes more mysterious and enigmatic the deeper we penetrate into the knowledge of its attributes, matter and energy, and the more thoroughly we study its countless phenomenal forms and their evolution. We do not know the 'thing in itself' that lies behind these knowable phenomena." But while he acknowledges the impossibility of solving the *problem of substance*, he rejoices in the firm establishment of the *law of substance*, the fundamental law of the constancy of matter and force, on which rests his monism of the cosmos, which proves to him that there is no personal God, no immortal soul, no free will.

It seems to me that he dogmatizes from negative premises. He rejects certain answers in terms of which men have sought to solve the problem and leads us to infer that for man there is no answer urging the reader to give up searching for one. It is just here where the fundamental error of Professor Haeckel's whole argument lies. He assumes that the problem of the universe as a whole is a scientific problem and scornfully rejects the introduction of metaphysical methods. Science deals with facts and asks the question, what is their nature and order of their sequence, under what generalizations may the facts and their observed sequence be comprised. But the inquiry into the source and origin of the facts, the question why there is any experience at all and why the sequence of events presented therein is what it is, does not concern science

as such but is a metaphysical question. It is precisely this which constitutes the riddle of the universe. Professor Haeckel, however, uses the same monistic key to unlock in his latest book the mysteries of anthropology, psychology, cosmology and theology, but since the key does not fit all these locks the locks are lustily broken. Man's relation to the rest of the organic world, the soul's relation to the body, and the relation of all these to the cosmic substance are explained empirically or inductively and upon a brilliant array of empirical demonstrations his monism which constitutes the bond between religion and science is deductively established. The law of substance manifests itself in the cosmic world as the law of the conservation of energy and matter, in the organic world as the law of the evolution of matter, more specifically in the so-called psychic world as the law of evolution of energy, in the moral world as the law of the supreme rule of energy over matter. Psychology is the foundation of all sciences but it in turn presupposes a knowledge of the brain. Soul is a phenomenon of nature; psychology, therefore, is a part of physiology which legitimately employs observation, experiment and deductive speculation. A dualistic psychology, on the other hand, which assumes energy without matter is the product of pure imagination, because the law of substance can be applied to it just as little as to the doctrine of the freedom of the will. Soul is the sum of vital phenomena, bound like all other vital phenomena to a material substratum, a psychoplasm which in turn produces neuroplasm. There still reigns great confusion in the minds of men on this subject, but the law of substance justifies the monistic view. The introspective method must here be employed because it is the only one applicable to the realm of consciousness and occupies over against the scientific investigation of the senses and of language (the exact psychophysics) a peculiar position. Wundt, Virchow and Du Bois Raymond have turned summersaults in their later years when they declared psychology to be a purely mental science and in no causal connection what-

soever with the natural sciences. There is only a difference in degree between man and the animal but no psychological barrier exists. The soul bound to matter is only an expression for the collective psychic functions of plasma. They are dependent upon certain chemico-physical properties and subject to metabolic changes. All living organisms are sensitive and answer to stimuli. This reflex arc consists in the beginning of one, two and three celled reflex organs. With the third cell, the soul or ganglion cell, a new function, unconscious presentation (*Vorstellung*), arises. Later on a fourth cell, the cell of sensation and will, appears. But as long as there are only reflexes, consciousness is still wanting. Conscious presentation is secondary. Presentation is the internal image of an external object transmitted through sensation. Unconscious memory is a very important function of the *plastidule*—in contradistinction from reproductive memory it is the most important difference between the organic and the inorganic. Animals also have reason and language. In the emotions the direct connection between brain function and other physiological functions is manifested. Attraction and repulsion are the source of the will which first appears in the three-celled reflex organ. The freedom of the will is disproved to-day.

The development of the soul is of great importance for monism. All processes of psychic origin belong to the sphere of cellular physiology. Every living being has a beginning of individual existence; with the origin of the new cell the new soul arises, and with it vanishes again; soul is, therefore, a physiological function of the organism to be traced back to chemical and physical processes, the mechanics of the plasma. Particularly important is the continuity of the psyche in the generative series. The great enigma of the nature and origin of the soul must be solved, if anywhere, within the process of historic evolution of the human soul from the animal soul. The methods of investigation are here those of anatomy and physiology. Among all Protists the psychic processes are still unconscious; sensation and

motion are identical with the molecular vital processes of the plasma as such. Every living cell has psychic properties. At first all cells are alike, later a select group of them become soul cells, and among these in the higher multicellular animals there hardly seems to be any difference. However, on this most important question opinions differ; some grant them consciousness, the presentation of an individual ego, spontaneous, arbitrary, intentional responses to stimuli, others only automatic and reflexive movements. The psychological facts of the blastoderm are locomotion and sensation. Anatomy and physiology have accumulated a sufficient mass of knowledge to transform our whole speculative philosophy, if that philosophy would take notice of it. Phyletic psychogeny must lead to a rational psychology. The anthropoids are closer to man in structure and function than to the lower apes.

Consciousness is the most wonderful manifestation of soul, the central mystery of psychology, the citadel of dualistic errors, but also a natural phenomenon and subject, like all others, to the law of substance. The content of consciousness is internal perception, compared with the action of a mirror. According to Wundt and Ziehen all psychic action is conscious, with Haeckel there are also unconscious presentations, sensations and volitions, more numerous than the conscious but separated from them by no sharp line of demarcation. The only source of our knowledge of consciousness is that faculty itself, therefore the difficulty of subjecting it to scientific research, subject and object are one and the same in it. Consciousness is the property of every cell but Haeckel agrees with Verworn in his belief that none of the protists have a developed self-consciousness, their sensations and movements are of an unconscious character.

The transcendental dualistic theory has gained its high position of honor again through Du Bois Raymond's "Ignorabimus" speech. But consciousness is to be reduced to the phenomena of physics and chemistry and is a neurological problem; it is only a part of the higher psychic activity with

its seat in the cortex of the cerebrum, dependent upon chemical substances, changeable, increasing and decreasing, in short a physiological function. Death ends the brain functions whose sum is the soul. On the other hand cosmic immortality is only applicable to the law of substance. The Christian articles of faith are thoroughly materialistic; compared with them Plato's metaphysical belief in immortality is much purer. The monistic conception of substance is inseparable association of energy and matter, in living protoplasm it is a union of psychic energy and psychic matter, *i. e.*, it furnishes psychic organs for the actual soul, the sum total of their physiological functions.

However, the dualistic philosophers say that the soul is invisible, entirely different from the body and immortality a postulate of practical reason. Haeckel replies that he seeks truth only through the conclusions of *pure* reason. All the objections of dualism are answered by the physiological, experimental, pathological, ontogenetic proof; that soul is a collective name for brain functions and subject to the law of substance. The hope of meeting one's friends and loved ones after death is an out and out materialistic thought.

The establishment of the law of substance is the greatest intellectual achievement of the nineteenth century. Energy and matter are essentially inseparable. Only the vitalistic biologists and dualistic philosophers are strenuously opposed to this claim, insisting upon the existence of free spiritual forces not subject to the law of energy, freedom of the will and specific vitality. The axiom of the constancy of the universe follows necessarily from the principle of causality. Spinoza's substance is one of the most sublime, most true and most profound thoughts. But there is no immaterial substance, no energy which is not bound to matter. Even the energy forms of the soul are based upon material processes. Empirical is only chemism or chemical affinity, the constant proportion between atoms of different elements and speculation lies outside of our sphere.

Ether motion alternating with mass motion is the last cause of all phenomena. Nature is a reciprocal play between apparent rest and motion, a transformation process of potential into kinetic energy, leaving the sum total involved in it unchanged; the same is true of the organic realm. God, freedom and immortality have been dethroned, everywhere mechanical causes lie back of the phenomena and the law of substance touches the universal law of causality.

The greatest, vastest and most difficult of all cosmic problems is that of the origin and development of the world, its key is evolution. A partial solution of the problem throws light upon the whole. Motion is just as immanent in substance as sensation and needs no external stimulus. To deny the reality of space and time would not be different from denying that of my own consciousness, but the former has now been definitely proved. The problem of biogeny has been solved by the theory of transformism, many of the phenomena of the organic world are now interpreted on physical principles. Darwin is the Kopernicus of the organic world.

The unity of the natural forces proves the monism of the cosmos. Reinke assumes the existence of intelligent dominants or regulative forces for the organic world. Teleology is dualistic, the mechanical conception of the world monistic and this alone furnishes a true explanation. But the idea of design has a very great significance and application in the organic world. We do undeniably perceive a purpose in the structure and in the life of an organism. Hence the assumption of a creator, later on an unconscious vital force was substituted but annihilated by Johannes Müller. But intellectual life and reproduction remained a mystery until Darwin pointed out that the struggle for life is the unconscious regulator which controls the reciprocal action of heredity and adaptation in the gradual transformation of species; this struggle is the selective divinity. Thus the principle of teleological mechanics is gradually displacing the dualistic idea of design; instead of functional self-production of pur-

positive structure we have struggle for existence. The history of nations does not demonstrate the existence of a moral world order or a wise Providence, and in the so-called chance event we recognize the activity of the law of substance. With it we can harmonize the teaching of pantheism, and amphitheism (the assumption of God and the devil) is perhaps the most rational system since it explains the struggle, even the sun worship would be fortified. But Plato's mystic dualism displaced the true monistic pantheism.

We know that the phenomena of the outer world are not imaginary but real. Two physiological functions are the sources of our knowledge: (1) Sense impressions coming from the sense organs, (2) presentations coming from the organs of thought. Man's sense activity is the starting point of all knowledge. In theory faith is indispensable; imagination must fill in the gaps of knowledge, hypothesis is scientific faith in contradistinction from dogmatic faith. Revelation is only found in nature itself and nature abhors superstition. Strauss and Ed. v. Hartmann have demonstrated that Christianity and science are irreconcilable. Monism is the bond between religion and science to satisfy ethical needs, in this respect the monistic religion is identical with Christianity. Moral life only forms a part of the cosmic unit; there are not two different worlds, a physico-material and a morally immaterial. Kant's greatest error was his dualism. The dome of his structure of faith was his categorical imperative. Modern science has triumphed over Kant; it has therefore become a constructive force in the form of ethical monism. Man as a social vertebrate has a twofold duty, towards himself and towards his neighbor. This is the simplest and most natural fundamental law of society, the golden rule, which is polyphyletic in origin. Altruism preserves the species. The social duties towards one's neighbor have developed from the social instincts of the animals. The abstract law of mechanistic causality—only a concrete expression for the cosmological law of substance—rules the universe to-day. There are star

germs containing perhaps the original substance prothyl, which have not yet been separated into ether and masses.

But one problem or riddle remains and that is the problem of substance. But the "thing in itself," the absolute essence of nature does not concern us here, let us rejoice that we have the law of substance, which is also the law of universal evolution, and the monistic religion of the true, the good and the beautiful. The reconciliation of the antithesis of dualism and monism and with it the solution of the fundamental riddle of the universe will gradually be brought nearer to us with the ever increasing growth of our knowledge of nature—until pure monism will rule supreme.

Such is, in brief outline, the contents of Professor Haeckel's monistic philosophy as laid down in his "Confession of Faith" and "Riddle of the Universe." The careful reader will at once recognize that he has grossly violated the first and most important demands of all philosophico-scientific investigation, viz., to respect the limits. The riddle of the universe and the riddle of science are not on the same plane of interpretation—we grant that organic and cosmic evolution will win the secrets of phenomenal sequence along the whole line, not only so far as it can at the present time be proved, but even further, reaching out beyond established facts in an attitude of belief. We grant that all material changes and all mental changes fall under certain broad and comprehensive laws as far as their nature and uniformity is concerned. But are we any nearer the solution of the "Riddle of the Universe"? Not a particle. Science has modified the form in which the riddle is cast but the essential heart of the problem remains absolutely unchanged, because it is at bottom a metaphysical problem. In the nature of the case monism can never be anything else but a definition of *idem per idem*. To define scientific reasoning it must be done by introducing a different factor which lies outside of its sphere, mere words will not cover the deficiency of a definition as, *e. g.*, in the sentence "the key to the problem of world evolution is evolution" or "the problem of

substance remains, let us rejoice over the law of substance." Experience and causality are hopelessly mixed up. If there is a key interpreting the orderly sequence of phenomena with which experience deals, this key must tell us of something which is their source. The whole evolutionary process is the manifestation of this source or cause. Experience will disclose to us the nature of the manifestation and this disclosure shows nature to be a connected, orderly system, stamping upon the whole the character of unity. Such a cause or source must have attributes of ordering, determining and unifying, but this cause must be conceived as immanent and not external. It is the metaphysical reality underlying the realities of experience, the former independent of time and space, the latter occurring only within these categories. Experience and causality can avowedly not be the same, the key to evolution cannot be evolution. Professor Haeckel practically admits that, when he makes his supreme world law the "axiom of the constancy of the universe" dependent upon "the principle of causality," the energizing influence within the phenomena, whether they are the phenomena of physico-chemical changes, or of life, of consciousness or of human thought. His monism is, therefore, in reality a mixture of dualism and pluralism. He is decidedly dualistic in his combination of matter and force, of matter and world ether, of physical and chemical, in his acknowledgment of the male sperm cell and the female germ cell in the process of reproduction; in his attack on the moral order of the world and the establishment of his own system of morals, and in his method of basing this system first on anthropology and then on zoology, especially embryology; further in his distinction of egoism and altruism, and his emphasis on the merciless struggle for existence in the whole organic world on the one hand, and the existence of brotherly love among men and the social animals on the other. His monism is in reality pluralism in the assumption of the three ideas of the true, the good and the beautiful, and the endless multiplicity of atoms. The insoluble difficulties, which enter

into every atomistic doctrine, are (1) the impossibility of proving the existence of atoms to our experience, and (2) either the atoms have no dimensions and are thus indivisible and can not explain matter which has extension, or they have dimensions and therefore, ideally at least, divisible, and only an *ipse dixit* can deny their divisibility. Professor Haeckel follows the second view.

The same contradictory statements are contained in the whole treatment of the idea of God, which at bottom does not exist for the monist. Once God is the supreme world law, but also the world ether, then the sum of the natural forces, and again the sum of ether vibrations and atomic energies, finally the sum of the ideas of the true, the good and the beautiful. Similar confused declarations occur in regard to the human soul. It is (1) the sum of our feeling, willing and thinking, (2) the sum of physiological functions whose elementary organs are the microscopic ganglion cells of our brain, (3) a part of the all-embracing world soul. Most curious of all, when compared with the second definition is the affirmation that the soul develops in reciprocal activity with its organ, the brain; would this not grant it independent existence! I think we all can affirm that the brain change is the strict concomitant of the mental process, but the nerve-tissue configuration and the thought configuration belong to different orders of phenomenal existence. Professor Haeckel so often uses the expression "*Vorstellung*" or presentation. This term is characteristic of empirical science but the science of pure reason or metaphysical science, if we may use the word, knows presentation only as an example or means to illustrate pure, asensual thought, as the mathematician uses a straight stroke, either drawn or imagined, as the representation of the infinite straight line without breadth or thickness. The impossibility of imagining an asensual or infinite entity does not prove its non-existence.

Professor Haeckel's assurance that his monism answers the causality need of reason is not very assuring. The whole doc-

trine of evolution is predominantly descriptive; it tells us *that* and *how* the processes have taken place but not *why*. It does not satisfy the scientific mind to state that a something has developed according "to eternal iron laws," not even when these laws have been definitely established, expressed and confirmed by experience. For the thought of the law is a mere abstraction. Law is, according to Krause, that which the links of a chain have in common; the permanent and eternally essential in them. The links of the chain may be temporal or eternal. In the former case the law is entirely unable to realize itself or to produce the links of a chain. It is a deception and semi-poetic phrase to say that "law reigns." It presupposes in any case an executive power and this again a living, self-determining being.

We repeat again Aristotle's dictum that science and metaphysics have different functions. We may witness that and how a being gradually perfects itself, but it is utterly unthinkable that the lower state should be the all-sufficient ground for the subsequent higher or the lower step of evolution the cause for the later and higher. The less perfect may form the substratum, the condition and material for the later and more perfect but no more. So likewise can the evolution of the higher from the lower only be explained to the thoughtful reasoner on the basis of the assumption of a higher Power which intervenes and coöperates or manifests itself in the unfolding, otherwise the rise of the organic from the inorganic and of man from the animal creature would be inexplicable. Even though we could see with our own eyes an anthropoid ape gradually develop into a man, as thinking beings we would have to postulate the coöperation of a higher Power as necessary. What is true of laws in general is especially true of the laws of evolution. Unlimited variability is not a matter of experience, for we can only observe variability within certain given limits. Design in nature is rejected with great vehemence by the monists and this rejection is lauded as one of the greatest achievements of modern science, but at the same

time it is solemnly affirmed that adaptation and selection always follow the direction of greatest usefulness. How can the purposeful be derived from the purposeless and the permanent from the variable? We are told that this is a matter of chance. How, then, did the idea of purpose arise in the human mind? On the contrary, I can only see behind the whole process of evolution, inorganic, organic and superorganic, or human, one pervading purpose and conceive the underlying cause as throughout purposeful.

Forever unexplained and inexplicable from the standpoint of the great zoologist will remain the realm and power of the imagination and the constructive power of the mind. Imagination is capable of constructing at will the individual parts of a whole, each separate from the rest as, *e. g.*, the head of a horse or the external form without the internal organs, while nature always creates wholeness, *e. g.*, the head of the horse only as a part of the whole body, a human form only in the real human body. But imagination forms freely and independent from any temporal sequence; it may go backward—"where I was raised and born," says Homer—or it may hop, skip and jump, now forward, now backward, but nature is always bound to a definite order: child, boy, youth, man. The works of the imagination and the corresponding products of the human mind which are transplanted by the skill of the artist from the inner world of spirit into the outer world of sense may surpass the creations of nature in beauty and perfection. Nay, the external sense perception of the mind, constantly cited by the sensualist, presupposes—outside of a whole series of asensual thoughts such as space, time, number, size, form, direction, etc.—the ability, activity and power of the reproductive imagination as already existing in the mind.

Unexplained and inexplicable remains on the monistic basis the origin of any of the so-called empirical concepts as, *e. g.*, ape. The world of sense perceptions offers the material for the formation of the concept, but the ability to reason from the general to the special, to select and determine the changeable

and to classify the different groups of apes on the basis of minor peculiarities did not originate in the sense world.

Unexplained and inexplainable remains the origin of a primary concept, an idea, as, *e. g.*, of the ideas of the true, the good and the beautiful assumed by our monist as something immediately given in contrast to his fundamental view of evolution.

Unexplained and inexplainable remains the "unity" of consciousness if the soul is only a mere "sum." The original unity cannot be derived from a mere unification, the original totality not from a mere sum total.

In short, we must reiterate Descartes' celebrated dictum, "*cogito ergo sum.*" This is a metaphysical postulate. From the scientific point of view it suffices to affirm *experientia est*, the former underlies the sequence of mental phenomena, the other is the result of observed mental sequence. The non-ego always presupposes the ego and not, as Fichte has it, the reverse. And to go one step further, if there is a metaphysical basis for the *cogito* my own system of related mental sequences is just the one bit of experience in all the world where the nature of the underlying Power which pervades the universe can stand revealed, if it can be revealed at all. "The same cause which drives the planets on their course, which sweeps the storm over land and sea, gives sensitiveness to the amoeba and intelligence to the elephant works in the busy brain and thought of man." The idea of a divine being could not have arisen in the human brain by unconscious evolution, but must have been given, otherwise the effect would be greater than the cause. If this is so this Cause must be conceived as personal, a personality which is transcending the limits of its manifestation in man.

Finally unexplained and inexplainable remain on the monistic basis the origin and existence of religion. Evolution fails to prove the presence of religion in the animal world, and cannot derive the religion of man from the religion of the animal. Professor Haeckel, however, is sincerely concerned about re-

ligion, worship, cultus and the church, which in itself is a proof of inherent religious cravings which must be satisfied, a manifestation of the all-pervading and underlying cause. It also proves that the religious training he received in his youth must have powerfully influenced him, although he advocates the abolishing of all religious instructions from the calendar of the public school system in his own country. He enters into a discussion of the history of religion and ridicules all mythological traditions, revelations, miracles, supernatural manifestations and mystical tendencies. He holds that if there is to be religion it would have to be in a certain sense supernatural, *i. e.*, transcending the corporeal world, but it should do no violence to the nature and essence of man but should lift it up and ennoble it. This process is in a certain sense a miracle but not one of those crude miracles which violates the laws of nature, for since those laws are eternal they can not be set aside at any moment or for any moment. Such a religion is only Professor Haeckel's monism. But we cannot comprehend how a religion without a revelation on the part of God is possible—for religion and revelation are inseparable reciprocal concepts. Moreover, the history of the world proves on a thousand pages that mysticism has played an important rôle in the making of the finest type of human character and profound piety has often looked much deeper into the eternal realities of life than the profoundest science. Professor Haeckel traces the doctrine of Christianity back to Buddhism, Platonism and Judaism, but a close analysis of the facts positively proves prophetic Judaism not mentioned by him, as the chief foundation of Christian teaching, while the historic connection with Buddhism has never been definitely demonstrated. The ecclesiastic doctrine of the "Trinity" does not speak of a "triune person" nor of "three Gods," but of "three persons in the one divine being." However, the primitive Christianity of Jesus and the Apostles does not know this doctrine, which is the result of gradual exegetical development of the baptismal formula, "Father, Son and Holy Ghost," in

connection with the honest effort to retain the true monotheism. Nevertheless, our monist does not hesitate to transplant the ecclesiastic idea of the trinity into his own monistic trinity of the True, the Good and the Beautiful. To him the heart of all religion is morality. This is decidedly Kantian, but Kant teaches the trinity of God, Freedom and Immortality, and if Kant is right in one of his essential postulates, why not in all?

The truth of the matter is that religion does not only rest upon the will but also on reason and feeling. The knowing of God and the feeling of God are essential and indispensable constituents of religion. On the other hand the willing and the doing of the good are not yet religion or even a part of religion as long as the relation of the good to God the perfectly good and holy being is not yet recognized. And if religion is to be confined to mere morality or will manifestation, how can religion and science ever be harmonized. For the will is indeed an *object* but not a *part* of science, nor is science will, although the growth of science presupposes the activity of the will. Therefore will and knowledge, or religion, *i. e.*, morality and science must ever remain apart.

As to the freedom of the will a few words must suffice. Science stands for determinism all along the line, both in the physical world and in the world of mental processes. For science there is not and there cannot be such a thing as free-will. But is there necessarily antagonism between the determinism of science and the free-will of metaphysics? From the metaphysician's point of view freedom is self-determinism. The determinism of science rests on observed uniformity, that of conduct on the uniform activity of a given character. My will is free to give expression to my character just in so far as I am not thwarted by constraining influences outside the character itself. Given the character, both hereditary and acquired, and the circumstances the act is determined by their interaction. External causes based upon mechanico-chemical laws, concepts based upon the laws of logic, and action based upon intellectual motives cannot be identified. A thousand

dollars in gold have different effects considered from these three different points of view. As a physico-mechanical mass they have everywhere the same chemico-physical effect; as a standard of value they have quite a variable effect according to the money standard of a country whether this be gold or silver or paper; as a cause for action they are still more vastly different in their influence. One man tries to acquire them by killing the owner, another by stealing them, a third by methods of fraud, a fourth by offering the equivalent value of service. This proves that the monistic law of substance becomes ineffective as soon as motives of conduct are concerned. Moral and intellectual qualities, inborn and acquired uprightness of character as well as logical methods of thought cannot be inserted as factors into a mechanico-mathematical calculation; they have erected above the world of gravitation a world of spirit which transforms and ennobles the former and is essentially a world of freedom.

Professor Haeckel is undoubtedly one of the foremost scientists of the nineteenth century; his contributions to animal morphology will forever stand as towering monuments to his scientific acumen and analytical genius, but his excursions into other fields of research have not proved him as infallible an authority, and his efforts to harmonize science and religion will ever fail to satisfy the profoundest longings of the human heart, which is seeking through humble faith in a personal God the solution of the "Riddle of the Universe."

LANCASTER, PA.

IV.

WEEK DAY RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION.

BY RUFUS W. MILLER, D.D.

Education is a unit. We speak of religious education, for the reason that we have tolerated the conception of education which limited it to the area of intellectual furnishing and discipline. But there is no real difference between education, and religious education. It is not possible to separate the education of the moral nature and the spiritual from the education of the intellectual nature and the physical. Educational leaders, rather than religious leaders, urge that the storing of the mind with useful information should not be isolated from the training of the moral and spiritual nature of the individual, and from the training of the body. It is important to recognize this truth in any discussion of the subject of week-day religious instruction.

We do well also to recognize that the impulse to education came originally from the Church. After the father of the family, the priest was the first teacher of mankind. Every great religion has been an educator of the people. Excavation in the Euphrates valley reveals the Babylonian libraries annexed to their temples. Buddha was called the "teacher" and his temples are still the only schools for multitudes. The mosque has been for centuries college and library for Islam. The Hebrews made education a religious duty, and religion the climax of education.

Jesus Christ was preëminently a teacher. He had his college of twelve about Him, and His last commandment emphasizes the teaching of all nations. A recognized order of teachers appeared in the earliest of the churches. Within a century, catechetical schools grew up to fit applicants for

membership in the churches. Necessarily, a religion with a book was an educational force wherever it went. For centuries, whatever of education Europe offered was administered by the churches. From the Council of Constantinople in 680, when it was decreed that bishops and priests everywhere should provide schools free of cost for the poor, and fix proper charges for those better endowed, education was the acknowledged duty of the Church. In the ninth century Charlemagne provided public schools, grammar schools and seminaries, and required that these be sustained by cathedral and monastery. Through him, councils and synods recommended and enlarged the scope of school training, but history records that the indolence and the ignorance of ministers were the chief obstacles in the way of realizing the ideals of that great emperor, who was great as a military conqueror, but still greater as a Christian educator. The larger life that followed the Crusades led to the establishment of schools in the cities all over Europe. All the professions were wholly in the hands of the clergy until the sixteenth century. It is a fact that the formative purpose of the European universities was the same that gave birth to our American colleges—provision for an educated clergy. The Reformation broadened the purpose of education. A note of universality was struck through the universities; but if direct control by the clergy was less evident, the spirit of the Church still ruled in the seminaries of learning, under the patronage of the state or of laymen. The reformers early devised systematic methods of imparting religious instruction to the young. The agencies used, were, first, the pastors, and secondly, the schools, and in many schools religion became the chief subject of education.

When the care of the school and university was handed over to the state, so was also the care of religion, as in Germany, England, and in Holland, and in other countries; but it was done with the understanding that the state was Christian, and would safeguard the interests of the Church in school and congregation alike.

We must not overlook the fact that the Jesuits organized a teaching body, the like of which the world has never seen, and to this day the Church of Rome, through the influence of the Jesuits, has not forgotten the fundamental importance of the early religious education of the young. The schools of America were originally established as auxiliaries of the Churches. Massachusetts Bay Colony had hardly established itself before the Puritans planned their common schools. The pastors were their first teachers. A number of the pioneer Reformed ministers were schoolmasters. The history of every colony on the Atlantic coast affords illustration of the truth that the Church and the school house were built side by side, and the schoolmaster came through the Church.

We recall that famous passage from the ordinance of Congress in 1787, creating the Northwest Territory. It is a distinct recognition of the fact that the State is a Christian State. It reads: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education, shall forever be encouraged."

In America, the separation of schools from churches has arisen within the past fifty years,—partly because of divisions and controversies among the ecclesiastical organizations, as to how the religious element should be presented in connection with the common school work, and partly because many people outside the churches were dissatisfied to have particular theological dogmas taught to their children.

As throwing light upon this question of week-day religious instruction, through the Church and the state, note briefly the methods followed in other nations. The Jews, during the Biblical period, and particularly since the first century before Christ, until modern times, had schools for the instruction and training of their children and youth in the faith of their fathers and they demonstrated the educability of man, and the power of that education when religious. They afford a good example of faithfulness in holding to a national religious

ideal in the education and training of the children and youth.

In Germany, religious instruction is a part of the regular curriculum of the public school. It is either Evangelical—that is, Protestant, or Catholic, in the sense in which these churches understand the term.

In the elementary schools there are from 30 to 32 hours of instruction during the week, and from four to six of these hours are devoted to religion—usually the first hours of the forenoon. In the high schools there are also 32 hours for instruction. In the lower grades, three of these hours are devoted to religion; in the higher classes, two. In home work the pupil is expected to devote about one-half hour to each lesson. In addition to the religious instruction given at school, the minister devotes two hours a week to advanced classes, for a year or two prior to confirmation. In the lower grades, Bible stories (those relating to individuals), and the memorizing of hymns, Scripture verses, and the Church Catechism, comprise the work done. In the intermediate grades, a little church history, ceremonies, symbols, and some general teachings of the Christian religion are presented. In the higher grades, the history and literature of the Bible, and Church history, are given special attention. The work of the lower grade is reviewed here. Text books are sometimes provided, and when the Bible is used directly, a copy, from which objectionable matter has been removed, is selected.

It is to be noted that the definite religious instruction in the public schools in Germany, is furnished according to the expressed wishes of the parents, by ministers of their faith, at fixed hours, and all children are required to attend the instruction of their own religious denomination.

In England, the question of religious teaching at the present time is in a state of flux. They have had a system of national and board schools, through which religious education was provided for every child. Whatever the outcome, week-day religious instruction is likely to be provided.

In Sweden, religious instruction is given during the eight

months of the school year. The average number of hours per week is five; the proportion of time allotted to religious instruction is one-sixth, that is, over 16 per cent. For home study the children usually require an hour a day for their lessons in religion.

In France, religious instruction is not given in the public schools, but besides Sunday, Thursdays are given to the churches for the purpose of imparting religious instruction in their own buildings. On these days, the children do not attend the public school. In the Reformed Churches on Thursday the sessions are usually an hour and a half long. When the lesson on Sunday is in the Old Testament, then the lesson on Thursday is in the New Testament, and *vice versa*.

Now, what are the facts in regard to the public schools in our country? First, the public school is the child of the Christian school. The Church after spending four hundred years in developing a system of education for the people, has handed it over to the state for the benefit of all.

The state would never have had the public school, but for the untiring efforts of Protestant ministers and Protestant churches. The Sunday-school itself has played an important part in securing the public school system. The First Day Society in 1791 petitioned the Legislature of Pennsylvania to establish a system of common schools. The teachers and directors of public schools are, to a great extent, members of our churches. We do well to insist that the public school system is Christian. The spirit and the atmosphere of our schools are generally dominated by true religion and morality. The teachers in the school are nearly always persons of religious spirit and moral character. Their influence upon the children of the school is religious and moral to a high degree. In the great majority of the schools of our country the Bible is regularly read; in a number of States it is required to be read, and in only a few states, by recent legal action, has its use in the school room been forbidden.

But there is no definite teaching of religion in the public school. The Bible is not taught, either as history or as literature. As to moral teaching, our schools generally inculcate the principle of temperance. Music is generally taught, and its influence is always wholesome in the direction of morals. Discipline is enforced, and increasing attention is being paid to patriotism and love of country as moral factors.

But there is no definite systematic instruction by means of text-books on the subject of morals. We cannot ask for the teaching of religion in the public schools. The responsibility for religious instruction rests upon the churches. We object to a state religion, therefore the problem of religious instruction must be solved by the Christian churches. Naturally, in this connection, we think of the Sunday-school. Does the Sunday-school meet the requirements of religious instruction? It is unquestionably a factor of incalculable influence. Its chief value lies in the personality of the Sunday-school teacher. Its subject of study is the Bible. It is indispensable as a field for the cultivation of lay activity, and of the practical demonstration of the priesthood of all believers. It reinforces the responsibility of the home as a religious institution. The work it has done is in the highest degree commendable, and the manner in which the Sunday-school has been fitting itself to meet its larger religious opportunities in the last ten years, gives promise of still greater achievements. Nevertheless, the best friends of the Sunday-school must concede its limitations. There are 16,000,000 children attending our public schools, in which they are receiving their intellectual equipment and discipline for life. Many of them are failing to receive the religious and moral equipment and discipline, and without this they will become abnormal men and women. Our Sunday-schools have a nominal attendance of some 12,000,000 pupils. Several millions of these are adults, but those who are enrolled in the Sunday-schools of America attend irregularly, and for a fewer number of years than in the day schools. The instruction which they receive is largely by volunteer and un-

trained teachers. The methods of instruction often lack pedagogical wisdom and fulness of knowledge. But there are more serious limitations.

There are three essentials in every educational process which the Sunday-school can never supply. One of these is *time*. The name of the Sunday-school reveals its first limitation. It is a Sunday-school. It is a school which convenes but once a week. There are but thirty minutes for lesson study and recitation against thirty hours in the public school. A second essential is work. The Sunday-school meets on a rest day, not on a work day. Everything invites to rest. It is not thinkable that either the children or the parents will be likely to turn it into a real work day, and attend the school which does serious work for several hours at a time. The crowded public school curriculum is also a hindrance in this respect. The third essential factor in education is *continuity*. The lack of continuity in the Sunday-school caused by the break of seven days between each lesson is a limitation for which there is no remedy. Thirty minutes study for history or geography in the public school, conducted once a week, however well equipped the teacher, or interesting the presentation of the subject matter or text-book, would not produce large results, from an educational point of view. These difficulties in the Sunday-school are essential and constitutional. They are not in any sense incidental. They must be taken into account whenever the curriculum of the school is considered, or when we desire to measure the possibilities of the Sunday-school in the matter of systematic religious instruction. And yet the fact remains that at the present time, with some exceptions, as in the case of the churches requiring months of catechetical instruction for confirmation, and churches maintaining parochial schools, the religious and moral education of the children of America depends practically upon the work of the Sunday-school. Is it not inadequate in quality and amount.

The present agencies for religion and morality, granting to

them the best ideals, a clear vision of their opportunities, unlimited energy, and first class methods, cannot accomplish the work which the importance of these interests requires. The questions arise: (1) Can any larger part of moral education be accomplished in the public school? (2) What can the churches do to secure more religious education for the children of the land? . By way of answer we would emphasize the correct idea of education, secure a higher rating and higher standard for the Sunday-school, and evolve from experiments tried in various parts of the land, a system of week-day religious instruction under the direction of Christian churches. Religious leaders must join hands with public school educators in asserting the oneness of education. When you send a boy to school you send the whole boy. You cannot leave his moral and spiritual nature at home, nor set it aside for Sunday teaching. We must take a stand with psychologists and educators in the depreciation of intellectualism as related to a higher appreciation of the value of conduct, character and social refinement as ends of culture, and especially a training for true intellectual tastes. The basis of morality must be recognized as something absolute and related to a hereafter, and therefore to religion. The school atmosphere should be a continuous influence in favor of morals and religion. Ethics should constitute an integral part of the education of the young, and as for all other subjects, so in this, text-books should be used.

Belief in God, the brotherhood of man, the value of life, the moral order of the universe, honesty, cleanliness, the rights of the individual, justice—these, and kindred subjects should be taught in our public schools, if we are to give the children an intelligent education. Then ethics in the public school must have the preëminence.

The Church should give a higher rating to the Sunday-school and secure a higher standard of instruction. The widespread interest in the advancement of the Sunday-school, the efforts of various kinds and degrees of effectiveness to secure better

teaching, the oft-repeated and well-founded statement that the pastors hold the key to the situation and that the better Sunday-school waits upon the time when the minister will be more alive to the problem and better prepared to solve it—these are indications of the importance, and the demand for a high type of the Sunday-school.

We come now, in the third place, to a brief consideration of methods and experiments being tried to secure week-day religious instruction. We can but mention the correspondence courses of Young Peoples' societies, Sunday-school boards and missionary boards. These are forerunners of an important adjunct of the system to be developed in the churches.

A plan which is an adaptation of the method of religious instruction in Germany and France was suggested by the following resolution adopted at the Inter-Church Conference in New York, November, 1905:

Resolved, That in the need of more systematic education in religion, we recommend for the favorable consideration of the public school authorities of the country the proposal to allow the children to absent themselves without detriment from the public schools on Wednesday or on some other afternoon of the school week for the purpose of attending religious instruction in their own churches; and we urge upon the churches the advisability of availing themselves of the opportunity so granted to give such instruction in addition to that given on Sunday.

If this request were granted, and say Wednesday afternoon of the public school session were given to the churches, it would mean the giving of 8 per cent. of the school hours to religion. Germany gives from four to six hours, or from 12 to 16 per cent. Viewed historically, it would be a partial restoration of the time which originally belonged to the churches. The plan recognizes the divided conditions obtaining in our land. Parents would have the choice of sending their children to the church school held in the church building on that particular afternoon, or if no church instruction were

selected, children would attend the public school session. It simply asks that all children who, by consent of their parents, attend the church school and bring a certificate of attendance shall be excused for their absence from the public school. It also asks that the curriculum of the public school shall be so arranged that the absentees have nothing to make up. Music, etiquette, ethics, manual training, raffia, sewing, or electives, might be given to those who remain. This plan has many obvious advantages. The method of secular instruction differs from that of religious instruction. Religion is a matter of the heart and life. The holy mysteries of faith cannot be taught in the atmosphere of mathematics, but should be taught in the church. Religion will be valued more highly by the children if they see that a fair proportion of the week-day time is given to the study of its history, its literature and its teachings. The public school will receive the unqualified support of the churches and its vast resources will be utilized more fully for the higher life of the nation. The work of the Sunday-school related to that of the week-day church school will acquire a greater significance. Pedagogic methods will be more fully followed. It may be said that the public school needs all the time it now has. This is true, but it is paying too high a price to give time to intellectual training at the cost of religion. Some say Sunday services could be made to serve the purpose of instruction. Christian parents should be awakened to their duties. The proposition implies that the public school is in some respects radically deficient. Others say: Ministers are not trained teachers, are not equal to the task. They are already taxed to the limit of their powers. Trained teachers are wanting for the week-day period. Perhaps the children will not come. The answer to all this is: What ought to be done, can be done. And experiments performed by pastors here and there under greater disadvantages than the plan proposed, prove that it is possible to have trained pastors, trained teachers and scholars who will give time and attention to the studies relating to religion, such as church

history, missions, memorizing of Scripture, hymns, Bible stories, Bible history, etc.

Another plan of great promise is the religious day school held during vacation time. For the last nine years this has been tried in northwest Wisconsin. The religious day school is in all essentials the exact counterpart of the public school, with the exception of the curriculum. That, of course, is religious. It is held in church every day except Sunday, for from one to two weeks during the summer vacation. A successful day school teacher is employed at fair wages. The atmosphere is serious—one of work. The pupils come for work, and for no other purpose. Their ages vary from six to over twenty years old. The school opens with twenty minutes of music and devotion. Then follows regular class work. The following are some of the subjects taught: Church history, home and foreign missions, the Bible, Christian teachings, the daily lesson and some of the cardinal Christian virtues. Those who have tried this plan report that it has met with uniform success.

Rev. H. R. Vaughn, Elk Mound, Wis., writes of such a school as follows: "We are now conducting a school in the M. E. Church at Knapp, Wis., about twenty-five miles from here. A description of that school would answer your question as well as anything perhaps.

"1. We have devotional exercises. The music is standard. The leader is trained. The object is to get the child to learn to sing the selections without the book and with perfect precision. The primary department has two hymns, 'How Gentle God's Command' and Luther's 'Cradle Hymn'; the other grades, 'Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God,' etc., and one or two others.

"2. Each grade has Old Testament studies, and the older grades both Old and New Testament. The children study the lesson at home, then with the teacher on the following day write out a brief of the lesson studied.

"3. Manual work—map drawing of Bible lands and mission lands.

"4. Memorizing selected portions of the Bible.

"5. Mission studies for the older grades conducted exactly like the Bible work.

"6. Lessons for the older grades in the cardinal virtues, truth, honesty, temperance, courage, faithfulness, obedience, etc. These are all taught from the standpoint of nature. We come at them from different angles. We show how these virtues are woven into the very fabric of nature, how absolutely we are dependent upon them.

"7. Religious and church history: (1) A lesson on God's Call of Abraham; (2) The Giving of the Law; (3) The Apostolic Age; (4) The Reformation. The rest of the lessons have to do with the history of the founding and development of the M. E. Church. (The primaries do not have this.)

"The school begins at 9 a. m. for the primary department and closes at 10.30. The remainder of the school comes at 1 p. m. and remains until 4. The school is in the M. E. Church. The teacher is a trained, successful and experienced public school teacher. She receives two dollars a day. Each family that sends children contributes at least fifty cents for the term. Others who are better able and more interested contribute one dollar. A few others who have no children make contributions. The school continues about two weeks—not, of course, on Sundays. There are about fifty in attendance.

"We consider this a good school. We have been holding these schools in this region the past eight years. They have been uniformly successful. The attendance has been steady. The children have needed no compulsion; they have always shown a good degree of most genuine interest. I have found that religious truth, when taught educationally and by able teachers, is almost fascinating to children. I do not believe there is any other subject which can be so easily taught and so readily absorbed by children."

It has demonstrated the fact that the child will apply himself to the careful, accurate study of religious themes without pressure or compulsion, and the average child will learn fully as much in the religious day school in two weeks, by consecutive study under the leadership of a trained teacher, as he will learn in the average Sunday-school in eighteen months. This plan could surely be employed to advantage in small towns and country places where the school term averages but eight months of the year. Why should not ministers and school teachers turn to account some portion of this time into the most important work that can be done for the children, from the standpoint of church and state. In our large cities, as in New York, Chicago and Philadelphia, the daily vacation Bible school has shown tremendous possibilities. For the last four years this plan has been followed and thousands of children have attended a four-weeks' vacation school, where there is a combination of play, manual training and moral and religious teaching. Here there is a great open door for the Christian Church.

Our brightest young men and young women in colleges, universities and theological seminaries are the teaching force ready to hand. As an illustration, in the work conducted by the New York City Federation the call was issued to the colleges and universities for men and women inspired by the love of Christ and qualified to assume charge.

Certain institutions were personally visited and the work presented, after which the student volunteers were personally interviewed. When at last the work of selection was completed, there assembled at the Judson Memorial Church on Washington Square (chosen as the headquarters and residence of the men) fifty women and twenty men, representing the best in Columbia, Barnard, Yale, Princeton, Colgate, Drew, Bryn Mawr, Vassar, Smith, Williams, Trinity, The General Theological Seminary, The Moravian Theological Seminary, Bucknell, St. Lawrence and Drake Universities, Cornell, Franklin and Marshall, Lafayette, New York University, Wellesley,

The American Institute of Applied Music, with fourteen other educational institutions.

Some twenty schools were located in the city, all of the churches being along the line of dense, overcrowded, tenement life. Pastors, Sunday-school superintendents and church visitors took a personal interest and church sextons showed willing helpfulness. There were 6,696 boys and girls enrolled, and during thirty-four sultry summer mornings in July and August the total average attendance was 1,847.

The subject matter consisted of Bible lessons, musical exercises and manual work. Italians, Russian Jews, Irish children, Bohemians, Germans and other nationalities were represented. The program and methods of the schools must have appealed to the children, since they abandoned the freedom of the streets to attend, and the type of men and women engaged in the work appealed to the children, for methods without magnetic personalities behind them do not appeal to children.

It is to be noted that the schools were held in church buildings and they proved no insuperable obstacle to the work. Local federations in our large cities connected with the National Federation of Churches open the way for a large development of the daily vacation Bible school.

But in any consideration of the subject of week-day religious instruction the chief emphasis should be placed upon the little children's schools, or the Christian kindergarten. Germany is the home of the little children's schools. We do not refer to Froebel's kindergarten—rather to the great work of Fliedner, of Kaiserowerth. Twenty-five years ago over 150,000 children were enrolled in 2,000 little children's schools in Germany.

In our land the kindergarten is becoming a public school institution. More than 200,000 children are now enrolled in public school kindergartens. We are confident, however, that the church loses a strategic opportunity in the life of childhood, if she does not plan an extension of the Sunday-school in the week-day sessions—at least so far as the elementary

grades are concerned, and particularly the little children of non-school age—six years of age and under.

With the development of the modern Sunday-school, our churches are now provided with suitable quarters for the week-day gatherings of the little children. With the training of the teaching deaconess, or the reestablishment of the office of church teacher, we have the trained teaching body who could give their time to the strengthening of the Sunday-school, and the moral and religious instruction and nurture of the little children on week days. Several branches of the Lutheran Church are establishing little children's schools as an integral part of their denominational educational work. We know of nothing more in harmony with the teachings of our Saviour, greater in its possibilities, or in its influence upon the children, the home, the Church and the future of our land, than the little children's school.

Once more in the thoughtful consideration of this subject, two principles and methods of education must be kept in mind. The one is—that in any true system of education the pupil and his place in society form the proper criteria of judgment as to material for study and instruction and method of procedure. And the other is—that the chief process, or set of processes, that educates the pupil is his self-activity. The individual element is the carrying element in progress. The activities of others, when properly directed, always assist the activity of the pupil, but never displace it. Knowledge and doing proceed together. From this point of view there is an absolute necessity for week-day religious instruction, which will afford to pupils the opportunity for study and self-activity.

Two practical deductions can be drawn from the consideration of this subject. First, we infer the necessity and value of endowed funds for the general Sunday-school work of a denomination.

If a denomination has a right to exist, if it is proper to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars for the endowment of denominational colleges and theological seminaries, surely it

is plain that the denomination as such must give heed to the needs of its Sunday-schools. The Church must exercise a directing and controlling influence through its general denominational Sunday-school agencies—it must give the impulse and inspiration to higher standards, to correct doctrinal teachings and church customs, and to more effective work in the local school.

The state spends its millions in supervision of the common school system. Is it not important for the Church to have endowment funds in order to adequately conduct its general moral and religious educational work in behalf of the young? The state and the public school cannot do this work. In the United States the Christian churches must, more than ever, pay attention to the teaching of the young and their proper training in moral and religious instruction.

Secondly, do we not see in the consideration of this subject that there is imperative need of magnifying the teaching function of the Church and of her ministry? Social, moral and religious conditions have changed more rapidly in the last twenty years than have the churches in readjusting themselves to the new education. The center of church activity and power is changing from that of the pulpit and revival to that of the teaching and training work, through the Bible school, etc. We do not mean that the pulpit is losing its power as such, but it is changing the direction and the application of its power. Is it not true that the Church has suffered enormously through the misdirection of pulpit activity, in setting aside teaching, in favor of homiletic and doctrinal lecturing? The time is at hand when the true value and place of instruction and training of children and youth of the Church is recognized and proper provision must be made.

When Horace Mann began the work of special training for public school teachers he was laughed at for his pains. It took fifty years to bring about the change. Politicians and conservatives opposed, but the rising tide of a popular demand

established costly normal schools, free to all who would fit themselves for teachers.

In the religious world the demand is upon the churches to prepare ministers and teaching deaconesses to meet the need for the moral and religious training and instruction of the young. The child occupies the supreme place of opportunity, and work for the child is supremely important.

Even President Harper, himself a Hebrew specialist and enthusiast, pointing out the fact that one-fifth of all the time spent by the student in the theological seminary is consumed in the study of Hebrew, and that a very small percentage of the ministers in charge of churches ever make any real use of Hebrew in actual life, argued in favor of making Hebrew an elective. Whether this be done or not, it is certainly necessary that seminary faculties arrange to give larger place and time for assisting young men in discharging the teaching function of the ministry,—a function that is second to none other.

Is it not true that the study of the child, Sunday-schools and the religious education and training of the young at the present time are all set aside as matters of minor importance, compared to other studies now included in the typical theological seminary curriculum? The best results of teacher training can only be secured when the Church, through the theological seminary, sets its seal of approval more fully upon the teaching work of the ministry, and opens the way for a more adequate fulfillment of its solemn obligations, its magnificent opportunities, its limitless possibilities.

The world needs not only "an educated ministry, but a ministry of educators." The pastor is the headmaster and must be equipped to train teachers as well as to teach. Some one has put the matter in a sentence: "If the Church expects teaching of the laymen, the minister must learn to be a teacher of teachers." Whether ministers like it or not, more and more the churches will hold them responsible for the religious education of the children and youth in the Sunday-schools, and through the Sunday-school on the week-day. The demand

is more than ever apparent that there must be a speedy remodeling of the theological curricula, in such a manner as to enable the student to prepare himself to do that which he will be expected to do, and intelligently to take advantage of the strategic opportunity of his work—the moral and religious fashioning of the child and the adolescent.

The minister is the key to the situation and the Sunday-school stands as the open door. When our ministers are trained to be teachers of teachers, we shall have entered the way to realizing the ideal of Dr. John M. Gregory, who said that "the Sunday-school ought to be the best and most successful of all schools, because it is openly, freely and fearlessly religious. The whole moral and religious nature of the child is open to its work. Its education ought, therefore, to dominate, inspire and consecrate all other education. Through the Sunday-school Christianity is free to pour its faith into all other schools. So soon as it becomes strong enough and skillful enough in its teachings, it will color and control all learning with its own higher ideals and hopes. The true interests of mankind, as well as the progress and final success of Christianity itself, demand that this shall be done."

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

VI.

THE MISSION TO SAMARIA AND MODERN MISSIONS COMPARED.

BY THE REV. HENRY K. MILLER.

Stephen, one of the seven deacons ordained by the Apostles to care for the poor widows of the new Christian community, by his zeal in preaching Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah, succeeded in arousing a storm of hatred that not only cost him his own life, but also scattered the members of the Jerusalem church throughout Judea and Samaria. Among these refugees was another deacon, Philip the Evangelist, whose interest in the faith was of such an active kind that it could not be limited to a mere performance of his official duties. Reaching the chief city of Samaria, then called Sebaste in honor of the Emperor Augustus, he proclaimed the Christ, reinforcing his words by mighty deeds of exorcism and healing. The result was that great numbers believed his message and were baptized. Indeed Philip's mission was so successful that the Apostles Peter and John were sent from Jerusalem to assist him. These latter, through prayer and the laying on of hands, conferred upon the newly baptized converts the gift of the Holy Spirit, that is to say, the converts received power to perform certain wonderful deeds which in those rude times were almost universally accepted, not only as unmistakable proofs of the Spirit's presence and power, but as evidence of a person's Christian status. Among those who came under the influence of Philip's evangelistic campaign and were baptized was a magician by the name of Simon, who had been accorded almost divine honors by the superstitious populace.

He was greatly impressed by the miracles that he saw Philip perform. Simon the magician thought he saw an opportunity to improve his business by learning what to him was a new art practiced by the Apostles. He therefore attempted to buy the power of conferring the Holy Spirit upon whomsoever he should lay his hands. Peter administered a sharp rebuke to him, in a manner excommunicating him and urging him to repent.

Political exigencies and national misfortunes almost inevitably made the people of the Northern Kingdom of Israel a prey to pagan influences. No sooner had the first king, Jeroboam, succeeded in firmly establishing his throne, than he adopted the policy of undermining the people's religious attachment to Jerusalem, the capital of the rival kingdom. He, therefore, set up two calves of gold, one in Bethel and one in Dan, saying: "It is too much for you to go up to Jerusalem: behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt." Later King Ahab's marriage to the Tyrian princess Jezebel became the occasion for introducing into Israel Phœnician idolatry. In B. C. 722 the Assyrian king Sargon captured Samaria and overthrew the Northern Kingdom, transporting many of the people and replacing them with colonists from Assyria. Alexander the Great, nearly four hundred years afterwards, also settled Macedonians in Samaria to replace the inhabitants that he had killed. Still later Roman influence made itself powerfully felt. Thus the population of the district of Samaria became mongrel and their religion also became a mixture of pagan and Jewish elements. The Jewish religion, among its many excellent points, was a foe to sorcery, but this bulwark against superstition having been weakened, the many black arts that inevitably accompany paganism seemed to have gained complete control over the Samaritans. We read that all gave heed to Simon Magus, from the least to the greatest, saying: "This man is that power of God which is called great."

Such was the soil into which Deacon Philip sowed the seed

of the Word. Looking forward to the coming of the Messiah who was to usher in the kingdom of heaven, or, as we should say, the golden age, still remained with the populace as an inheritance from their Jewish ancestry. Philip met this expectation by announcing the Nazarene Jesus as that very Messiah for whose appearance they had been waiting, and the people received the announcement favorably. Not only so, but, steeped as the people were in superstition, their very slavery to sorcery is an eloquent testimony to their belief in superhuman, spiritual powers. When, therefore, Philip reinforced his more or less welcome doctrine by the performance of miracles—exorcising demons and curing the sick—he became irresistible. Nothing that their “great power of God”—Simon Magus—had done could equal the new teacher’s deeds. Here was power, indeed, in the presence of which all, including the great sorcerer himself, were filled with awe. It was like Moses confounding the Egyptian magicians at Pharaoh’s court by performing greater wonders than they. It is not strange, then, that there was a pretty general acceptance of the Gospel, and that the work proved too great for Philip’s strength, so that the Jerusalem church sent Peter and John to assist him.

With the advent of the two Apostles, the revival in Samaria entered upon a new stage. Though the converts had received Christian baptism, they yet had not been officially invested with the peculiar powers and privileges that in those early days attached to membership in the Christian community. By prayer and the laying on of hands the Apostles conferred upon the new members the Holy Spirit—that is, those special gifts of the Spirit of which a list (not necessarily complete) is given by St. Paul in I. Cor. xii., viz., the word of wisdom, the word of knowledge, faith, gifts of healings, workings of miracles, prophecy, discernings of spirits, divers kinds of tongues, interpretation of tongues.

At this point let us pause to consider the bearing of such miraculous gifts upon missionary work. The ancients in their crude way saw evidences of supernatural power or powers

everywhere. No doubt, owing to their ignorance of physical science, they mistook many natural phenomena for divine acts. To them the marvellous was the miraculous, as the etymology of the word "miracle" indicates. Nowadays the sphere of the natural in men's thoughts is being constantly expanded, and that of the supernatural correspondingly contracted, so that we are perhaps not in a position fully to appreciate the attitude of heart and mind to which the Apostles and early Christian preachers addressed their message. It is safe to say that the spiritual development of the times was such that no new religious teaching, no matter how inherently reasonable, could ordinarily secure a hearing unless authenticated by the external evidence of miracles. When a great teacher simply systematized what was generally accepted as true, when he merely acted as mouthpiece for the body of an ethically organized society, as was probably the case with Confucius, there was no particular need of supernatural attestation in the form of miracles. But when a sage appeared who was in advance of his age, whose doctrine transcended the moral consciousness of his generation and was intended to guide the community upward and onward to a higher stage of moral and spiritual development, miraculous authentication was absolutely necessary. Otherwise the new system could not have been gotten into working order. We see the same thing even to-day in the case of the numerous impostors whose profit is found in trading upon the credulity of their fellow-men. The followers of Dowie represent a type of humanity, one that was generic in our Lord's day and before, but that now, in an age when a new type of mind—the scientific—is becoming universal, merely survives as a species. In ancient times most great leaders into new paths, true as well as false, on account of their psychological environment, were obliged to resort to the performance of marvellous deeds in order to obtain a hearing. Thus Jesus Christ and His early disciples were perforce compelled to demonstrate by miraculous power the divine character of their message. The age could not have believed the

Gospel if this proof had been lacking. Hence, instead of questioning the possibility of miracles, we believe that the New Testament writings would be justly open to suspicion if no miraculous occurrences were reported in them. Without these accounts the New Testament would not be in harmony with the age in which it professes to have originated.

We conclude, then, that in Apostolic times missionary work would have been well nigh impossible without the power of performing marvellous deeds to authenticate the message of the Gospel. But it does not follow that the necessity for such a method is inherent in the nature of the Gospel, nor that the necessity is a permanent one. On the contrary, Christ himself, who performed many miracles, placed no exaggerated value upon them. He would not resort to the exercise of His superhuman power to turn stones into food with which to satisfy His own hunger, although in satisfying the hunger of thousands by means of five barley loaves and a few small fishes He clearly showed what power He possessed. Though He raised three people from the dead and healed the ear of Malchus which Peter had cut off in a rash attempt to defend his Master, yet Jesus did not put forth the least effort to mitigate His own sufferings, to staunch the blood drawn from His own body by the lash and the crown of thorns; nor did He rely upon His great power to prevent His enemies from putting Him to death unjustly. Moreover, when challenged to prove His claims by means of a miracle, He refused, actually saying that it was an evil and adulterous generation that required such proofs. Jesus even asserted that the miracles He performed were inferior to those deeds His followers would perform after His ascension.

Moreover, the history of the early Church made it clear that the power of performing external miracles was particularly liable to abuse. For instance, people endowed with the gift of tongues were very apt to be puffed up with pride and act in a reckless and lawless manner at the church services. Paul boldly asserted that love was better than the

so-called spiritual gifts. Besides, the common run of people could not readily distinguish between true miracles and the marvels of sorcery. Now the genius of Christianity, while indeed spiritual, is strictly opposed to spiritism; yea, more, while our holy religion does not contradict the facts of a true psychology, the experiences of the divine life in man are deeper and nobler than the phenomena of trance, vision, hypnotism, telepathy, etc. In an unscientific age the essence of religion is combined with elements that are more or less of a related nature, but really are different, as, for example, jurisprudence, politics, medicine and divination, with its hand-maidens astrology and alchemy. Now it is the problem of true religion to differentiate itself from these admixtures as man struggles upward and to confine itself more and more to ethico-spiritual functions. Thus we Christians of modern times, while believing in the supernatural as firmly as the ancients, refuse to limit our thoughts of God's energy to the startling, irregular, unaccountable phenomena that appealed so strongly to the imagination of people in by-gone days. We perceive that order is Heaven's first law, and recognize the hand of God in the regular succession of all phenomena according to fixed laws. The distinction of natural and supernatural is a convenient form of words, but the power *in* and *through* nature is no less divine than that *over*, *under* and *behind* nature, for it is the same. Hence, in our work as missionaries, instead of limiting ourselves, as our predecessors necessarily did, to a particular class of supernatural evidences, we lay everything under contribution (for all is ours), of course, selecting what is best adapted to our purpose. But, generally speaking, the manifestation of the Spirit now is internal rather than external, mediate rather than immediate. Divine power has become assimilated into our own being, rather than superadded. God energizes through us in ways suitable to and conditioned by our present nature, even as He accommodated His methods to the peculiar character of spiritual life in the days of old, and the activity in the one case is as

truly supernatural as in the other. Difference in mode of action does not change the nature of the energizing force.

From time to time Christians are challenged to return to primitive methods in Church work. Not only is the faith once delivered to the saints supposed to involve a fixity of theological belief, but also unchangeableness in practice. In certain circles it is constantly insisted upon that the Apostolic *modus operandi* is the only true one. This means, not that we are to use the same liberty as the Apostles exercised in adapting means to an end, but to reproduce literally those means that the Apostles actually happened to adopt. Surely our study of the revival in Samaria ought not to lead us to such a conclusion. In the light of the above considerations we hold that the particular forms in which the gift of the Holy Spirit manifested itself were incidental and temporary, suited to those times, but not necessarily to all times. For us the primal duty is to *preach, preach, preach*, whether it be from the pulpit or from the teacher's desk. If conditions indicate the need of the work of healing bodily and mental diseases, instead of establishing Christian Science churches and faith cure institutions, we must found hospitals to be conducted in an orderly and rational manner by God-fearing physicians and surgeons. Do we feel called upon to drive out the unclean demon of licentiousness? The only effective exorcism in this case is that which by means of patient, unremitting instruction convinces people that their bodies are temples of the Holy Ghost and must be kept pure. So with the other demons that hold men and women in their relentless clutches. Instruction supplemented with better conditions of living will bring about the results that are those works greater than His own to which our Lord referred. This is the great truth we need to take to our hearts as we reflect upon the revival in Samaria. The miraculous accompaniments to the preaching were in their nature temporary, but proclaiming the Christ and the kingdom of heaven will never be superseded no matter how times may change. Christianity is a

teaching religion, but with a practical end. We preach in order to induce men to act. True salvation must in a deep sense be worked out by men themselves. God and His ministering spirits may inspire men's hearts, urge various motives and even impart strength, but the building up of a true character (which is the modern way of designating the process of salvation) is possible only through man's own volition and effort. This is an ethical process, and to set it in motion ethical means must be employed. In this connection those words of Christ: "Already ye are clean because of the word which I have spoken to you" are full of meaning.

Let us now give attention to the case of Simon Magus. It is scarcely necessary to say that he is to be regarded as an historical personage, just such as he is described, and not as a mask for St. Paul, the representative of liberal Christianity, seeking to gain recognition as an Apostle. There has been much interesting speculation concerning this Samaritan magician, but we are not now concerned with it. We have to do with a mere sorcerer, rather more successful than the common run of his kind, who, coming into contact with Christianity and witnessing the marvels performed by Philip and the Apostles, could see in it all nothing more than an improvement on his own art, a higher kind of sorcery than he practiced. He was not only a shrewd man of business, but progressive withal, ready to adopt anything new in his line. He, therefore, offered the Apostles money and requested them to impart to him the power of conferring the Holy Spirit upon whomsoever he should lay his hands. Horrible thought! we exclaim. Yes; and yet from Simon's point of view his proposition was natural enough. The fact is, in the history of the Christian Church this sorcerer has had many successors. As needs hardly be stated, trading in sacred things has come to be called, after the name of this eminent sorcerer, *simony*. One of the subtlest snares for priests and ministers is professionalism. A certain Protestant minister serving a country charge was once heard to greet a brother with: "Well, how's

business?" It is by no means impossible for persons to take up the work of the ministry mainly for the purpose of making a living. Who of us here in the course of his missionary career has not met people who naïvely offered to become Christians if they were given employment? I once had an offer from a man to bring his whole family into the Church if he were given a position that would yield him two hundred *yen* a year. Cases essentially similar are by no means rare. In fact Simon Magus represents a type of mind, of which Judas Iscariot was also a notorious exponent. Both were always on the make. Now Christianity is essentially the very opposite. It is not acquisitive, but imparting, self-sacrificing, helpful, loving. Hence, though Judas and Simon were in the Church, they were not of it, having no real part in the matter or business with which Christ's followers are occupied.

As missionaries we shall do well to keep this class of people in mind. Not all are as hopeless as the betrayer of our Lord and as the Samaritan sorcerer. Even Peter had an idea that he and the other Apostles deserved some adequate return for having left all to follow Christ. Indeed, within proper limits the hope of reward is a legitimate motive, but those who have been united to Christ by true faith esteem the privileges of service above any and all material returns. Filled with Christ's love for their fellowmen, they must give outward expression to it in deeds of helpfulness. That is, of course, what we must hold our own selves to, and that is also the great truth to keep before the minds of the people who inquire of us the way of life. We are apt to expatiate upon the great progress made by Christian nations in all the arts of civilization as an ocular demonstration of the truth of the Gospel, and it is a true argument. But what is likely to be the effect of such reasoning upon the average hearer whose principal business in life is to gain something for himself? Is it not to excite an ambition to secure the material advantages that, he has been told, Christianity produces, a desire to go abroad to seek his fortune in the Occident? No, let us call upon men to

enter the Church for service! We should give people an opportunity to make sacrifices for the cause of Christ, rather than to advance their own interests. Sinful though men are, there are always not a few who can appreciate the nobility of self-sacrifice. Such will respond if properly called upon to do something for their fellows. A genuine summons to suffer in a good cause will be obeyed, and those who do respond will experience a joy that more than repays the losses incurred.

Our study of the revival in Samaria, then, yields nothing startling. Viewed in the proper light, the work of Philip, Peter and John, when due allowance is made for temporary and local conditions, appears to be essentially the same as what we are doing to-day. Missionary operations have come to be very complex and multiform, but after all are they at bottom anything else but proclaiming the Christ and the kingdom of God? There are but two things that I desire to emphasize in connection with this study: (1) Faithful and persistent preaching of the great facts of Jesus as the Christ and of the kingdom of which He gave the highest interpretation; (2) presentation of the Christian calling as a life of unselfish, unmercenary, cheerful and loving service and suffering (if need be) in the cause of the divine righteousness and of downtrodden humanity.

YAMAGATA, JAPAN.

VII.

CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA.

BY THE REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D.

HELPS AND HINDRANCES TO THEOLOGICAL PROGRESS.

In the field of theological thought, the publication of Campbell's book on *The New Theology* was doubtless the most stirring event of the year that has just closed. Immediately upon its appearance, the Rev. Dr. Robert F. Horton, whose careful and balanced literary and theological judgment carries unusual weight, declared that its effect was sure to be "epoch-making." This appraisal did not mean that its contentions and doctrinal statements were throughout approved and unassailable, but that it set forth the general principles, under which the modern religious mind is working, in a form that was bound to make a permanent impression. It would arrest and encourage the attention of progressive thinkers on the one hand, and on the other arouse and alarm the adherents of the stern and unbending type of traditional orthodoxy. In every one of its successive chapters there breathed the spirit of convinced passion, and its utterances were plainly prompted by a love of the truth at once fearlessly frank and thoroughly sincere. Apart, therefore, from the distinguished literary ability and the prominent ministerial position of its author, the book could be neglected by neither those that approved nor those that disapproved of its doctrinal position and bearings. It would necessarily force the old and the new theology to join battle in earnest, and compel them to measure each other's strength in reason and its value in practical religious life.

It is not the purpose of this note of reference to the book, to discuss what in it appeals to one as valid, or is regarded as unsound, in its particular attitude and claims. This has already been done in these pages. With a keen analytical grasp and insight, the editor of this journal has given its readers a review of the volume sufficiently extended and eminently satisfactory.* The present design is rather to direct attention to the correctness of Dr. Horton's estimate as above given, by noticing several of the more important volumes of other theologians which owe their appearance directly or indirectly to the controversy that has been provoked by Mr. Campbell's utterances. Some of the volumes to be noticed, it is admitted by their writers, are intended to serve as aids, others as hindrances, to the movement inaugurated by the London preacher. Others of the volumes take up the principles underlying the movement and give them independent study and interpretation, without formally referring to the author of *The New Theology*, or acknowledging his influence and leadership.

Among the works of this character that have come under one's observation special interest attaches to that which has for its title the question, *What About the New Theology?** It was written in response to a request from a source not indicated, by the Rev. W. L. Walker, who by experience and attainments seemed peculiarly well qualified for the task "of controverting the views of a brother minister." His treatises on *The Spirit and the Incarnation*, *The Cross and the Kingdom*, and the more recent *Christian Theism* and *A Spiritual Monism*, have given him distinction as ranking with the ablest contributors to the theological literature of the age. In these latter books, not a few of the readers of the *REVIEW* will recall, many of the main points raised by *The New Theology* are discussed with ample learning and unquestioned candor, so that one can readily accept his statement of personally

* See Dr. Richard's article in the issue for July, 1907, pp. 414-426.

* Published by Messrs. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1907, price \$1.00.

"being far from unsympathetic with the attempt made by Mr. Campbell." "Urged by motives similar to his," he writes, "I went some twenty years ago even further in some directions, although not so far in others; but in time became able to work my way back to the evangelical faith without any sacrifice of truth or consistency." In these circumstances, one must feel constrained to accord a most attentive hearing to his examination of his friend's views, and the value of that examination lies perhaps principally in three things: (1) It not only grants, but urges, that we need such a restatement of Christian Theology as shall make it more intelligible, as shall commend it to the reason and consciences of men to-day, and as shall direct it to its proper practical ends with respect to both the individual and society. (2) It points out in a plain and out spoken way, yet without a single unkind or unchristian word, the weaknesses and fallacies which, according to his conception, forbid concurrence in the views under examination: The radical error, underlying the whole system and vitiating its conclusions at many points, is an unethical conception of God. Resulting from this are its unguarded statements concerning the fundamental unity of man with God, its vague and imperfect apprehension of the nature and wickedness of sin, its undervaluation of the significance of Christ's work of reconciliation, and its undue emphasis of the Divine Immanence—an emphasis which hides from recognition the equally important corresponding fact of the Divine Transcendence. (3) It concludes its argument by setting forth in the final chapter the content of what to the author's mind can be reasonably accepted in our time as a positive faith,—a statement which for those who desire constructive effort as well as critical investigation for their guidance, will be found rewarding and invaluable.

In Frederick R. Swan's *The Immanence of Christ in Modern Life*,* the subject of Dr. Walker's two most helpful chapters, receives, from a somewhat different view-point, the

* Published by Eaton and Mains, New York, 1907, price 75 cents.

ampler and more detailed treatment it deserves. The belief that *God* is immanent in all things, this accomplished theologian, like the two scholars already mentioned, is fully persuaded, has helped the modern mind to see the universe as a temple of his Spirit and as a symbol of this thought. It has made the material world more interesting, more mysterious, and more living. It has given the soul its real foundation, to all history a new significance, and to all created existence an eternal purpose and unity. "In fact," Dr. Swan thinks, "this doctrine has explained what evolution really is—namely, the Divine development of all creation into a preordained perfection." And, what this fruitful conception has done for the outer material world, that the great idea of the immanence of *Christ*, once it is properly apprehended, is destined to do for the inner, spiritual world of the soul. Its recognition will bring the reality of God, the reality of religion, and the reality of Christ—this term indicating the presence with men of the eternal God whilst the name Jesus is reserved to represent the historic Son of Man—into direct connection with the soul's innermost, deepest thought and life. This truth, emphasized, as it is, as a "ruling idea" of The New Theology is not a modern discovery. It has been insisted on by the mystics in the religions of all ages, and men's return to and acceptance of it in our day, must aid powerfully in presenting old truths in new forms, adapting them to the requirements of new conditions, and applying them to the varied needs and relations of life in modern society.

With what skill and illuminating theological result, such use of the truth under consideration can be made, may be gathered from the several chapters of this unpretentious, but suggestive and informing, little volume. The one theme of the immanence of Christ in its bearings on authority in religion, the person of the historic Jesus, the nature of Christianity and its originality, the ancient religions, the modern church, and the perplexing problems of social reform, receives here scholarly exposition and forceful illustration. The studies

of the book constitute not simply "an appeal for a liberal, spiritual, and so to speak, human-hearted theology," but a justification of Christian "faith by showing that its foundations are laid deep in the human soul itself." The true spiritual theology of God and of man, on which it stoutly insists, reveals the truth which concerns all and appeals to all. It shows the presence of God in every member of the race. It lies at the basis of all social service, and furnishes the inspiration for the pursuit of all the noblest ideals. It will revive and help to reinterpret the great doctrines of the Gospel which in their traditional forms no longer make a moving appeal to the hearts of multitudes of people both inside and outside of the churches. It will bring to Christian manhood once more the power and authority which shall make vital the spirituality of the Church for a new age. Above all, it will serve to make the Jesus of history known as the Christ of God—a Divine personality, an ever-living and ever-present power in the world. Those who have been long and anxiously waiting for such a theology—and there are great numbers of such—will find at least a promise of its coming in the brief suggestions and outlines of this book which should prove especially helpful and valuable to men in their regular ministerial labors.

Of perhaps even greater service to the cause of truth and faith than that of the last-mentioned book, will be found *The New Evangel—Studies in The New Theology*,* by the Rev. Dr. J. Warshauer. In reading his carefully wrought-out and clearly-stated discussions, one realizes he is brought in contact with a thoroughly equipped and competent scholar, listening to his views and interpretations of certain important aspects of great and engrossing themes of philosophy and theology, and receiving instruction highly valuable in practical methods of solving some of the most pressing intellectual, moral, and religious problems of the day. Want of space precludes the possibility of our following these discussions into details. The

* Published by James Clarke & Co., London, 1907, price \$1.00.

barest mention of several of their distinguishing characteristics must here content us. The chapter on "Forces of Change" discloses an unsurpassed acquaintance with conditions prevalent in current thought and life, and with the causes that have been operative in bringing about those conditions. If any one has written on this subject with similar breadth and strength of grasp, and illustrated it so effectively by references to facts gathered from history and biography, literature and science, one must confess that such writing has not come under his observation. The chapter on "The Divine Immanence," for the recognition and employment of which the negative movements of the last two generations have slowly and inevitably prepared the way, shows it to be at once the refutation of the plausible but devastating fallacies of agnosticism, and the one reassuring means of rehabilitating religious faith. If any other author has succeeded in administering stronger or more persuasive correctives to agnostic tendencies, or given more successful illustration of the value and necessity of the recognition of the truth of the divine immanence for arresting the progress of those faith-blighting tendencies, one should be very thankful to have his attention called to them. The chapters on "The Incarnation," on "The Problem of Sin and Human Freedom," on "The Atonement," and on "The Resurrection," are all of them illuminating and instructive, even though they may not be wholly approved, or satisfactory in every point. As to the author's conception of the nature of sin, however—a conception concerning which other writers on The New Theology have been blamed especially as being heretical—comparatively few among the most strenuously "orthodox" even, will find themselves his opponents. Holding, as thoroughly and consistently as any one, to the idea that God lives in, is immanent in, man, Dr. Warshauer refuses to draw the false inference that man's being is identical with God's, and thus escapes from making God responsible for sin as others are charged with doing. "Sin is that which comes between the soul and God," he

writes, "and as an act of self-exile from the Divine presence, it is a going into the darkness away from the light in which alone the soul sees light." "It is an internecine strife of the soul against Him from whom it is derived. We must beware of seeking to shelter ourselves behind specious phrases about moral evil being only good in the making, or a mere falling short, a stage in man's evolution. So far as sin is sin, and experienced by the soul as such, it is the conscious and wilful resistance to, and violation of, what we know to be the good; it is rebellion, the setting up of self-will against the holy and blessed will of God, and its confession always takes instinctively the form 'Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned.' " A view of sin such as this must, of course, have its effect upon the study of the other chapters referred to, and an effect that is as wholesome as it is inviting to one's approbation. "Mingled with the reasonings and conclusions of these studies to which his accepted governing principle is applied, the manifest religious sincerity, seriousness of purpose, mental simplicity, and depth of personal experience on the part of the author, combine to make his book strong in its appeal to the heart and full of manifold instruction for the mind of its readers.

The latest book from the learned and versatile pen of the Rev. J. Brierley, entitled *Our City of God** deserves notice in this connection. One does not recall having come across the phrase "Divine Immanence" in the reading of it, so that in the technical sense it may not be allowable to class its author with the "new school" of theologians. But in the absence of the phrase, it is significant of much to find that the views and statements here set forth by him approach very closely the points of The New Theology which have aroused the most hostile antagonism. And upon his own representation, indeed, the book was written "with special reference to the controversies which are at the present time agitating our religious life," thus making the pronouncements it contains all the more worthy of somewhat careful examination. Comparatively few

* Published by Thomas Whittaker, New York, 1907, price \$1.50.

contemporary writers on the profound questions of philosophy and theology address so large a public as he, and fewer still enjoy a fuller confidence of being "a safe guide" as regards those matters with which he deals. What he says in the present publication, with all his accustomed learning and lucidity, clearness and charm, may cause some shaking of heads, but it will hardly provoke the stout and bitter opposition that has assailed others with whom, on cardinal issues, he is in doctrinal accord.

Mr. Brierley is clear in his perception of the cost and difficulty of displacing "the old, the established in theology, which has gathered all the vested interests around it." This makes his intelligently chosen and unambiguous attitude toward the new the more refreshing. "The new faith, which begins by exposing an earlier order," he says, "may usually reckon on crucifixion. Jesus, greatest of revolutionaries, expected to be put to death by the vested interests, and he was not deceived. Orthodoxy, that is to say, the line of life and thinking that has established itself, is sure of its army of defenders. On its side are the honors and dignities. Annas and Caiaphas are well housed and belong to the best of Jerusalem society. The Galilean has nowhere to lay his head. Along this well-worn track, too, the mental going is so easy. It is the line of least resistance, and upon it, accordingly, will be found that numberless host who wish to be spared the trouble of thinking." In spite of such facts, however, our author has the audacious courage of expressing his conviction that "the Church, talking as it does to-day about 'the restoration of belief' should recognize that its prime duty is to offer men something they can believe, that it must pay its long-standing debt to the intellect, and that it must make its door high enough to enable a man to enter, head and all without stooping—or decapitation!"

The direction of the course to be followed, according to this counsel, and in regard to certain particular issues in the present controversy, is plainly that in which the advocates of modern scholarship are traveling. In determining, for in-

stance, our estimate of the character of the scriptural record, "the facts, which the modern critical study and investigation of it have brought to light, must be frankly accepted and declared. There is no virtue in concealment and the age is sick of it. For ourselves we are prepared to admit the possibility of a legendary element having crept into the Gospels and colored certain of the accounts of Jesus' doings." Concerning miracles in general, he says, that whilst "at one time belief in them was easy," by and by a stage of mental development was reached "when their production ceased, and that not because the outside world had changed. The change was in minds and thoughts." And with reference, in particular, to the miracle of the conception and birth of the Saviour, we find him saying that "it has been a mistake of orthodoxy, from which it is time Christian thought should finally rid itself, to base its doctrine of Incarnation on the notion of a virgin birth. The birth stories of Matthew and Luke fail to approve themselves as of authority. They stand alone. Mark, whose gospel is now generally recognized as the earliest of the four, knows nothing of these events, nor are they mentioned in the fourth gospel. Jesus himself, in all his recorded utterances, lets drop no word about them. St. Paul, whose Christology is of the loftiest, from whom, above all others, the Church has taken its doctrine of Jesus as the Divine Redeemer and Saviour, nowhere bases or props his doctrine on these or similar stories. Could he have omitted them had he heard of or believed them? He begins his great Epistle to the Romans with a contrary affirmation, declaring that 'Jesus Christ our Lord, . . . was made of the seed of David according to the flesh.' He was made to be 'the Son of God with power,' not by his birth, but 'by his resurrection from the dead.' Furthermore, the birth narratives of Matthew and Luke, which stand thus solitary, so strangely unsupported by the earliest and most authentic witnesses, bear also in themselves the plainest marks of their late origin. Besides being flatly contradictory, the two narratives are so clumsily compiled that the genealogies which have been

tacked on to them, actually derive Christ's royal descent through Joseph. And it is noteworthy that the manuscript discovered in the Sinaitic convent gives the reading of Matt. 1:16, as 'Joseph, to whom was espoused Mary the Virgin, begat Jesus who is called the Christ.'"

These few illustrative instances, characteristic of Mr. Brierley's spirit and typical of his theological attitude, must suffice for our present purpose. Whilst one may not care, in the state of knowledge as yet available, to pronounce dogmatically in favor of all his conclusions, many of them will no doubt seem valid to unprejudiced readers. And, coming as they do, from one whose confidence in the uplifting and saving power of the Gospel is as unshaken as that of reactionary thinkers, and whose acceptance of the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God is unquestionably sincere and abundantly evidenced by both his theological statements and his Christian character, they may well serve a two-fold purpose: They may quiet the alarm of those who imagine that Christian faith is imperiled by the new conceptions of the Bible, and make them more patient with and tolerant of those who subscribe to the methods used and the results accomplished by the new learning. And they may aid those who have lost confidence in the doctrinal formularies, which to their minds seem to have been superseded, to persevere in their honest quest after the truth, assured that in new and higher forms it continues to support a reasonable faith and command a steadfast devotion to Christ and his Kingdom. Both these classes should see that the fearlessness and courage of such leaders of thought are helpful as well as hopeful signs, and that they are to be welcomed, therefore, with undisguised pleasure and satisfaction.

One additional book, chosen among the rest for notice here, remains to be spoken of. It is made up of a number of discourses, the connection between which is not always very close, and issued under the title of *Faith and Verification*.* The author of it is Principal Griffith-Jones, whose literary ability

* Published by James Clarke & Co., London, 1907, price \$1.50.

and graciousness of spirit towards others with whom he disagrees were shown in his earlier volume on *The Ascent Through Christ* and won for him a very wide circle of readers and deserved popularity. The same characteristics appear also in the present pages. One feels the attractiveness of the writer's personal urbanity and real kindliness, of the charity and respect which he has for other men and their opinions, of the beauty of his literary expression, and the felicity of his phrases throughout the entire volume. No doubt these will again bring him hosts of interested and sympathetic readers in his own land and ours. As a contribution to current thought, its helpfulness and value may, however, be questioned. Notwithstanding the declaration he makes, of being "in hearty sympathy with the progressive movement in theology," and his manifest acceptance of the main conclusions of biblical investigations and modern science, his attempt to occupy a mediational position makes his work an inhibitive rather than a propelling force in the evolution of theology. At any rate, his sympathy with the progressive movement falters at the very point upon which every one of the books already referred to feels it necessary to lay particular stress. In the preface to his book he declares that the attempt to "restate the essential doctrines of our faith in terms of the Divine Immanence is utterly futile and distinctly mischievous." Much of what in the older theologies has become repugnant to the modern mind is certainly due to the fact that in their production the truth of the indwelling of God in the world and in man was eliminated or forgotten. The restatement of the essential doctrines of Christianity, which is essayed by the "new" theologians, properly insists upon the necessity of laying renewed stress on the Immanence of God, but not to the exclusion of the complementary truth of the Divine Transcendence. The refusal on the part of Mr. Griffith-Jones to grant this necessity, nay, to call the application of it "distinctly mischievous," compels one to regard his present book a hindrance rather than a help to the advancement of theological thought. We have no room to

show by quotations the consequences which, in the way of doctrinal result, follow this attitude. All we can do is to express the conviction that what in present circumstances is called for is not compromise such as is again and again in evidence in these discourses, but the frankest acceptance of facts and the utmost loyalty in the application of them to the formulation and interpretation of Christian doctrine.

THE PASSING OF EPISCOPALIAN EXCLUSIVENESS.

Signs which indicate the passing of denominational exclusiveness, abroad in the Anglican establishment, here at home in the Protestant Episcopal communion, have recently been multiplying with a gratifying rapidity. The efforts of broad-minded, catholic men, like Dean Stanley and Phillips Brooks, seem in these days to show increased fruitfulness. On various sides religious leaders are openly expressing themselves in a way that promises the removal of the bars by which ministers of other churches have too long been excluded from the pulpits, and communicants not confirmed by bishops kept away from the altars, of Episcopalian houses of worship. Influences emanating from clerical sources and lay are at work to bring about early in the twentieth century the reunion of Protestant Christians and the first step to be taken in this direction, it is acknowledged, is to displace the spirit of aloofness and exclusiveness which too long has been characteristic of certain bodies.

During the sessions of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church, recently held in Richmond, Va., voices advocating "the letting down of the bars" were repeatedly heard, according to the newspaper reports, and action taken looking forward to the admission of ministers not of their order into the pulpits of their churches. The generous words of the Rev. Dr. William R. Huntington, of New York, were especially noteworthy as breathing the atmosphere of a true catholicity. In his view "all who have been duly bap-

tized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" are "to be accounted to be members of the flock of Christ,"—the general acknowledgment of which, together with its implications, would go far towards the realization of the unity of believers, apart even from that of the organic relationship of ecclesiastical bodies holding to non-essentials in forms of polity and worship.

In harmony with these sentiments are the pronouncements made recently by two distinguished Englishmen. The Bishop of Carlisle writes in a late issue of the *National Review* a severe and outspoken arraignment of the well-known, despicable attitude of the Church of England towards the Nonconformist bodies of the country. The history of that attitude, he declares, "should flood churchmen with crimson shame, and compel them on their knees to shed tears of humble penitence." He looks with scorn upon the arrogance and intolerance which Anglicans have so long and so unjustly exhibited toward other Christians, whose life and activity, he affirms, "have been manifestly inspired and blessed by the Holy Spirit." Canon Hensley Henson, the eloquent preacher in Westminster Abbey, in a sermon delivered there a short while ago, was even more caustic in the rebuke he administered to the unwarranted self-importance and self-sufficiency prevalent in the established church. "I venture to submit, with all deference to you," he is reported to have said, "that the time has fully come for us to revise our formal ecclesiastical theory in deference to considerations which unquestionably command the assent of our reason and our consciences. The mountains of prejudice, unreason and bigotry, by which we hold our nonconformist brethren at arm's length, must no longer be allowed to hinder us from fellowshiping with them, or them from fellowshiping with us. We must no longer quietly acquiesce in a working system, which involves the dominance of empty religious pretensions like that of exclusive apostolical succession, nor continue the hollow affirmation of obsolete ecclesiastical ideas like that

of being the sole bearers and interpreters of the 'sacred deposit' of religious doctrine."

The primary need of the hour, in his judgment, is religious honesty. "In the classic phrase of Dr. Johnson, churchmen, beyond all others, need 'to clear their mind of cant.' 'Let love be without hypocrisy' is the kindred phrase of St. Paul. On all sides there is *talk* of Christian unity,—I submit that in the interest of our self-respect, our cruel and insulting exclusiveness in *practice* should cease, that we should at least receive to Holy Communion those whom we hail with much ostentation as our fellow disciples, and to many of whom it must be acknowledged we are under such great spiritual obligations." The facts which he mentions as having brought home to his conscience the "intolerable outrage" of Anglicanism toward Nonconformity are worth noticing. In his study, at work in the preparation of sermons expressive of his obligations as a Christian teacher, he is not obliged by ecclesiastical law to draw any invidious distinctions. Baxter and Jeremy Taylor, Dale and Gore, Ramsay and Lightfoot, Ritschl and Moberly, Döllinger and Hort, George Adam Smith and Driver, Fairbairn and Westcott, Bruce and Sanday, Liddon and Lacordaire—these and many others of all Christian churches are allowed fellowship with him. It is not otherwise in the matter of his devotions. Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Nonconformist, no less than Anglican, are welcome to make their helpful contributions to him in the privacy of prayer and meditation. The two persons whom he venerated as the best Christians known to him, and to whom he owed most, were not Anglicans. But when he came into the sanctuary, the hideous discovery was forced upon him that all upon whose heads a bishop's hands had not been laid were to be treated as outcasts from his fellowship. "I might feed my mind with their wisdom, and kindle my devotion with their piety, and stir my conscience with their example, but I might not break bread with them at the table of our common Lord, nor bear their presence as teachers in the churches dedicated to His worship."

Deliverances like these cannot fail of serving the re-uniting of divided portions of the Church of Christ, and if under their influence the traditions of Archbishop Leighton could be allowed to replace those of Archbishop Laud, as we ought earnestly to pray and labor that they may do, the day of unification of reformed Christendom, at least, might be expected soon to dawn.

THE MOTIVE OF MODERN MISSIONARY EFFORT.

The *American Journal of Theology* during the past year published a number of distinctly excellent and really valuable articles on practical religious questions. Among them there is one, in the July issue, on the modern motives in missionary effort, the well-founded contentions and practical suggestions of which are entitled to the careful consideration of all who are interested in the enterprise of carrying the Gospel to the heathen world. The article was contributed by the Rev. Dr. Hastings Rashdall, who is an Oxford theologian, belonging to what a generation ago was known as the "Broad" church party. Whatever truth, in a general way, there may be in the facetious characterization of the thought of "broad" churchmen as "hazy," in distinction from that of the "low" as "lazy," and the "high" as "crazy," in Dr. Rashdall's views there is nothing at all obscure. He writes in the language and style of one that has clear convictions, and the courage and ability of expressing them unequivocally and forcefully. He is a convinced present-day theologian, a well-informed biblical critic, historian and scientific scholar. Those reading his interesting paper will find no difficulty in ascertaining what he thinks are the missionary motives that appeal to the modern mind, nor in determining the grounds on which, to his thinking, those motives are justly based.

"Recent changes of theological opinion have weakened certain arguments," he tells us, "by which the duty of missionary effort was once generally enforced by the churches." To two

of these he gives incidental attention: (1) How far orthodox people of the last generation really did believe that the whole heathen world was doomed to everlasting torments unless they heard and accepted what is technically called "the Gospel," I will not attempt to inquire; but it cannot be denied that missionary appeals have frequently assumed that some awful fate was in store for the heathen, no matter how fully they acted up to their lights and no matter how great the measure of that light, if they died without having accepted the gospel message. However effective such appeals may once have been when they fell on minds to which such a view seemed really credible, very few would feel disposed to question Dr. Rashdall's affirmation to the effect that such effectiveness attends them no longer. Even the most thoroughly orthodox have come to recognize that the "theories of retribution of ferocious theologians like Tertullian and Calvin make but little impression on thoughtful minds of to-day." (2) The other line of argument, whose efficacy is questioned by this Oxford writer, although still widely employed by preachers, is that which bases its appeal on what is called "the express command of Christ"—"Go ye into all the world and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Given such a direct and explicit command by their acknowledged Master, assembled congregations are often told in sermons, Christians should regard it necessary neither to inquire into the reasonableness of "their marching orders" nor to postpone even for a moment the consecration of themselves to the loyal obedience of it.

"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die."

Aside, however, from the question as to the authenticity of this command which, we are told, is to be classed "among the most disputed of all the sayings attributed to our Lord in the Synoptic Gospels," it is questionable whether "even among

those who have no definite theological or critical objections to the rather drill-sergeant theology which it implies, this kind of appeal is very effective in modern times. It is vaguely felt that it cannot be wrong to think, to demand a reason for what we do; and the modern man who is not convinced that missions are really a good thing on their own merits, will seldom be converted into a hearty or enthusiastic supporter of them by insisting on the positive command of Christ." Unless one is greatly mistaken, probably a majority of those who are the regular readers of these pages will not feel disinclined to give their assent to the statement "that as things are the duty of missionary work cannot be rested on a text. It must commend itself to reason and conscience, or it will no longer be recognized as a duty by the average man. It must be shown to rest upon and spring from that moral ideal which Christ taught, and which as a whole does so thoroughly commend itself to the consciousness of the moral world, or of all that is best in it, as to make personal missionary service or the cheerful and generous support of it, an inner and irresistible moral compulsion." For those who in our missionary boards are officially charged with the duty of leadership and inspiration in the Church at large, and likewise for those who in the humbler and narrower spheres of pastoral charges should be intent upon awakening a deeper and more intelligent interest in, and more liberal support of, the important cause of missions, the motives to which the modern man is most likely to give sympathetic response, as suggested by the article we are noticing, should be of commanding and informing interest. A few of them may be briefly stated.

The first of the considerations appealing to "the mind of the modern man as adequate motives for corporate effort and pecuniary contributions on the part of many, and for the severer self-sacrifice of the actual missionary" is that which springs from our knowledge of Christianity's contribution to ourselves, our social relations, and our civilization. Every consideration which in the light of uplifting and saving results

accomplished, "is sufficient to induce a man to subscribe to, or personally to take part in, the work of the Church at home, should move him to corresponding interest and activity in regard to the dissemination of its blessings among the non-Christian peoples. Every consideration that leads a man to value Christianity for himself must lead him to value it for others; and if he has at all entered into the meaning of Christianity—into its fundamental idea of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man—everything that commends our religion to him as a good thing for his own countrymen must constrain him to regard it as an equally good thing for the members of other nations and races,—a thing he is in duty bound to assist in giving to all men. The essential principle of Christian ethics is that it is a duty to promote the good of all mankind."

The second consideration springs from our conviction that the religion of Jesus has supreme value. Under the influence of the study of "*Comparative Religion*" an enormous change has taken place in men's conception of the relation of Christianity to so-called ethnic beliefs. As a consequence men's attitude toward the work of missions has been greatly modified. Upon the principle of measuring the value of religions "by their fruits," the supremacy of Christianity in its worth for individuals and for society can, however, be successfully maintained. Greater prominence, accordingly, should be given to the diffusion of knowledge of the actual results that missionary effort is accomplishing. "Abundant evidence of this sort can be collected from the testimony of impartial and trustworthy witnesses. Christianity does produce enormous and most salutary effects upon the lives alike of the most degraded savages and the most highly educated Hindu or Mussulman. The number of converts should not be regarded as the only or principal test of missionary success. The diffusion of Christian ideas which has resulted from missionary work in India and Japan, should be considered as of quite equal importance with the making of actual individual converts, both on account of

the improvement in character and conduct of the persons influenced and of the probable increasing influence of Christian ideas upon society and institutions in the future." These considerations, duly emphasized in connection with the motives that spring from the self-sacrificing life and death of our loving Saviour, may be expected to wield an influence in the present age over men in behalf of missions, the equal of which was not achieved by the metaphysical doctrines, now superseded, in the ages that believed them and willingly listened to their proclamation.

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.

VII.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

BY PROF. A. V. HIESTER.

At the request of the managing editors the writer has undertaken the difficult but important task of keeping the readers of the REVIEW in touch with the main currents of contemporary social thought. This innovation in the policy of the REVIEW has been prompted by the growing recognition of the importance of sociology, not only for the citizen and man of affairs, but particularly for the Christian minister. No minister who would wield an influence in his community can afford to be ignorant of the social, economic and political questions of the day, any more than a physician can afford to be ignorant of the structure and functions of the human body. It is in accordance with this opinion that some of the leading theological seminaries are now engaged in the task of recasting their courses of study with the purpose of making more room for sociology, philanthropy, penology, psychology and kindred subjects. This is notably the case at Yale. In our own seminary Dr. Rupp for a number of years gave a course of lectures along social and economic lines; and in Franklin and Marshall College sociology, both pure and applied, has been an established feature of the curriculum since 1900.

But, first, a word of caution. The various currents of thought are not so clearly defined in sociology as in the older sciences. There are many eddies and cross-currents to confuse and mislead. That sociology is still in this inchoate state is due to the fact that the theoretical part of it has been built up largely through the work of men, who have confined themselves to particular phases of social life, and have ignored,

not only other phases, but also the work of other men. Sociologists have, therefore, worked at cross-purposes, and the consequence has been an utter lack of agreement on fundamentals. Nor has there been any proper coördination between the historical, the analytical and the ameliorative sides of the science. It was very largely owing to this manifest defect that the American Sociological Society was organized two years ago; and it was the unanimous opinion of those who were present at the preliminary meeting that the new society should include in its membership, not only persons engaged in academic instruction, but also practical philanthropists and penologists, not only sociological writers, but also sociological workers. This was done in order to create a clearing house of social ideas, establish a federation of sociological interests held in proper balance, and bring the several groups of persons interested in sociology into relations of mutual sympathy and helpful coöperation.

In order, however, to make contemporary currents of social thought comprehensible it will be necessary, first, to relate them to the past. It is because we can learn what a thing is by tracing it through the various stages of its growth and development, that the historical method has become so important in modern research. It will be altogether proper, therefore, and not without value, if at this point a rapid survey be taken of the road by which sociology has arrived at its present attitude toward the problems of society. Such a survey will prove helpful, not so much because the attempts of yesterday to formulate and solve social problems can suffice to solve the problems of to-day—as though the battles of the modern world could be fought with the weapons snatched from the walls of some feudal armorial hall—but rather because these attempts of yesterday have led to a clearer statement of the problems, and because, too, they have helped to eliminate the impossible solutions and so cleared the way for better ones.

It is quite needless to ask when men first directed their

attention to social phenomena, and tried to see these phenomena in their connections, and then attempted to describe them in their supposed relations. We cannot go back far enough in the history of the race to catch these first beginnings, for ever since men have been men they have puzzled their brains about social truths. At first, of course, and for a long time, the attention paid to social phenomena was unconscious, and only very gradually did it become deliberate and take rank as a dignified intellectual pursuit. Hence, while sociology as a distinct science is scarcely more than half a century old, there is a sense also in which it is as old as human reflection.

If the body of ideas about society, which we call sociology, be examined genetically, they will be seen to have sprung from three distinct sources. The first source will be found in the plans of government, law, industry, religion or social order in general, which have been formulated and put into operation by leaders of thought and action in the course of social evolution. These plans sprang in the first instance out of the peculiar conditions of particular social groups, and in the degree that they proved successful under the tests of actual practice they helped to prepare the way, as they were meant to do in many instances, for more general systems and theories. The second source of social ideas is to be found in the ideal systems put forth, sometimes by philosophers, sometimes, too, by idle dreamers and fanatical visionaries, but never tried. And in the third place we shall find the contributions of the scientists who through systematic investigation and logical construction have laid the permanent foundations of sociology.

These three classes of ideas do not follow each other in chronological order; nor are they constant in their relative strength and influence; nor are they so completely separated that none is influenced by the others. On the contrary they are synchronous, variable and interdependent. They are

rather like three streams flowing side by side with varying rates, volumes and courses, now narrow and now broader again, now sluggish and now rapid and violent, now mingling their waters and now dividing again.

I. Under the first source of ideas there are two distinct classes of social experiments: 1. Those which have been imposed upon entire nations by governmental agencies, whether these agencies expressed the collective will of the people or only the arbitrary fiat of a despot. 2. Those which have been entered into voluntarily by small groups without governmental support or sanction, and which have been maintained, not by external coercion, but by an internal cohesive force.

1. Of the first class there are a large number of experiments, both ancient and modern, which may be studied with profit by the sociologist. But in this paper only the following can be considered: (a) the Hebrew Commonwealth; (b) the Solonian Constitution; (c) the French Revolution.

(a) The Hebrew Commonwealth from whatever point of view regarded presents a peculiar social polity. For the sociologist it raises two important questions: first, the question of its origin; and, secondly, the question of its content.

The question whether the Mosaic system was given by God in immediate revelation and in completed form, or developed through long ages of national evolution from certain germinal principles, cannot perhaps be definitely determined. But most probably it was the product of a process of gradual growth and development. This view is supported by several considerations.

From various passages of the Old Testament it appears that what Moses received from God was only a rough outline which was gradually filled in under the requirements of the times. In several places, indeed, we are afforded glimpses of this process of growth, passages which show how general rules, civil, criminal and ceremonial, originated in, or were modified by, special circumstances.

A second consideration is the fact that of the several codes which contain the Mosaic legislation the earlier ones limited themselves for the most part to the broader duties of humanity, justice and morality. Thus the *Deuteronomic Code* is distinguished from the earlier *Book of the Covenant* by its systematic and elaborate character; and it clearly evidences a more advanced social life. In addition to nearly all the provisions of the *Book of the Covenant*, it contains many new ones, and along with this greater variety of subjects there is also a more detailed treatment. This proves that social organization has grown more complex and needs institutions at once more numerous and more complicated to regulate it. A still greater advance in social organization is indicated by the code known as the *Law of Holiness*, Lev. chs. 17-26, and the *Priests' Code* scattered over the books of Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers. But this advance is almost entirely limited to ceremonial observances, which do not abrogate, but presuppose and complement, the provisions of the earlier codes dealing with civil and criminal law.

A third argument in behalf of the view that the Mosaic polity was a gradual growth is afforded by the fact that it was not peculiar to the Hebrews. It did not in fact differ essentially from the systems of other Semitic peoples, nor even from those of the ancient world generally. It is maintained by Semitic scholars that it contains elements borrowed from the Canaanites; that some of its ceremonial terms are found in Carthaginian and other Phœnician inscriptions; that the Levitical ritual goes back to a time when there was no material difference in form between Hebrew sacrifices and those of surrounding nations, that the Babylonians had something analogous to the Jewish Sabbath; and that even the rite of circumcision was not peculiar to the Hebrews.

All this is quite in harmony with the conclusions of modern publicists. For no political principle is more generally accepted to-day than the doctrine that no constitution can be either enduring or efficient unless founded on the basic prin-

ciples of national character and molded by the physical and social environment. It must be a slowly developed organism, a growth, not an invention; and it is no disparagement, therefore, of the great work of the Hebrew lawgiver that the system which bears his name was built up in this gradual normal way. For the great lawgivers of history have proceeded, not by the arbitrary imposition of artificial systems of laws and institutions, but rather by taking the materials at hand, and gradually infusing them with a new spirit, and slowly adapting them to the accomplishment of a particular end. That such accommodation to the temper and character of the people was actually practised in the Mosaic economy may be seen from Christ's well-known reference to the Mosaic law of divorce, as well as from other instances in which "existing usages are limited and modified rather than actually sanctioned, because they were so deeply seated as not to admit of any but gradual extinction."

With respect, then, to the origin of the Mosaic legislation, we must conclude that what we have in the Pentateuch is not a new polity, but a long-established system infused with a new spirit and animated by a new and higher purpose.

The second question is the question of content. The various social attributes of the Mosaic polity may be arranged under the two principles of the sovereignty of God and the equality of its members. Jehovah is sovereign, king, the supreme civil ruler, the source of all law and authority. His will is the constitution, and his laws are the statute-book of the commonwealth. This is the first, the theocratic, principle and has various implications.

(1) As sovereign, God was regarded as the owner of the soil, and like any ordinary landlord he received from his tenants rents which were known as tithes. The offering of the first fruits was another acknowledgment of God's ownership of the soil. The Israelite owned his land only for use, but it was an ownership that could not be alienated. If he was in debt he might give his land in payment of the debt,

but only until the next year of jubilee when it returned to him unencumbered, unless in the meantime it had been redeemed either by the debtor or some one for him at a price determined by the distance of the next year of jubilee.

(2) The persons of Israelites were similarly the property of Jehovah. This is shown by the dedication and ransom of the first-born, and by the limited power of the master over his slave, if a Hebrew, in contrast to the absolute authority permitted over a foreign slave.

(3) The theocratic principle leaves no room for the assumption of despotic power by man over man, whether based on natural relationship, as in tribal society, or on the conferring of benefits, as in feudalism, or on physical or intellectual superiority, as in more advanced stages of social organization. In a theocracy the so-called rulers are not rulers at all but only the agents of God. This is seen, in the early history of the Hebrew Commonwealth, in the dictatorship of the judge, and, later, in the limitation of the power of the king by the spiritual commission of the prophet.

(4) Of the theory of the inherent rights of the individual, no less than of the theory of the absolute power of the governors over the governed, the theocratic principle is utterly destructive. It leaves no room for the principle of democracy whereby all authority proceeds from the people, either directly, as in a pure democracy, or indirectly, that is, through the delegation by the people of a part of their powers to their chosen agents, as in a representative democracy. Hence under the Mosaic system the individual had no inherent rights against the law, which, since it proceeded directly from God, was absolute in its authority and unlimited in its scope; and the consequence was that the daily life of an Israelite was regulated to the minutest detail.

(5) The Hebrew Commonwealth, because of its theocratic basis, involved a peculiar conception of goodness. Now goodness in its relation to man takes the form of righteousness and love; in its relation to God the form of piety; and in

its independence of all relation the form of purity. While other systems of government than the theocratic attempt only the regulation of the relations of men to one another by enforcing or protecting righteousness and love, disregarding entirely purity and piety, the primary concern of the Mosaic system was to promote purity and piety, leaving righteousness and love to find their proper place as deductions from the other two. How it emphasized purity is seen in its laws requiring ceremonial cleanness and punishing self-pollution. And in punishing sins against a man's own self, without reference to their effect on others, the Mosaic law set up a moral standard that was practically unknown, both to the nations of antiquity and the legal systems of the modern world. This lofty morality was the logical outcome of the theocratic principle which rested personal purity, not upon the dignity of human nature, but upon the obligation of communion with a holy God. At the same time, however, it bred a contempt for the persons and rights of unbelievers, and helped to preserve the principle of national exclusiveness.

(6) The theocratic idea involved, finally, a national cultus and a permanent sacred caste to maintain it. For the support of this caste the people were required to pay tithes, which, besides supporting the priests and Levites, the office bearers of the state, also went to the support of the poor and the maintenance of the sacrifices and sacrificial feasts. In the tithe we have a foreshadowing of the modern income tax which is almost universally regarded as the justest of all taxes. In addition to this main tax there were a number of minor ones: a poll tax of half a shekel for the maintenance of the sanctuary, the first fruits of corn, wine and oil, the firstlings of clean beasts, the first born of men and and unclean beasts to be redeemed with money, certain fines paid in the shape of sin offerings, and certain votive and free will offerings.

The other principle which distinguished the Hebrew Commonwealth is the principle of equality. This appears first of all in the original distribution of the land by which every

family was provided with a freehold as a permanent inalienable possession. Even the inhabitants of the towns were freeholders and combined agricultural with mechanical pursuits. Inasmuch as the whole population consisted of freeholders, there was no system of castes, no secular nobility, no submerged tenth. There was of course a spiritual nobility, the permanent sacred caste already referred to, whose members being Jehovah's ministers were also ministers of the state and exercised legislative as well as judicial powers. There was also a class of persons known as elders or princes, who, by virtue of character, intelligence or even wealth, exercised a certain influence. But there was no noble order in the modern sense of that term, no class enjoying prerogatives by birth in utter disregard of mental and moral qualities.

This principle of equality is seen further in the treatment of the poor. The provisions of the Mosaic law with regard to debt and the pledging of land have been noted. But a debtor could also pledge any other property of which he might be possessed, even his own person and the persons of his children. In this way slavery became more or less common but it was comparatively mild. The lot of the slave differed little from that of a hired servant. He had certain rights before the law. If a Hebrew, he could go free at the beginning of the sabbatical year; and his master was required to provide him liberally at his manumission with corn, wine and cattle. If a Hebrew was sold to a resident alien, he could be redeemed at any time at a price determined by the distance of the next sabbatical year. Every seventh year there was a general release from debt. The exaction of pledges for debt was restricted. The clothing or ox of a widow, or the upper or neither millstone, could not be taken in pledge. The creditor was not permitted to go into the debtor's house to fetch a pledge, but was required to wait on the outside until the debtor brought him a pledge of his own choosing; and this pledge the creditor could not keep overnight. The wages of servants, both Hebrew and foreign, were required to be paid

at the end of each day. The needy, particularly the widow and orphan, were to be aided and cared for. Loans were required to be without interest, if from a Hebrew to a Hebrew. Those who walked through cornfields and vineyards were permitted by the law to pluck of the corn and wine; and the corners of the fields were not to be reaped clean but left for the poor and the stranger.

The Hebrew Commonwealth has been considered somewhat at length because of its value for sociology and its great influence on subsequent forms and philosophies of government. No other code of laws in existence exhibits so completely the sociological conception of the state. It aimed at political, social and industrial justice, and dealing as it did with a semi-civilized race passing from ethnic to demographic society, it recognized and clearly defined all social relations and regulated the conduct of the individual in minutest fashion. It subordinated the individual to the social order, and thus gave recognition to the conception of the social organism as no legal code has ever done. All this, however, was not an end in itself but in order to something else. The Mosaic polity was animated and shaped by a great purpose and in this lies its great value for the modern world. Perhaps no topic in political science has received so much consideration as the question of the ends of the state. And out of the controversy there has emerged with more or less clearness the principle that the highest end of the state is not to exercise the police power and postulate its own existence as a sort of necessary evil, but to develop the universal side of man's nature, to promote morality, to perfect humanity. This is what Hegel meant by his doctrine that *sittlichkeit* is the end of the state. But morality is only one end of the state, and Hegel went wrong when he disregarded those other ends, which are more immediate and the means, indeed, by which alone the ultimate, the highest, end may be attained. In this recognition of morality as an end of the state we can trace the influence of the Hebrew Commonwealth.

(b) In order to understand the significance of Solon's reforms it is necessary to know the social, economic and political condition of Athens by which they were preceded. The population was roughly divided into two classes, the Eupatrids, or well-born, who owned nearly all the land and monopolized the whole power of the state, and the Thetes, who tilled the lands of the Eupatrids and paid five-sixths of all they raised as rent. In case of failure to pay the exorbitant rentals, a common occurrence, the miserable tenants could be sold into slavery at home or abroad. Besides these two classes, there was probably also a small class of peasant proprietors, little if any better off than the Thetes, for at any time they might be forced into debt by war, an unfavorable season or any other contingency, and if unable to pay, they were likewise sold into slavery. Thus we see on the one hand a grasping and despotic oligarchy, and on the other their miserable and helpless dependents, the great army of slaves, and of tenants and small proprietors on the verge of slavery.

Matters had gone from bad to worse until the lower classes were ripe for revolt. At this crisis Solon was elected archon in 594 B. C. and invested with extraordinary legislative powers for the purpose of making a constitution that would be just to all classes.

Solon's first step was to cancel all outstanding debts and free all who had been sold into slavery at home for debt. His justification of this step was his belief that the great mass of debts had been unjustly imposed. He also recast the law governing debt by forbidding the pledging of any man's person for debt and limiting the amount of produce or money which could be required as rent.

But Solon did not stop with these negative measures. His scheme contemplated a broadening of the foundations of the state through an extension of the franchise. Manifestly, however, the slave could not be enfranchised until he had first been freed, and the abolition of slavery for those of Attic blood was, therefore, only a preliminary step to what proved

a thoroughgoing transformation of Athenian society. Up to this time the gens, phratry and tribe had been the recognized sources of power, and no one could be a member of this society, or share in the government, except through membership in these social units which were based on blood kinship. But owing to the disturbed state of the Grecian tribes, and the consequent migrations from one state to another, large numbers in Attica and elsewhere had lost their connection with their own gens without acquiring membership in another. Persons of distinction were sometimes adopted by one gens out of another, but this privilege was seldom or never accorded to the poor. As this unattached portion of the population waxed larger and larger it became a growing menace to the security and stability of the social order, of which it formed no integral part and in which it enjoyed no privileges.

Clearly recognizing that its gentile institutions had become wholly inadequate to the needs of the Athenian state, Solon boldly resolved to substitute for the gentes, phratries and tribes a classification based on wealth. Having divided the entire free population into four classes, he made all citizens and gave to each one a share in the government corresponding to the rank of the class to which he had been assigned. Solon was not a democrat, and while he believed that it was an indispensable condition of order, good feeling, and efficiency in the state that all freemen should have some share in the government, it was not his purpose that they should share equally. The government was still to be a government of wealth and position, but limited by the principle of popular consent.

This limitation comes to view more particularly in the character of the organs of government which Solon added to those retained from the former constitution. The archons, nine in number and charged with the more important executive and judicial functions, the Senate of the Areopagus, composed of ex-archons, who had held their office without blame

and whose chief function was to supervise the laws, the magistrates and public morals, and the Council of Four Hundred, which proposed legislation, were all retained; and under the new constitution they were chosen by lot from the highest of the four property classes. To balance archons, senate and council Solon created two organs of popular control. The first was the Assembly to which all classes could come. Its chief function was to decide such matters as were submitted to it by the Council of Four Hundred, and in it any one, even the humblest citizen, could bring a magistrate to book. The other was the Heliaia, which was chosen from the general body of citizens and charged with the duty of revising the judicial judgments of the archons, whose power was thus very materially curtailed.

The real meaning of all these changes may be summed up in the statement that they mark the beginning of the transition from gentile to political society. That is to say, Athenian society, instead of resting on the principle of blood relationship, was made to rest on property and territory. This change was necessitated by the failure of gentile institutions to meet the growing needs of the state. Athenian society had reached that point in its development where there was needed a broader foundation for the state, a clearer definition and wider distribution of the powers of government, and the substitution of written laws for usages and customs. And these the gentile system was wholly unfitted to provide.

Like all far-reaching social changes this transition from gentile to political society was gradual; and for a time the two systems existed side by side. This is shown by the fact that along with the classification of the free population according to wealth as the basis of the state, the archonships continued to be limited to the members of the four tribes. Each tribe selected ten names which were placed in the urn, and from these forty, nine were drawn by lot to be archons. Hence, unless a citizen belonged to one of the tribes, he could not be an archon—and the same principle applied to the Council of

Four Hundred—no matter how wealthy he might be. A second fact, showing the incompleteness of the transition, is that while Solon did much to make property the basis of the state, he did nothing to establish the political principle of dealing with persons through their territorial relations, further than to make a mere beginning in the establishment of local units of administration.

It will be seen, therefore, that the reforms of Solon were prosecuted in a conservative spirit. They were not a radical experiment, for the noble families were continued in power, though their authority was made to rest on a foundation of popular consent. They fell far short of the spirit of modern democracy, because they did not open the doors to the offices and dignities of the state to every citizen irrespective of birth and wealth. But it was just because the experiment was kept within conservative lines, and did not break sharply and violently with the past, that it proved permanent, and that the changes which it inaugurated could take a full century to complete themselves.

(c) The French Revolution involves a number of social experiments that are well worth the attention of the sociologist. History affords no other instance where an entire people, stung at last into desperation by the oppressions of long centuries, broke so violently with the past and rushed along so blindly and passionately into such a jumble of ill-considered and for the most part short-lived changes.

Like the reforms of Solon the French Revolution was mainly an economic movement. France was still lingering in the grip of a half-decayed feudalism. It was a half-decayed feudalism because feudalism is in theory a system of reciprocal services, under which for certain privileges certain services are rendered, and because, furthermore, by the eighteenth century the privileged classes had ceased to render any services and only the privileges remained. To the evils of feudalism must be added a highly centralized organization of industry, the outgrowth of political conditions, and a general

depression of trade, due to oppressive monopolies and unwise interferences on the part of the state with industry. The result of all this was an exceptionally inequitable distribution of wealth.

When the States-General met in 1789 at the royal summons the economic condition of the masses was wretched beyond description. But instead of addressing itself in a practical way to the mitigation of the worst ills, the National Assembly, which had grown out of the States-General, adopted a Declaration of the Rights of Man whose cardinal doctrines were the sovereignty of the people and the equality of all men. Then it proceeded to sweep away all such institutions and arrangements as were deemed inconsistent with these principles. The first object of attack was feudalism. In a single night the National Assembly razed a social, political and industrial system, which ramified through every part of the national life, and which had molded customs, manners and habits of thought for centuries. However beneficial the ultimate effects of this step may have been, the suddenness with which the change was accomplished dislocated industry and led to frightful excesses on the part of the peasantry. But this was only the beginning. In its passion for equality the Assembly proceeded to level everything. With feudalism went all titles of honor, orders of knighthood, armorial bearings, liveries, distinctions of birth, monastic and religious orders, monopolies, the exclusive guilds of the towns, restrictions on trade and industry, the iniquitous exemptions of the privileged classes. Even the army, stronghold of birth and privilege, was reorganized so that preferment depended on merit and length of service. While very much of what was so blindly swept away was unquestionably bad, it must not be forgotten that many institutions, which were necessary and not inherently bad, were also involved in the general ruin simply because the innovators were too impatient to attempt their reformation.

The derangement of trade and industry brought about by

these changes soon made itself felt in the national finances. To meet the growing necessities of the state the lands of the Church were confiscated. An attempt to sell them having failed because of a general feeling of distrust, it was provided that they should be sold to the municipalities, to be resold later to private purchasers, and that the municipalities might pay for them in paper money based on the actual value of the land. This device flooded the country with an inconvertible paper currency—37,000,000,000 francs were issued altogether—and added greatly to the disturbing effect of other factors. It was thought that these measures would increase the number of small proprietors, and thus promote the principle of equality and at the same time build up a strong class that would be zealous to preserve the revolutionary settlement. But this expectation was not realized, for the lower classes were too poor to buy and only the middle class, therefore, benefited by the arrangement.

These enormous issues of paper money resulted in an inevitable depreciation and prices mounted higher and higher. To check this laws were enacted prescribing maximum prices for the necessities of life and punishing with death those who, having supplies of such commodities, failed to offer them for public sale at the legal price. This legal price was usually far below the actual value of the commodity. The effect of all this might easily have been foreseen. Production could not go on where the producer was forbidden to take what his goods were worth and what the consumer was willing to give. The consequence was that people produced almost entirely for their own consumption, and that in the cities and unfruitful districts, where it was impossible to produce enough food for local needs, large masses were reduced to the verge of starvation.

This precipitated a new problem. It was one of the principles of the Revolution that all had an equal right to labor. And where a man could not secure employment for himself, it was declared to be the duty of the state to provide him with

work. To this end, as well as to keep the hungry masses within bounds, large amounts were squandered by the cities in making employment for those out of work. When this was not possible, outright charity, thinly disguised sometimes, as when the state bought bread dear and sold it cheap, was resorted to. The result again was just what might have been foreseen. The vilest elements drifted into the cities, particularly Paris, bent on living without labor, and the disease was only aggravated.

On its political side the Revolution was an attack on the monarchy, as on its social and industrial side it was an attack on the aristocracy. The National Assembly declared from the first that the sovereignty lay with the people, not with the king; and the Constitution of 1791 was based on this principle. It took from the king nearly all his ancient prerogatives, and vested in a legislature consisting of a single chamber the absolute power to originate and enact laws, limited only by a restricted veto power permitted to the king. While the authority of the legislature was undoubtedly great in comparison with the royal prerogatives, it was very materially limited by the extraordinary powers which the constitution conferred upon the cities and departments; so that, in trying to avoid the extreme centralization of the old system, the constitution fell into the opposite error of an excessive distribution of the powers of government. Thus the departments, which had been substituted for the ancient historic provinces, were divided into districts, and these again into communes; and all of them, departments, districts and communes, had more or less complete powers of government. France had, indeed, been divided, as Burke said, into thousands of republics.

Any adult male who paid taxes equivalent to three days' labor and upwards could vote for an elector. The electors, who were subject to a higher property qualification, chose the members of the National Assembly, the administrators of

the departments, districts and communes, and, later, the judges, bishops and priests.

The Revolution was no less destructive of religious, than of political and economic, arrangements. It was voted in 1793 that there was no God, and almost everything that had any reference to Christianity was either altered or destroyed. The abolition of the monastic and religious orders, the confiscation of the lands of the Church, and the appointment of priests and bishops by popular election, have been noted. The clergy were completely subjected to the civil power, and everywhere the churches were handed over to the local units to be dealt with as these saw fit. In many places the worship of the Goddess of Reason, accompanied by sacrilegious rites, was substituted for Christianity.

To signalize its thoroughgoing rupture with the past the Revolution invaded every department of life. Its transforming power was felt in dress, manners and modes of speech. It set up new standards of morality. It changed the whole system of weights and measures, and established a new calendar. September 22, 1792, the date of the proclamation of the Republic, was adopted as the starting point of the new era. The year was divided into twelve months of thirty days, and each month was divided into decades, the last day of each decade to be observed as a day of rest in place of the Christian Sunday. This arrangement left five, and in leap years six, odd days at the end of the year. These were made festivals and consecrated to Genius, Industry, Fine Actions, Rewards, Opinion and the Revolution. The attempt was also made to divide the day successively into tenths in place of hours, minutes and seconds, but this was soon abandoned.

It is no easy task to give a just estimate of this greatest revolution of modern times. The lessons which it has to teach are not always decipherable. Many of its innovations were so crude that their failure sheds little light on the feasibility of similar experiments made under more settled conditions. And then there is the old question whether the insti-

tutions of ancient France had within themselves enough vitality to admit of a gradual and peaceful development in accordance with modern conditions, or whether they were only fit to be cut down and cast into the fire. But this much may be said with certainty, that along with much that was vicious, impracticable, ephemeral and grotesque, the Revolution gave to France several permanent gains of undoubted value. The new industrial arrangements which it inaugurated greatly stimulated the production of wealth, and, at the same time, distributed that wealth more equitably; so that France is to-day a more prosperous and contented nation in consequence of that terrible upheaval. On its political side it might seem to have accomplished much less, for in a few years France returned to a more or less despotic type of monarchy, while republican forms were abolished, and hereditary distinctions created anew. But though it may have been obscured for a time by the glare and glamor of war, the principle of the sovereignty of the people, established by the Revolution as one of its most fundamental doctrines, was never altogether lost from the consciousness of the French people. Through all the various political changes from that time to this it has had to be reckoned with, and with each new settlement it has brought France a little nearer to real republicanism.

The Hebrew Commonwealth, the Solonian Constitution and the French Revolution have been considered simply as types of social experiments projected on a national scale. There are, however, many others of scarcely less importance for the sociologist, and among them the following may yet be named: the Roman Constitution of Servius Tullius, which was very similar to the Solonian Constitution; the Carolingian Empire with its fusion of German customs and Roman law; the American Revolution with its bold enunciation of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people; the English Revolution of 1832 which marked the successful completion of the long struggle for popular government; the formation of the Swiss

Republic with its strange combination of aristocratic free cities and rural democracies; the abolition of serfdom in Russia, a half-way measure which the present forces of revolution are determined to complete; the establishment of the German Empire after a long and almost hopeless struggle with the forces of princely particularism and popular indifference; and, lastly, the futile attempts in Central and South America to plant republican institutions where only despotism can cope with the forces of anarchy.

LANCASTER, PA.

VIII.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE CHURCH.

We take pleasure in announcing to the readers of the REVIEW that the Rev. A. V. Hiester, professor of political and social science in Franklin and Marshall College, has consented to take charge of the new department of Contemporary Sociological Thought. He is peculiarly well-fitted for this work. He was reared in a Reformed parsonage, educated in the college in which he is now a professor, and trained in theology in the Seminary at Lancaster, Pa. He spent two years in Columbia University working in the department of sociology under Professor Giddings. His Alma Mater honored him by an election to the chair of political and social science, which he has acceptably filled for more than ten years. His influence on the students is evident in the subjects of their orations, debates and graduating theses. Imbued from childhood with the spirit of the Reformed Church, a minister of the gospel and a specialist in sociology, Professor Hiester is prepared to discuss the many difficult and vital problems of society from a point of view that will commend itself to the patrons of the REVIEW.

Sociology ought to appeal forcibly to the Church and the ministry. It is the counterpart of theology. The one balances the other. Jesus inseparably united them in His summary of the Law and the Prophets. Love of God is a human function which is scientifically treated in theology. Man's relation to his fellows furnishes the material for sociology. While the Church in the past has devoted its time almost exclusively to the study of theology, there is no reason why the study of sociology should not be equally profitable. In

the teachings of Jesus there are sanctions for both. Much of the one-sidedness of theology would have doubtless been avoided, had the theologian been kept in restraint by sociological study. The latter has to do with men in their social relations, and it will readily be conceded that these relations largely condition the religious life. The Christian life is not normal until men are in harmonious fellowship with both God and one another.

But some one will say theology cannot make men religious and sociology cannot make men social. That is true. The sciences do not beget life. It is their mission to observe, collate, and analyze the facts of life. We do not become healthy by reading physiology, still physiology may suggest ways of living which will preserve or restore health. We do not become rational beings by studying logic, still a definition of the laws of thought will help us think correctly. The psychology of religion does not convert sinners, still it aids men to understand the nature of religion and to discriminate it from religiosity. Men were social beings long before the sociologist arrived, still the science of society enables them to perform their social functions in a more intelligent and effective way. We recognize that life and love are born of personal fellowship and come from the realm of the infinite and eternal. The Church's function is to mediate, through the gospel, these heavenly gifts unto men. Neither science, art, nor philosophy can take the place of the gospel, but they ought to be its servants without a sacrifice of the freedom which is necessary for their successful pursuit.

The Church, however, has not accomplished its mission when it has saved an individual here and there. The gospel leaven must transform the social organism with its institutions. The process of social redemption does not operate magically. While the power comes from Christ, the method of procedure in reconstructing society according to Christian principles must be determined by men. For this purpose the results of sociological study are indispensable. The minister can no

longer afford to be ignorant of the nature of society, the laws of its development, and the conditions of its well-being. All the subjects, which the sociologist discusses, the preacher touches in the sermon. Among them are: the home, the school, the state, municipal and national politics, crime, wealth, poverty, trusts, unions, intemperance, charitable work, art, and the various theories of social betterment. It would, indeed, be a fatal error to read sociological essays on these topics to a congregation, and call that preaching. But the fund of material furnished by the sociologist to the preacher will enable him to proclaim the gospel more wisely and pertinently. The Church in its benevolent operations, also, ought to be guided by the laws, principles, and schemes for social correction and improvement, which are propounded by the social scientist.

There is a conception of the kingdom of God in which the world is not regarded as an object of redemption. The present social and political order is held to be essentially unsalvable and doomed to disintegration and annihilation. By the preaching of the gospel, it is true, some men are saved. They must live, however, as strangers and pilgrims on earth waiting for the Lord's return. At His coming He will gather His own unto Himself, the evil world will be dissolved, and the new heavens and the new earth will be established by a divine fiat. The dispensation of the Church is, therefore, a relative failure. The gospel is not intended to change the social system and Christians have no inspiring motive for taking part in the work of social redemption.

The signs of the times, however, indicate a decided change of view in reference to the scope of the gospel and the purpose of the Church. The aim of the Christians of the twentieth century is apparently not only to go up into heaven but to bring heaven down, to save the individual and the social organism of which he is a member. For society is more than a conglomerate of individuals; it is a living organism which is itself capable of transformation by the Spirit of Christ. In

an admirable book on Christianity and the Social Crisis, Professor Rauschenbusch lays down as his fundamental thesis that "the essential purpose of Christianity is to transform human society into the kingdom of God by regenerating all human relations and reconstituting them according to the will of God." Professor Matthews in *The Church and the Changing Order* says: "The greatest service which the Church can render society just at present is to contribute the Spirit of Jesus to the ideals which are provocative of discontent." The Presbyterian Church has commissioned the Rev. Charles Stelzle to conduct a religious propaganda among the working-men of America in order to bring about closer relations between the Church and the masses. His work is attracting national attention. Socialism is spreading and increasing in force at a startling rate. Several years ago Professor Thos. C. Hall, of the Union Theological Seminary, N. Y., wrote an article on "Socialism as Christianity's Most Formidable Rival." Reports from Europe and America prove that there are sufficient reasons for a consideration of this subject. Shall the Church stand aloof from this movement? Or shall it, in the words of Professor Peabody, "communicate to the social movement that social energy which the teaching of Jesus originates and conserves"? If not, society must remain un-Christian and be tossed about hopelessly by every wind and wave of human caprice and passion.

In England, probably more than in this country, prominent ministers of the gospel are actively interested in Christian socialism. Dr. John Clifford, pastor of the most influential Baptist Church in London, and Dr. Stopford Brooke, an eminent Unitarian scholar, are both members of the Fabian Society. Canon Scott-Holland has been for years the leader of a Christian Socialist group of Anglican clergymen.

This change of attitude on the part of the Church toward social questions is due partly to a change in the idea of the kingdom. It is no longer regarded as something above, or apart from, the existing social order, but it is that order

gradually leavened and controlled by the Christian spirit. Christ is coming in the course of the ages and the kingdom of the world is becoming the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ. His advent is consummated when He is all in all. It is a reasonable hope, then, that the home, the school, the state, and the industrial system will be dominated by the mind of Christ. The Church's mission, now as always, is not to resolve itself into a social organization, but to inspire Christian ideals in men's hearts. The social institutions will in time be Christianized. The minister is not to turn into a political partisan, nor a moral reformer, nor an apostle of sweetness and light. He has a higher mission than these, namely, the preaching of the gospel.

After years of experience in the ministry and in practical politics, Dr. Gladden writes, on the work of the Church in political affairs, as follows:

"Its business is to apply the law of Christ to all the concerns of life, and to reveal the spirit of Christ in the lives of its members. Its high calling is to fit men and women for self-government, to fill their minds so full of the wisdom that is in Christ and their hearts so full of his love that good government shall be the spontaneous and inevitable expression of their lives.

"This means that the teaching of the church with respect to social and political principles shall be clear and authoritative. It means that the pulpit shall show men what the law of Christ means and how it works in existing human relations; that it shall take the great ideals of brotherhood and service and hold them close to the life of every day, so that men may see what it means to be Christians now, in this twentieth century, and in all the business of this complex civilization. . . .

"Here the duty of the church ends. These Christian citizens, thus instructed and inspired, must unite in other organizations to give effect to the truth which has taken possession of their lives. It is not for the church, in its meetings or by its official action, to seek to make nominations, or to elect

officers, or to frame legislation; the working out of these principles must be left to other agencies. Either through the parties to which they belong or through independent organizations these Christian citizens must exercise their political functions."

The Church has a message on every subject related to human welfare. When men are hardened by materialism it proclaims eternal ideals. When scepticism attacks creeds, it is the pillar and ground of the faith. When superstition and ignorance enthrall the conscience, it stands for reasonableness and light. When anarchy stalks red-handed over the land, it is the champion of law and order. When the tyrant grinds the faces of the poor, it demands justice and equity. The Church is to rule the world, but "not by might nor by power but by my Spirit, saith the Lord."

G. W. R.

MODERNISM.

The encyclical of Pius X., dated September 8, 1907, is one of the most notable theological documents of the current year. When Rome speaks the world still listens, but no longer trembles. The occasion for this utterance is not found in conditions outside, but inside, of the Roman Church. With the concern and grief of a father for his erring children, the Pope admonishes, and pleads with, his wayward sons. "That we make no delay in this matter," he says, "is rendered necessary especially by the fact that the partisans of error are to be sought not only among the Church's open enemies; they lie hid, a thing to be deeply deplored and feared, in her very bosom and heart."* Many of the laity and the priesthood are charged with holding "the poisonous doctrines." He admits, indeed, that they lead "a life of greatest activity, of assiduous and ardent application to every branch of learning, and that they possess, as a rule, a reputation for the strictest morality."

* The quotations are taken from the translation of the Encyclical published by *The Catholic Mind*, Nos. 20, 21, 22.

Of course all this makes them only the more dangerous enemies of the Church.

What is meant by the term "Modernism"? The answer is found in the Encyclical which is divided into three parts as follows: (1) Analysis of Modernist Teaching; (2) Causes of Modernism; (3) Remedies. Printed in the REVIEW the material would cover about seventy pages. By far the greater portion of the space is given to the first part. The reasons assigned for dwelling at such length on the exposition of the erroneous doctrines are: first, to refute the charge of his opponents that he "does not understand their ideas"; and, second, "to show that their system does not consist in scattered and unconnected theories but in a perfectly organized body, all the parts of which are solidly joined, so that it is not possible to admit one without admitting all." In our opinion both these ends have been accomplished. The Pope understands the fundamental principles of what he terms Modernism, so far as an opponent can. He has, also, demonstrated, what we have always contended for, that the difference between the medieval and the modern theology is not found in this or that doctrine, but in a general view of the world and of life. The two systems are principally antagonistic and irreconcilable. Unless the men in controversy will agree on the premises, it is love's labor lost to argue about conclusions.

The modernist is considered as philosopher, believer, theologian, historian, critic, apologist, and reformer.

In the analysis of the philosophical foundation the theory of knowledge is found to be the point at issue. Modernism is said to deny that man, by the natural reason, can know God. The methods of Natural Theology are given up. In so far it is a species of agnosticism. But what the reason cannot discern is comprehended by faith. The positive side of the system is the theory of the "vital immanence" of God. He reveals Himself in the heart of man as "sentiment." "In the presence of this *unknowable*, whether it is outside man and beyond the visible world of nature, or lies hidden within

in the subconsciousness, the need of the divine, according to the principle of Fideism, excites in a soul with a propensity towards religion a certain special *Sentiment*, without any previous advertence of the mind; and this sentiment possesses, implied within itself both as its own object and its intrinsic cause, the *reality* of the divine, and in a way unites man with God. It is the sentiment to which Modernists give the name of faith, and this it is which they consider the beginning of religion." Their agnosticism is, therefore, not atheistic but theistic. Both the Pope and the Modernist believe in God but their way of approach to Him differs. A natural corollary of this view of revelation is the evolution of religion, corresponding to the progressive revelation of God in human consciousness, and the development of dogma by expressing in philosophical formulas the contents of the religious sentiment in the several stages of its growth. This theory undermines the Catholic idea of authority and the Pope calls it "an immense collection of sophisms, that ruins and destroys all religion." The refutation of the false philosophy closes in papal style as follows: "Blind that they are, and leaders of the blind, inflated with a boastful science, they have reached that pitch of folly where they pervert the eternal concept of truth and the true nature of the religious sentiment, etc."

The Modernist is, also, a believer. His faith, however, does not rest on miraculously revealed facts and dogmas which have been entrusted to a hierarchy and must be accepted without question by the laity, but upon the individual's experience of God. "In the religious sentiment one must recognize a kind of intuition of the heart which puts man in immediate contact with the very reality of God, and infuses such a persuasion of God's existence and His action both within and without man as to excel greatly any scientific conviction." It necessarily follows that faith and science are separated. The only function of science is to formulate the material furnished by faith. In so far, and no further, faith is dependent on science. This is said to be in opposition to

the decree of the Vatican Council, the teaching of Pius IX., and of Gregory IX. Without further argument the error is disposed of in this summary appeal to authority.

As a theologian the Modernist is declared to be in error on the Sacraments, the Scriptures, the Church, the Relations between Church and State, and the Magisterium (authority) of the Church. The Sacraments "are mere symbols or signs, though not devoid of a certain efficacy—an efficacy like that of certain phrases vulgarly described as having 'caught on,' inasmuch as they have become the vehicle for the diffusion of certain great ideas which strike the public mind." Or, in other words, they "are instituted solely to foster the faith—but this is condemned by the Council of Trent." The Scriptures are described "as a collection of experiences, not indeed of the kind that may come to anybody, but those extraordinary and striking ones which have happened in religion." The source of inspiration is the immanent God. "Of inspiration in the Catholic sense there is no trace." The Church "has its birth in a double need, the need of the individual believer, especially if he has had some original and special experience, to communicate his faith to others, and the need of the mass, when the faith has become common to many, to form itself into a society and to guard, increase and propagate the common good." It is an organism whose vital principle is Christ and which has gradually unfolded into the Catholic system with a "triple authority," namely, "disciplinary, dogmatic, liturgical." The encyclical teaches, on the contrary, that the Church was "instituted by God as the author of the supernatural order." According to Modernism Church and State ought to be separated. They "are strangers by reason of the diversity of their ends, that of the Church being spiritual that of the State is temporal." The principles, from which these doctrines spring, have been solemnly condemned by Pius VI. in his Constitution *Auctorem fidei*. "What will become of ecclesiastical authority," it is asked, "which can only be exercised by external acts? Obviously

it will be completely under the dominion of the State. It is this inevitable consequence which impels many among liberal Protestants to reject all external religious community, and makes them advocate what they call *individual* religion." Enough has been quoted to indicate to the reader the system against which the Pope contends. At the conclusion of the analysis he says: "We should define it as the synthesis of all heresies." "Their system means the destruction not of the Catholic religion alone, but of all religion."

Two causes are cited. "The proximate and immediate cause consists in a perversion of the mind." The remote causes are "curiosity and pride." These statements will not likely have a conciliatory effect on the dissenters. Nor will the "Remedies," which are proposed, cure the disease. The scholastic philosophy, especially the system of St. Thomas, is to be made the basis of the sacred sciences. The policy of repression and prohibition, rather than of argument and conversion, is advocated with more rigor than in the sixteenth century. All who are suspected of being imbued with modernist tendencies are not to be chosen as directors and professors for seminaries and Catholic universities. "Diligence and severity are to be used in selecting candidates for Holy Orders." Bishops are "to prevent writings infected with modernism or favorable to it from being read when they have been published, and to hinder their publication where they have not." Pernicious books are to be driven out of the dioceses. "It is not enough to hinder the reading and the sale of bad books—it is also necessary to prevent them from being printed." Directions are carefully given for the publication of books under the strictest censorship. Special censors for newspapers and periodicals are to be appointed. Congresses of priests are considered dangerous and are to be prohibited by the bishops. In order that the commands and prescriptions may be carried out, "Diocesan Watch Committees" are to be appointed. They shall meet every two months and "shall watch most carefully for every trace and sign of

modernism both in publications and in teaching and preserve from it the clergy and the young." These defensive measures lead close to obscurantism, not only denying the right of private judgment but the means for forming private judgment. Carried out consistently the world would have to bow at the knee of the Pope and submit all the great problems of human destiny to his decision; accepting the answer without protest and with childlike trust.

That the Modernists have not been silenced by this formidable document is shown by a publication which came in its wake, entitled "What We Want: An Open Letter to Pius X. from a Group of Priests."* It comes from Italy. The authors take the Holy Father to task somewhat in the manner of the reformers of the sixteenth century. They profess to be true Roman Catholics and deprecate schism. They deny allegiance to the misty Neo-Catholicism which reduces religion to an indefinable emotion. "For us," they say, "Christianity is the highest expression of religion and of Christianity in its turn we consider Roman Catholicism to be the amplest realization." Still they claim the right to affirm that other religions outside of Roman Catholicism, outside of Christianity even, are also revelations of God to the human soul. They plead for an abandonment of coercive measures by the Church and for permission to study the Scriptures critically. The evolution of dogmas is conceded. The rights of reason are demanded. Reasonable men cannot be asked to give their "adhesion to certain assertions determined by the blind faith of souls, however holy." For instance, they cannot adhere "to what you (Pius X.) yourself affirmed in the Encyclical of October 27, 1904, viz.: that the Hebrew patriarchs were familiar with the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception and found consolation in the thought in the solemn moments of their life." They welcome science and democracy and seek to make them their own. "One thing, at least, is certain, that democracy has come to stay; that to the

* Reviewed in *The Spectator*, September 21, 1907.

generations of the near future any other conception of authority will be simply unthinkable; that if the authority of popes, councils and bishops cannot be reinterpreted in the same, it is as irrevocably doomed as the theologies of man's childhood."

The battle has evidently begun in the Roman fold. Those in a position to know, like Mr. Sabatier, declare that many young men are in sympathy with the Four Priests. Both parties appear equally inflexible and determined. That a break must come sooner or later no one can doubt. It is the beginning of a new movement with consequences second only to those of the Protestant reform.

There are Protestants who will doubtless applaud the Pope's manifesto. For in viewpoint they are in accord with him. They, too, appeal to tradition as a final argument; they reject the theory of development; they denounce the critical study of the Scriptures, and they put the infallible Book in place of the infallible Man. The view of the world, on which both systems are based, is essentially the same. Is it possible that we are on the verge of a new alignment in Christianity when the Modernists of all churches will unite on one side and the Medievalists will join hands on the other? The signs of the times point to an inevitable reconstruction, the method of which no one can foretell.

In conclusion we shall summarize certain prominent characteristics of the Encyclical:

1. Like all papal documents, this is given to unwarranted generalizations. With a majestic sweep of the hand the best products of modern civilization are condemned. No one will deny that there is a strong materialistic and atheistic tendency in our age. But theistic and Christian Modernism is no more accountable for that than Medievalism was for similar godless and rebellious tendencies in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By their fruits ye shall know them.

2. The statement of the Modernist position is strong but the refutation is weak. Abusive epithets, citations of papal utterances and quotations from the Fathers did not satisfy

even the enlightened men of the sixteenth century; how much less will they convince men of the twentieth! When the appeal to reason and conscience is made in every sphere of life, and the child is trained to it from the home to the university, can it be dispensed with in questions that concern our holy religion? Verily, the currents of the age are sweeping away from Rome.

3. The Modernists do not, as the Pope claims, deny the supernatural nor do they disclaim an objective authority. But they define these terms differently. God is recognized by both as the source of truth and as the ultimate authority. For the Romanist God is removed from the world and speaks through the divinely ordained men and institution. Authority, therefore, is above men. For the Modernist God is in His world and speaks directly to the soul. Authority is in men. The whole matter is a controversy about authority in religion.

4. The conflict resolves itself into a difference of Weltanschauungen. The Catholic Church condemned Copernicus and Galileo and remained immovably fixed on medieval bases. Many of its members have moved out of the Middle Ages and have built on new foundations. The consequence is a painful tension between two ideals.

The Roman system rests on the geocentric theory of the universe. The earth is a flat disc floating on a circumambient ocean. The stars are set in the arched firmament. Above the firmament is the celestial ocean, and beyond it is the heaven of heavens in which is the throne of God surrounded by angels, archangels and the host of the redeemed. Hell is under the earth. The Church, the City of God, is the center of humanity with divine authority to rule over it. The terrestrial hierarchy has its counterpart in a celestial hierarchy, and thus through an ascending series of mediators man reaches the transcendent God. This view has on its side the witness of the senses, the authority of antiquity, the philosophy of Aristotle and the Ptolemaic astronomy. The conceptions, in the popular mind, of the supernatural, of the miracle, of inspira-

tion, of incarnation, of grace, of the second advent and of ecclesiastical authority are largely shaped by this cosmology. Introduce the heliocentric system and you will have a view of the universe which will require a reconstruction of theology. The whole structure of limited and local conceptions totters and trembles as soon as the earth ceases to be the center of the universe and the heaven its dome. If the Vatican could have silenced Copernicus and Luther it would not have the Modernists on its hands to-day. This the Pope seems to feel when he says: "Modernism leads to an annihilation of all religion. The first step in this direction was taken by Protestantism; the second is made by Modernism; the next will plunge headlong into atheism."

G. W. R.

X.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. By Philip Schaff. Vol. V., Part I. The Middle Ages. From Gregory VII., 1049, to Boniface VIII., 1294. By David S. Schaff, D.D., Professor of Church History in the Western Theological Seminary, Alleghany, Pa. Pages xiv + 910. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. Price \$3.25 net.

The long-expected fifth volume of Dr. Schaff's Church History has at last appeared. Instead of one volume, however, it is two, each numbering more than 900 pages. The first part of Volume V. is in print; the second is passing through the press. In explanation of the preparation of two volumes instead of one, as was originally planned, the author says: "It is doubtful whether Dr. Schaff, after proceeding with his studies, would have thought it wise to attempt to execute his original purpose. However this might have been, to have confined the treatment of 500 years to the limits of a single volume would have meant to do a relative injustice and, in the light of recent study, to have missed a proper proportion."

It was, indeed, no small task for a son to complete a father's work which he had planned on so comprehensive a scale. Dr. Philip Schaff had finished six volumes and was gathering material for the volume on the Middle Ages, when his long and brilliant career was ended by death (1893). The work was then assumed by his son who has devoted the greater part of fifteen years to the task. He could use comparatively little of his father's material, and whatever was available is incorporated in the first four chapters of Part I. The reason for the apparently long time taken for the preparation of the two parts is found in the vast amount of material that had to be mastered and in the difficulty of procuring the necessary literature in this country. "The author has felt unwilling to issue the volume without giving to it as thorough study as it was possible for him to give. This meant that he should familiarize himself not only with the medieval writings themselves but with the vast amount of research which has been devoted to the Middle Ages during the last quarter of a century and more."

The book, both in binding and in the arrangement of the contents, conforms to the former volumes of the series. The reader will find the customary introductory survey, the exhaustive citation of sources and literature at the head of each chapter, and

numerous footnotes from the original documents or the leading authorities. In these respects at least the continuity is conserved.

The reader, however, will be no less gratified to find that the father's mantle has fallen on a worthy son. If the style is less florid and graceful, it is all the more terse and concise. The author has carefully selected the necessary material to delineate the character, principles, and ambitions of the great medieval popes. No space is wasted on incidents and on efforts to solve questions which for the present cannot be answered. The genetic relation of the papal reigns from the first of the Hildebrandian popes to Boniface VIII. is described in a masterly way. The first six chapters are devoted to this subject.

In the last ten chapters the following topics are treated: The Crusades, The Monastic Orders, Missions, Heresy and Its Suppression, Universities and Cathedrals, Scholastic and Mystic Theology, Scholasticism at its Height, The Sacramental System, Pope and Clergy, Popular Worship and Superstition. There is not a single volume in English which treats these subjects so thoroughly. Nor is there a period in church history on which less is written and read than this. Yet it is in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when some of the greatest movements of history began, the fruits of which we are still reaping. The papacy reached the summit of its power. The mendicant orders were founded. Men were carried away by the crusading spirit and chivalry was in bloom. The universities were opened and the cathedrals were erected. The scholastic philosophy and theology attracted the attention of priest, monk, and noble. The western nations were born and the spirit of nationalism appeared. The teutonic peoples were reaching their majority and the conflict between medievalism and modernism was begun. The period is full of tendencies which are preparing the way for the reformation. In the light of these facts the historical student will see the import of Dr. Schaff's history.

The professors in the theological and literary institutions and the ministers of the Reformed Church take a special interest in this work. Many of the older men were pupils of Dr. Philip Schaff while he taught in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church at Mercersburg. There he achieved his first success as an author in this country. His *Principles of Protestantism*, *What is Church History*, and his *History of the Apostolic Church*, all published in his Mercersburg days, attracted attention in America and Europe. The *History of the Christian Church* has been used in the class room, and for collateral reading, in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church since the several volumes have appeared. The six volumes are found on the shelves of the libraries of nearly all

the Reformed ministers. Most of these men will doubtless complete the set by adding the two parts of Volume V.

It is with special interest and gratification that we welcome this book by the son. We assure him that the institutions, in which his father rendered such brilliant service, rejoice with him in the completion of so admirable a work.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

A HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION. By Thomas M. Lindsay, D.D., LL.D. Vol. II., *The Reformation in Switzerland, France, The Netherlands, Scotland and England, the Anabaptist and Socinian Movements, The Counter-Reformation.* With Map on the Reformation and Counter-Reformation (1520-1580). Pages xvii + 631. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. Price \$2.50.

The first volume of this work, on the Reformation in Germany, has been favorably noticed in an earlier number of the *REVIEW*. The scope of the second volume, as the title indicates, is the history of the Reformed Churches in the lands beyond Germany, of the Anabaptist and Socinian movements, and of the Counter-reformation in the sixteenth century. The two volumes are a complete history of the Reformation. In this respect the work meets a long-felt want among English readers. The general church histories, as a rule, are too brief and fragmentary. The sixth and seventh volumes of Schaff's *History of the Christian Church* are limited to the reformation in Germany and Switzerland. The eighth volume which he had planned he was unable to finish. Numerous monographs have presented detailed accounts of the origin of protestant churches in different lands, of the rise of the Anabaptists, or of the causes and purposes of the Catholic reaction, but we have not yet found so thorough a treatment of the whole subject within the limits allowed the author. The grouping of the material, in books and chapters, according to nationalities and genetic development, is in itself illuminating and helpful, especially to the young student. The book is well adapted for use in the class room or for collateral reading alongside of lectures on the subject. The terse and fluent style, which seems to be a peculiar heritage of the Scotchman, helps to make the reading easy and fascinating.

In the Introduction the unity and the diversity of protestantism are recognized. The reformation outside of Germany resembled the German movement in its intellectual, spiritual and economic tendencies. Still it took a distinctive form in each country. While the territories beyond Germany followed mainly the Reformed type of doctrine, the Reformed churches differed from one another on account of certain national characteristics. "It is the one story with differences due to the accident of national temperaments, memories, and political institutions." He differ-

entiates Lutheranism from the Reformed group of churches in points of doctrine, polity, and the humanistic spirit. The last factor he finds to have been a strong influence on Zwingli and Calvin, and in Switzerland, France, and England generally. Luther and his followers owed much less to Humanism.

A high tribute, doubtless warranted by the facts of history, is paid to Luther in a section on "What the Reformed Churches owed to Luther." "If it can not be said that the beginnings of the Reformation in every land came from Luther, it can scarcely be denied that he gave to his contemporaries the inspiration of courage and of assured conviction. He delivered men from the fear of priest-craft; he taught men, in a way that no other did, that redemption was not a secret science practised by the priests within an institution called the Church; that all believers had the privilege of direct access to the very presence of God; and that the very thought of a priesthood who alone could mediate between God and man was both superfluous and irreconcilable with the truest instinct of the Christian religion. His teaching had a sounding board of dramatic environment which compelled men to listen, to attend, to be impressed, to understand, and to follow."

The author has evidently made a "careful study of contemporary sources of information" and has verified facts by reliable evidence. Many subjects, which have been worn threadbare by historians, are presented in a new light and with fresh coloring. This is apparent, for example, in the treatment of the Marburg Colloquy and the sacramental question. He is not inclined to pay a high tribute to Zwingli. The defects in his character are emphasized to such an extent that the picture of the Zürich reformer lacks perspective and shading. The American biographers, Jackson and Simpson, give him a more prominent place among the sixteenth century leaders.

His chapter on Anabaptism is an advance on the traditional representations of protestant historians. Kurtz designates the anabaptists as deformers and has little regard for their principles. In fact all the writers of the churches by law established have been under the influence of prejudice which has come down from the reformation. The whole subject has been re-studied and written up in a new way. Dr. Lindsay says: "The old monotonous mode of describing Anabaptism has almost entirely disappeared with the modern careful examination of sources. It is no longer possible to sum up the movement in four stages, beginning with the Zwickau prophets and ending with the catastrophe in Münster, or to explain its origin by calling it the radical side of the Reformation movement. It is acknowledged by students to have been a very complicated affair, to have had roots buried

in the previous centuries, and to have had men among its leaders who were distinguished humanists. It is now known that it spread over Europe with great rapidity, and attracted to itself an enormously larger number of adherents than had been imagined." The Anabaptists doubtless had many strange and radical vagaries. Among them were all kinds of enthusiasts and dreamers, still some of their principles have become the common possession of modern protestantism. Then, too, one must distinguish the different types of Anabaptism, the conservative from the radical. The chapter on this subject is especially instructive.

In the sixth and last book 127 pages are given to the much-neglected study of The Counter-Reformation. The necessity of a reform was acknowledged by many Catholics. There was a liberal school in Spain and in Italy. But the conception of a reformation which these men held differed from that of the Germans and the Swiss. The counter-reform was an effort to recover lost territory for the Roman church and to prevent further defection. The measures taken to gain these ends were the organization of the Society of Jesus, the Council of Trent, and the revival of the Inquisition and the institution of the Index. These movements are discussed in the last three chapters.

One looks in vain for a chapter on the Reformed Church in Germany. All the reference made to this subject is found in the introduction in less than a page of material. When the works of Heppé, Seisen, Göbel, Ebrard, Schweizer, Müller, etc., on the German Reformed church are considered and when we remember that the most widely accepted Reformed catechism was prepared in the Palatinate, we believe a more extended treatment is warranted. The subject is all the more interesting since the German Reformed church spread over territory which in many instances would naturally have been Lutheran. This we may call a defect of omission, rather than of commission, in the book.

The work as a whole is so decidedly satisfactory that comparatively little can be said against it and much for it. It will be heartily welcomed by students in theological seminaries, by pastors, and readers of history generally. It is one of the notable historical productions of the year.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

THE DIVINITY OF OUR LORD. By the Rev. John I. Swander, D.D., Ph.D., F.S.Sc., author of "The Substantial Philosophy," "Text Book on Sound," "The Invisible World," "The Reformed Church," "The Swander Family," "Old Truths in New Form," "The Evolution of Religion." Pages vi + 263. Cleveland, Ohio, Central Publishing House. Price \$1.25.

This volume contains the third series of lectures delivered by the author before the faculty and students of the Theological Sem-

inary of the Reformed Church in the United States, at Lancaster, Pa., on the Foundation of the Swander Lectureship. The purpose of the author in the choice of his subject was not only didactic but also apologetic. This may be inferred from a statement in the preface, in which he says: "For a number of years the author has shared with many other anxious watchmen upon the walls of Zion in the fear that there is a growing humanitarian sentiment respecting what was once supposed to have been settled and placed beyond all catholic controversy as to the supernatural divinity or absolute deity of Immanuel." Still he contends "not so much for the old *forms* as for the old faith which animated these forms and started them down the current of the ages as the watchwords of Christological orthodoxy."

The subject is treated historically. For thus the author seeks to show that "the Christ of history has by his Spirit and word manifested and testified to his own Messianic character through the creeds and dogmas of the Church, and that no creed or dogma can be properly interpreted except as viewed in the light of its historic setting." In pursuance of this plan we have an introductory chapter on the preparation for Christianity in the Gentile and the Jewish worlds. The early conceptions of Christ as held by the apostles and fathers are rapidly sketched and described as the "Ground and Pillar of the Dogma." The heresies of the first three centuries are defined and classified. The two leading types are Ebionism and Gnosticism. In six chapters the specific christological contributions of the several ecumenical councils are presented in an interesting way. The chapters on the christology of the reformation and the modern period will naturally attract the reader's attention. By numerous citations from the protestant confessions the different shades of view are clearly represented. The author declares his opposition to all forms of Socinianism and Unitarianism with a trumpet of no uncertain sound. "Arianism," he says, "was the most fundamental of all the false conceptions of the truth that had ever threatened to extirpate the cause of Christianity from the earth. . . . It took on its new incarnation in the Socinianism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian era." He makes a statement in reference to its introduction into America that some of the pilgrims and their descendants might dissent from, viz.: "Although Socinianism was anathematized in the hour of its birth, and not allowed to gain a broad and permanent foothold upon the European continent, its fundamental principle continued to crop out in various religious sects until in a more dormant state it crossed the Atlantic Ocean in the Mayflower, and unconsciously substituted Plymouth Rock for the Rock of Ages."

He believes the science has rendered and still is rendering an invaluable service to religion. He quotes Professor Huxley to show that "the mysteries of the church are child's play compared to the mysteries of nature. The doctrine of the Trinity is not more puzzling than the necessary antinomies of physical speculation. Virgin procreation and resuscitation from apparent death are ordinary phenomena for the naturalist." Religion is not so much jeopardized by the scientist as by "the shallow theologian." He makes a strong plea for the Virgin birth and insists that its denial must lead to a denial of the incarnation and the deity of Christ.

The lectures are interspersed with appropriate poetic selections composed by the Doctor himself. Many striking personal touches and humorous allusions relieve a naturally prosy argument. Those who have read the previous works of the author know that he is always original and fresh, and has an inimitable style of composition. He has evidently read extensively on this subject, and selected and prepared a vast amount of material with great care.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOKS TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. Edited by Orello Cone, D.D., Vol. IV. *The Johannine Literature and The Acts of the Apostles*, by Henry Prentiss Forbes, A.M., D.D. Pages vi + 375. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907. Price \$2.00 net.

This is the last of four volumes belonging to the series of International Handbooks to the New Testament. The titles and authors of the other three are: *The Synoptic Gospels*, etc., by George L. Cary; *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Thessalonians*, etc., by James Drummond, M.A., LL.D.; *Hebrews, Colossians, Ephesians*, etc., by Orello Cone, D.D. The scope of each volume is determined by the purpose of the series in general. The best use is made of the limited space. The text of the Scriptures is not printed. The verses which are expounded are designated by numbers. The elaborate processes of exegesis are notable for their absence. There is not a Greek, Hebrew or Latin word on the pages of the book. The results of comprehensive scholarship, however, are in evidence at every turn. The author has mastered a vast amount of material, ancient and modern, and in the briefest form possible presents it in an introduction to each book and in notes on the principal passages of each chapter. In the general preface the editor says: "More prominence has been given to the statement of the results of the critical processes than to the presentation of the details of these processes by means of extended discussions of questions of Greek grammar, philology and exegesis."

The viewpoint of the commentator is another determining factor in a work of this kind. The author's position is clearly

stated by the general editor in the preface: "The books of the New Testament are treated as a literature which in order to be understood must be explained, like all other ancient literature, in accordance with the accepted principles of the grammatical and historical interpretation." The introductions to the Acts and to the Johannine writings take up the question of authorship, purpose, and date. The various theories are concisely stated and weighed, and the conclusions of the author are presented. He has evidently read widely and thought deeply on these questions, and his views bear the mark of originality. He holds that there are written sources behind the Acts and that Luke was the author of the chief source—the "we-sections." The book as we now have it, was prepared by a redactor, and tradition has ascribed it to Luke because he wrote the principal source. The time of composition is put "far toward the end of the first century or may well be regarded as one of the earliest products of the second."

The difficult question of the author's purpose he treats with a saneness and balance that are gratifying. He recognizes the arguments pro and con of the Tübingen school which claims that the peculiarities of the book can be accounted for by the theory that the writer attempted to conciliate hostile Jewish Christian and Pauline factions. The hypothesis of conciliation is not considered satisfactory. For "much that was thought to be proof of tendency or purpose turns out to be more or less incidental feature." Far more satisfying is the theory, which the author holds, that the purpose of the writer of Acts was to give an account of "the history of the power of God in the apostles." One must not forget, however, that history in the ancient, Oriental, religious sense is altogether different from the modern, Occidental, critical sense. Two characteristics in the Acts stand out prominently: its fervent religiosity and its interest in persons. "It is at once a sermon and a series of biographies."

The purpose of the Gospel of John is to show that Jesus is the Son of God. That He was the Christ or Messiah, his readers did not doubt. But they were not clear as to His divine sonship. The author had the Synoptics before him and he felt the need of writing a fourth gospel to supplement the Christology of the first three. His task was, therefore, primarily doctrinal, Christological—"a Christological supplement." The time of composition is the period between A. D. 100 and A. D. 140. "Possible, indeed, but improbable in the extreme is authorship by John of Zebedee." Dr. Forbes inclines to the theory that "some time during the last third of the first century a disciple in the second sense indicated (the broader sense), John by name, perhaps a priest (Acts VI. 7), resident at Jerusalem, familiar

with Jewish learning and with the earlier and later forms of Christian tradition as they developed at Jerusalem, went to Asia Minor, came into high esteem, lived on into the opening years of the second century, died of old age." Such an one wrote, or was the redactor of, the book of Revelation and the Gospel of John. This theory explains many of the traditions and of the characteristics of the contents of the Johannine writings.

We cannot enter upon a discussion of the commentary in detail. The expositions are pointed, suggestive, and illuminating. When a subject of special importance comes up in the narrative a paragraph in fine print covering a half page or more is given to it. The fund of historical and doctrinal material that is condensed in these discussions is surprising. Rarely does one read a commentary with so much interest, or find so much that is pertinent and illuminating on a single page. It is what it is called, a handbook. The advanced student will thoroughly appreciate it. The busy pastor, the Sunday-school superintendent and teacher, and the layman generally will find this volume to meet a long-felt want.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

THE ANCESTRY OF OUR ENGLISH BIBLE. An Account of the Bible Versions, Texts and Manuscripts. By Ira Maurice Price, Ph.D., Professor of the Semitic Languages and Literature in the University of Chicago. Pages xxiv + 330. Philadelphia, Pa., The Sunday-school Times Company, 1031 Walnut St. Price \$1.50 net.

The form of this book is attractive. The work of the printer and the binder is all that can be desired. No less than forty-four illustrations add interest to and throw light on the narrative. Among the illustrations are specimen pages of ancient Hebrew and Greek manuscripts, portraits of biblical scholars and translators to whom the English versions owe so much, and facsimiles of several English translations from the fourteenth century to the present time. For the convenience of the reader and student a comprehensive bibliography, a chronological table, and a topical and a scriptural index are appended. The material has been arranged with great care and was doubtless prepared for use in the class-room and the study. We consider it admirably adapted for this purpose as well as for general reading.

The author describes his purpose in the preface. He aims "to present in as concise and popular form as possible a description of the principal versions and texts of the Bible, from the earliest known translations and manuscripts down through the middle ages, even to modern times." In a scholarly and yet simple way this task is accomplished. The English translation of the Bible is based on material drawn from four sources. They are (1) the reconstructed original texts found in our best printed

editions of the Hebrew Old Testament and the Greek New Testament; (2) the manuscripts of these Testaments as either collated and published, or as preserved in various great libraries of the world; (3) the most important ancient versions, whose translations were made more than a thousand years before the invention of printing; (4) paraphrases and quotations from ancient authors which may be valuable in the determination of some points in the text.

Following this division of sources the author takes up in the ten chapters of Part I the Old Testament text as found in the manuscripts, in printed form, in Greek, Latin and Syriac translations, and in Jewish paraphrases. One chapter is given to the Eastern versions of lesser importance—the Coptic, the Ethiopic, the Gothic, the Georgian, the Slavonic, the Armenian, the Arabic. "These versions were prepared for peoples whose homes were on the outer borders of the nations where Christianity first made large conquests. The influence of such versions on the English Bible may be slight, but they are nevertheless worth our consideration."

In Part II., six chapters, the same plan of treatment is followed in reference to the New Testament. The principal Greek manuscripts and texts are described, the Latin, Syriac and other versions are discussed, and the principles of textual and higher criticism are defined. Thus the process, by which the most reliable Greek text was obtained, is explained.

In Part III., seven chapters, the history of the English versions is traced. The English Bible is a product of the English nation. The stages in its development correspond to the great eras in English history. The earliest forms of literature were paraphrases of portions of the Scriptures. Caedmon sang the story of creation. Wycliffe's version became the basis of future translations. His work still appeared in manuscript. Probably the most abiding work was done by Tyndale. A number of translations followed Tyndale's until the Authorized Version of 1611 became the standard of the realm. The history of the Revised and the American Revised versions concludes the book.

One must admire the scholarship of the author, which is apparent on every page. The treatment is exhaustive and still concise. Of the many volumes written on this subject this will take rank among the foremost. We recommend it to students, preachers, Sunday-school teachers, and laymen generally.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

JESUS CHRIST OUR LORD. An English Bibliography of Christology Comprising Over Five Thousand Titles Annotated and Classified. By Samuel Gardiner Ayres, B.D., Librarian of Drew Theological Seminary. Pages 502. New York, A. C. Armstrong & Son. Price \$3.90 net.

The purpose of this volume is to furnish the student an exhaustive and convenient list of all the English works on Christ and Christology. Over 5,000 titles are arranged under the topics in the scheme followed by the compiler. "As far as is known this the most complete collection of classified titles on the subject." In the outline of classification there are twenty-three headings. Among them are the following: The Pre-existence of Christ, Christ in the Old Testament, Christ Incarnate, Christ's Life on Earth, The Life of Christ in Detail, The Mystical Union of Christ and Believers, etc. There is not a subject relating to Christ on which one could not here find the English books and authors. Two indexes—subject and author—will aid the reader in turning to the sources in the easiest and quickest way.

In the nature of the case this is a book of reference and commends itself to systematic students of theology or the Bible. It ought to be found in public libraries, in libraries of colleges and seminaries; and the preacher, who seeks references on any phase of Christ's life and work, will find this list unexcelled.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

THE INVISIBLE THINGS AND OTHER SERMONS. By J. Sparhawk Jones, Minister of Calvary Church, Philadelphia, Pa. Pages 232. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Price \$1.25 net.

This volume contains a series of fifteen sermons. The title is taken from the subject of the first sermon. The choice of subjects commends itself to the thoughtful reader. Among them are: Posthumous Influence, The Blessing of the Pure in Heart, A New Year Sermon, The Need of Faith, Worship God, The Uses and Ends of Life, The Cost of Progress, etc. The treatment is fresh and original. The method is the topical and the expository. In the introduction the context and the historical circumstances of the text are, as a rule, clearly defined. In a striking way the author then deduces principles of life and applies them to the present age. In this regard the sermons may be considered models and rank among the foremost of those published during the last decade. Dr. Jones preaches a reasonable though not a rationalistic Christianity. He does not aim so far above men that he fails to touch them; nor does he descend to their level so that he fails to lift them up. His message humbles and exalts. It exposes human sin and misery, and reveals human possibility and dignity. He is in sympathy with man as he is to-day, knows

his strength and weakness, but he never modifies the gospel so as to make it acceptable to the hearer. His sympathy and his rigor doubtless commend the respect of the audience.

His rhetoric and logic are beyond criticism and a rare combination. He combines beauty of diction, depth of thought, simplicity, directness and unction. Each sermon is a distinct entity, contains a central truth, and leaves a definite impression. Some one has said that he is the lawyers' preacher in Philadelphia. More lawyers attend his church than any other in the city. One can see the reason for this fact both in the style and the contents of the sermons. Not unfrequently printed sermons lose their vigor. These discourses, however, read well and may be classed as literature.

The author has given his life to preaching and pastoral work. He has not divided his attention between his parish, the platform, the press and the mass-meeting. He took time for study and meditation. The results of his wide reading, deep thinking, keen observations, and careful sermonic preparation are evident in this book. It is the first he has consented to publish. We trust he will permit more of his discourses to appear in print. Their type is so virile and healthy that it will appeal to the strong men and women of this country.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

LUTHER'S CHURCH POSTIL, GOSPELS, PENTECOST OR MISSIONARY SERMONS. Translated now for the first time into English. With Introduction, Walch's Analyses and Bugenhagen's "Summaries." By Professor John Nicholas Lenker, D.D. Vol. III. Pages 454. Minneapolis, Minn., U. S. A., Lutherans in All Lands Co., 1907. Price \$1.05.

This volume completes the translation into the English language of Luther's sermons on the gospel lessons for the Sundays and Festivals of the church year. There are 113 sermons in all, published in five volumes; 26 are found in the volume before us. Hitherto nearly all of Luther's writings in English appeared in abridged form and for this reason they are not satisfactory. It is the plan of the present work to translate not only the sermons but all the works of the great reformer without abridgment. The editor, Dr. Lenker, deserves the cordial support, not only of the Lutheran Church, but of the Christian Church generally, that he may bring his gigantic task to a successful conclusion. Luther belongs to no denomination or sect exclusively. He belongs to the modern age, and the Protestant Church everywhere is indebted to him. Probably none of his writings will be more popular and helpful than his sermons in which his cardinal doctrines are practically applied and the principles of the reformation interpreted in the language of the common man. He himself says that he prepared the sermons on the Epistles and

Gospels, "as a mother chews the food before giving it to her infant." For edification, for historical data, and for light on theological questions this volume is almost equally valuable. We heartily agree, also, with the editor's suggestion in the foreword that these expositions are a valuable contribution to the homiletical literature of the church year, which is so meager in English. In the five volumes there is a sermon for every Sunday and festival of the year.

This particular volume covers the period from the second Sunday after Easter to Trinity Sunday, 26 sermons. The general theme is Pentecost including Christ's words after the resurrection, his promise to send the Holy Spirit, the Missionary Commission to His disciples, the ascension, and the coming of the Holy Spirit. Preceding the sermons, pp. 9-15, are Luther's "Brief Instruction on What We Should Seek and Expect in the Gospel" and his "Preface to the New Edition of his Church Postil, edited by Dr. Casper Creuziger in 1543." Both these sketches contain valuable material especially in reference to his conception of the nature of the gospel. On this point he says: "A custom still more to be deprecated is our conception of both gospels and epistles as law books to be literally obeyed, and the works of Christ as mere examples for us to imitate. Wherever these two false conceptions lurk in the heart, neither the gospels nor the epistles will be read with profit, as Christians should read them, and we must remain heathen as we were before." A little further on he continues, "The chief part and the foundation of the gospel is that before you take Christ for your example, you first receive and confess him as a gift and present that is given to you by God and is your own." "Now when you have Christ by possession, the foundation and center of your salvation, then you are to take him as your example." It would be hard to find passages in present-day literature which so clearly define evangelical Christianity as these. Nor was there ever a time when such definition was more necessary than now. The error of seeking salvation by precept and example and of making Jesus merely a teacher and a moral hero is widespread in protestantism as well as in Romanism. If Christianity is to remain a religion of redemption and salvation with glad tidings for men, instead of becoming a scheme of moral reform and a new code of laws published by the Nazarene, you must, in the language of Luther, "before you take Christ for your example, first receive and confess Him as a gift and present that is given to you by God."

It is not possible to quote even some of the many striking passages which are imbedded like gems in the Sermons. While in many respects the discourses belong to the age in which they were delivered, and to the general reader will not be as interesting as

they were to the original hearer, they contain none the less an abundance of material that will never grow old and will edify the laity as well as instruct the preacher.

Numerous inaccuracies in the text are due to defective proof reading and printing. These will doubtless be corrected in a second edition.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

THE WAY TO HAPPINESS. By Thomas R. Slicer. Pages 171. New York, The Macmillan Company. Price \$1.25 net.

The author takes the ground that it is not only man's privilege, but his duty, to be happy. All the unimpeded, undiverted and unsophisticated functions of nature are functions of delight. The bird singing in its flight, the brooding of the mother bird, the honey-gathering bees, echo the declaration that "God saw all things He had made, and behold they were very good." All the instincts of human life are native to joy. The natural desires, from the lowest appetites to the highest intellectual aspirations, are all keyed to joy. Hunger is satisfied with a feeling of pleasure. Truth is discovered with keen delight. Duty is done with a sense of indefinable peace. Nature about us and the soul within us bear testimony to the fact that we are meant to be happy. Still we are not wholly so. This becomes the rational motive for the search of happiness. What man is to be, he can be.

The ways of life, which have been evolved and followed in the course of ages and are still pursued, are analyzed and discussed. They are: the Way of the Stoic or Happiness by Self-control, the Way of the Epicurean or Happiness by Pleasure, the Way of the Altruist or One's Self and the Other, the Way of Worship or Happiness by Inspiration, the Way to the Holy Place or Happiness at Home, the Way of Freedom or Happiness by Liberty, the Way to the Heights or Vision and the Dream, the End of the Way of Blessedness and Peace. In the discussion of these Ways the author rises from the lower to the higher. There are elements of truth in Stoicism and Epicureanism, but they lack some of the essential principles of life. These are found in the Christian ideal. While little is said directly about the gospel, the author evidently interprets life from the viewpoint of Christ whom he calls "the Master of the Art of living."

The book abounds in passages which the reader will ponder with profit. We are not too favorably disposed toward books which tell us how to be happy. Those who are happy do not need them and those who are miserable will not profit by them. Happiness is one of the subtle fruits of the Spirit that cannot be raised by rules. If one, however, is in search of literature of this kind, he will find this volume both helpful and delightful reading.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

A. CAPITO IM DIENSTE ERZBISCHOF ALBRECHTS VON MAINZ. Quellen und Forschungen zu den entscheidenden Jahren der Reformation (1510-1523). Von Dr. Paul Kalkoff, Prof. aus Gynn. zu St. Maria Magdalena in Breslau. Berlin, Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1907.

This pamphlet of 151 pages is the first publication of the New Studies Pertaining to the History of Theology and the Church, edited by Professor N. Bonwetsch, of Göttingen, and R. Seeberg, of Berlin. This beginning augurs well. It deals in nine chapters with the influence and activity of Capito, the sagacious and farseeing statesman, humanist and preacher during the early years of the Reformation. The author shows from studies of the original sources, the chief of which are appended to the book, that the evangelizing tendencies which made themselves strongly felt in those days at the court of Archbishop Albrecht of Mainz, a prince of the house of Hohenzollern, must be exclusively ascribed to the efforts of the prince's wise councillor. As early as 1518 Capito wrote a preface to Karlstadt's theses against Eck and in 1519 announced his sympathy with the Wittenberg school in certain dissertations on the writings of Chrysostom, which he dedicated to the archbishop. In 1520 he was appointed preacher at the cathedral of Mainz and the archbishop's spiritual adviser. The papal nuntio Aleander, a very shrewd man, feared the influence of Capito and became an important factor in the transactions between Mainz and Rome. The archbishop's ardent desire was to become the Roman Legatus a latere for the whole of Germany, but the papacy refused to accede to his wishes. The former was therefore all the more inclined to listen to the suggestions of the humanists such as Erasmus, Wimpfeling and Capito, who succeeded in suppressing almost every violent measure against Luther dictated by Rome. Capito was shrewd enough to offer his resistance in the form of an advice of caution on the part of the Romanists and against rashness on the part of Luther. He prevented in this way the execution of the papal bull of condemnation at the diet of Worms and succeeded in having the archbishop appointed inquisitor general of heretical Germany, placing into his hands the whole fate of the new protestantism, admonishing at the same time Luther not to act rashly. He prevented the sale of indulgences within the Mainz diocese and dealt mildly with the preachers who had violated their priestly vows and preached the new evangelism. He even succeeded in persuading the archbishops to ask Luther's pardon for allowing the sale of indulgences within the Halle diocese. Of course Capito's methods were purely diplomatic and had nothing in common with the impulsive enthusiasm of the reformers, but just on that account they aided the cause of the Reformation immensely. As a friend of Erasmus he constantly urged him to uphold the side of the reformers and finally he himself went over

into the camp of protestantism by resigning his position as Albrecht's councillor.

This pamphlet is a splendid example of the methods of modern historical research and should find a large circle of readers among those who are especially interested in the multiplex problem of the great protestant Reformation.

R. C. SCHIEDT.